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This thesis is an attempt to theorise and operationalise empirically the notion of
‘civil society leadership’ in Sub-Saharan Africa. ‘AIDS leadership,’ which is associ-
ated with the intergovernmental institutions charged with coordinating the global
response to HIV/AIDS, is both under-theorised and highly context-specific. In
this study I therefore opt for an inclusive framework that draws on a range of ap-
proaches, including the literature on ‘leadership’, institutions, social movements
and the ‘network’ perspective on civil society mobilisation.
This framework is employed in rich and detailed empirical descriptions (‘thick
description’) of civil society mobilisation around AIDS, including contentious
AIDS activism, in the key case studies of South Africa and Uganda. South Africa
and Uganda are widely considered key examples of poor and good leadership
(from national political leaders) respectively, while the Treatment Action Cam-
paign (TAC) and The AIDS Support Organisation (TASO) are both seen as highly
effective civil society movements. These descriptions emphasise ‘transnational net-
works of influence’ in which civil society leaders participated (and at times actively
constructed) in order to mobilise both symbolic and material resources aimed at
exerting influence at the transnational, national and local levels. They endeav-
oured to influence both AIDS policy and the course of the epidemic directly. I
conclude that these networks played a key role in the effectiveness of both TAC
and TASO.
These qualitative cas studies are complemented by econometric analyses. At
the continental level, I attempt to measure the impact of civil society mobilisa-
tion on the performance of national governments through a cross-country regres-
sion analysis applied to 42 Sub-Saharan African states. This analysis fails to show
a strong relationship between the presence of AIDS NGOs and HAART and
PMTCT coverage (controlling for a range of factors)—potentially supporting my
hypothesis that civil society mobilisation is only effective in certain circumstances.
At the local level, a second set of regression models using household survey data
investigates whether TAC’s mobilisation in Cape Town impacted appreciably on
HIV prevention efforts. They show a significant relationship between contact with
TAC and not endorsing false conspiracy beliefs about AIDS as well as condom use,
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The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the disease it causes (AIDS) rep-
resent a major challenge facing humanity. Nearly thirty years since the first AIDS
cases were identified, about 30 million people have died of the disease (UNAIDS,
2011c:3) and 34 million people were thought to be living with HIV in 2010 (UN-
AIDS, 2011b:6). While new infections have been declining, 2.7 million new infec-
tions and 1.8 million deaths occurred in 2010, 1.2 million of those in Sub-Saharan
Africa (ibid.:7,10). Progress has been made, especially in providing treatment, but
the challenge remains.
The story of society’s response to this unprecedented epidemic is still emerging
and is only beginning to be analysed. It is a tale of denial, tardy responses and in-
stitutional failures, but also one of triumphs in research, drug development, global
activism, international cooperation and occasionally in political leadership.
It is a tale, also, of innovation in global institutions and global health gov-
ernance, in which theWorld Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations
(UN) were shaken out of bureaucratic intransigence and ossified ‘business as usual’
approaches to global health challenges. This shakeup was the work of uncon-
ventional public health figures like Jonathan Mann (the first head of the WHO’s
Global Programme on AIDS) and Peter Piot (the first executive director of the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS or UNAIDS), but above all of
a global AIDS activist movement, perhaps the most impressive example of health












Figure 1.1: Individual leadership: Zackie Achmat of the Treatment
Action Campaign takes on the pharmaceutical giants
Source: www.zapiro.com. ©2000-2012 Zapiro. Printed with permission from Zapiro.com.
been spectacular successes as well as dismal failures), these have resulted, at least
in part, from leadership. Visionary leadership has occurred at the national political
level (such as by leaders in Uganda, Brazil and Thailand), at the global intergov-
ernmental level (such as by Mann and Piot) but also within the private sector and
civil society—both within countries and globally. The most visible success in the
response to AIDS has been the provision of antiretroviral treatment to millions of
poor people—more than five million people in low and middle-income countries
(UNAIDS, 2010:7). Given the huge obstacles (massive costs, logistical challenges,
expensive patented drugs, etc.), this could never have been achieved had it not been
for the emergence of a global coalition that mobilised support for treatment access
as a fundamental right and a moral imperative. This coalition—which I refer to as
the ‘global AIDS treatment movement’—was constructed through vigorous global
treatment activism from social movements and civil society organisations (CSOs)
across the globe, ‘medical activism’ from a global community of politically and
ethically committed researchers and clinicians, and ‘bureaucratic activism’ from












In this thesis I will attempt to tell the story of how AIDS, a disease whose viral
cause is transmitted largely through sex (and in certain regions mainly through
needles used for injecting drugs) was transformed from a stigmatised disease few
politicians would mention to a global public health priority. I will do this by focus-
ing on the efforts of civil society leaders (and their interactions with national and
international leaders and bureaucrats) in two highly significant cases: Uganda, the
‘poster boy’ for effective political leadership (as one of the first African countries to
show declines in new infections) and South Africa, whose response was rightly seen
as informed by criminal denial and inaction, but where a policy reversal under act-
ivist pressure saw the establishment of the world’s largest antiretroviral treatment
programme.
1.1 Leadership for a global AIDS response
1.1.1 From stigmatised ‘gay disease’ to global public
health priority
The global AIDS activist movement deserves substantial credit for the unpreced-
ented international public health response since the 1990s. In the 1980s, activism
was concentrated in North America and Europe (especially the United States),
where the epidemic first came to light as it wreaked havoc among gay men. Act-
ivism—led by a generation politicised in the 1960s and 70s Stonewall-era—was
aimed at the neglect and denial of political leaders and at securing investment in
research and gaining access to experimental drugs (see Epstein, 1996). But after the
spectacular success of triple-therapy—known as highly active antiretroviral ther-
apy (HAART)—essentially transformed AIDS into a manageable chronic disease
in industrialised countries, the focus of activism shifted to expanding the avail-
ability of antiretroviral drugs in developing countries where the majority of HIV
infections occurred (Smith and Siplon, 2006).
Expanding treatment access to the millions of patients in middle and low-
income countries (especially Southern Africa) would require, however, both a sub-
stantial reduction in the prices of antiretroviral drugs—in 1997 a year’s treatment












Figure 1.2: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan opens discussions on a
new partnership on AIDS in Africa in 1999 with UNAIDS Executive
Director Peter Piot looking on
Source: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe. ©United Nations 1999.
http://www.unmultimedia.org/s/photo/detail/158/0158044.html
ant resource transfers from industrialised countries. On both counts the global
AIDS treatment movement has been spectacularly successful: by 2010 poor coun-
tries could purchase first-line drugs1 at US$143 per patient per year (Médecins
Sans Frontières, 2011:4)2 and, as shown in figure 1.3, international AIDS assist-
ance disbursements rose from US$1.2 billion in 2002 to US$7.7 billion in 2008
(Kates et al., 2012:5). International assistance for AIDS has remained around that
1‘First-line’ refers to the cocktail of three drugs that patients are typically prescribed when initiat-
ing antiretroviral therapy. When the virus becomes resistant to one or more of these drugs (usually
after some years), the patient is switched to a ‘second line’ regimen and eventually to ‘third-line’ or
‘salvage’ regimens, if available. Public HAART programmes in developing countries generally do
not offer treatment options beyond second-line regimens.
2The US$143 per patient per year (ppy) is the lowest price from a generic manufacturer for a
tenofovir-lamivudine-efavirenz co-pack. The same regimen in a one-pill-per-day fixed-dose com-
bination is US$173 ppy and from the originator company is offered at US$613 ppy to low-income
countries (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2011:4). Tenofovir-based regimens are better tolerated than
the stavudine-based regimens initially rolled out in most countries and the WHO has recommen-
ded shifting from the latter to the former since 2006. A stavudine-based fixed-dose combination













level, with a brief reduction in 2010—probably largely owing to the global financial
crisis—but have stopped rising.
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Source: The Kaiser Family Foundation (Kates et al., 2012:5).
Two critical factors in the rapid increases in international assistance for AIDS
programmes was the creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria (GFATM or the Global Fund) in 2002 as a dedicated multilateral
vehicle for channelling funding from donor governments (and some private donors)
to HIV prevention and AIDS treatment efforts in developing countries and the
United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which was
established in 2003. The majority of the assistance is channelled through the
Global Fund and PEPFAR, as the largestmultilateral and bilateral funding vehicles
respectively. Visionary individual leadership and coalition-building played an im-
portant role in the creation of both, with the Global Fund primarily an initiative
of then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and PEPFAR of then-US President
George W. Bush. In both cases coalitions had to be constructed to support the












PEPFAR requiring congressional earmarking of its budget.
The Bush Administration managed to secure US$15 billion allocated over the
first five years of the programme (with additional allocations since), in a process
that was notable for the unusual allegiance of AIDS activists, development/debt
relief activists (such as the Irish rock star Bono) and and evangelical Christians (an
important support base for then-President Bush). Themobilisation of support from
the American ‘religious right’ was indeed surprising, with even the controversial
senator Jesse Helms (who had consistently opposed funding for AIDS in the past)
supporting the bill.3 However, the support of this constituency came at a price:
much of the money was to be channelled to religious groups, and while most of the
funds would be spent on AIDS treatment, $1 billion was earmarked for HIV pre-
vention programmes that promoted sexual abstinence. Other religiously-inspired
conditions imposed by PEPFAR on recipients included requirements not to tar-
get commercial sex workers or to provide reproductive health services that may
include termination of pregnancy. (These conditions have substantially changed
under the Obama administration.) Nevertheless, PEPFAR has become the largest
source of funding for AIDS efforts in developing countries (and is extremely influ-
ential in the ‘focus countries’ where most of its funding is allocated. The Kaiser
Family Foundation reports that 77% of all international AIDS assistance is now
bilateral rather than multilateral (Kates et al., 2012:3), with PEPFAR dominating
bilateral financing—the United States was responsible for 59.2% of all donor gov-
ernment disbursements for AIDS in 2011 (Kates et al., 2012:6). Both PEPFAR
and the Global Fund have received substantial criticism, but it is undeniable that
much of the progress in the global AIDS struggle has been funded through these
two vehicles.
The rapid progress in treatment provision resulted from a broad coalition that
emerged in the late 1990s around the idea that treatment access represented a
moral imperative. It united the unlikeliest of partners: a global activist network
comprising newmovements across the developing world (among the most promin-
ent being the Treatment Action Campaign), veteran activists in the United States,
3Senator Helms had even said in 1995 that AIDS funding should be reduced because homo-













international bureaucrats and even conservative American politicians. Individual
leadership played a key role in the emergence of the global AIDS treatment move-
ment: activists and civil society leaders like TAC’s Zackie Achmat, TASO’s Noer-
ine Kaleeba and the New York-based Treatment Action Group’s Mark Harring-
ton and Gregg Gonsalves made moral appeals that resonated in the global media
and with certain political leaders. Jonathan Mann and Peter Piot brought vigour
to efforts at coordinating the international response and brought activists and rep-
resentatives of affected communities to the table at the highest levels, helping to
lend scientific and political legitimacy to the claims of activists. Kofi Annan and
George W. Bush managed to garner support for global AIDS funding, and later
former US President Bill Clinton used his foundation to negotiate access to gen-
eric antiretroviral medicines. Without individual leadership, the coalition could
not have been built.
In the next section I will briefly discuss the emergence of a global architec-
ture for addressing AIDS, including coordination at the intergovernmental level
through theWorld Health Organisation’s Global Programme on AIDS from 1986
and the new Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS established in 1996.
1.1.2 Towards an architecture for a globally coordinated
AIDS response
Early international efforts at responding to AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa were
driven mainly by infectious diseases researchers. During the early 1980s, many
believed the disease to be confined to homosexuals and the risks to the general pop-
ulation confined to the safety of the blood supply. TheWorld Health Organisation
under its director-general HalfdanMahler mainly saw concerns about HIV/AIDS
in Africa as a diversion from the WHO’s ‘Health for All’ programmes in develop-
ing countries (Lisk, 2010:13). However, through projects such as Projet SIDA in
the then-Zaïre, an international collaboration on which Jonathan Mann repres-
ented the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta and Peter Piot the Institute of
Tropical Medicine in Antwerp, the extent of AIDS in Africa was documented (see
Piot, 2012:133-147) and eventually it become clear that HIV was being transmit-












Figure 1.4: Jonathan Mann of the WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS
addresses the UN General Assembly in 1987
Source: UN Photo/Saw Lwin. ©United Nations 1987.
Fakry Assad of the WHO’s Division of Communicable Diseases was given overall
responsibility for the agency’s HIV/AIDS activities (Lisk, 2010:13). He organ-
ised an important first meeting on AIDS in Africa, held in Bangui, capital of the
Central African Republic in October 1985 (Piot, 2012:149). The Control Pro-
gram on AIDS was set up within the Division of Communicable Diseases in 1986
and Jonathan Mann recruited from his directorship of Projet SIDA to become its
director. The Control Programme on AIDS was renamed the Special Program
on AIDS in February 1987 and then the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) in
January 1988 (Knight, 2008:15).
The GPA grew rapidly under Mann’s leadership, who had won the confidence
of Director-GeneralMahler (Lisk, 2010:16), who himself became a strong advocate
for action on HIV/AIDS. Mann placed strong emphasis on human rights and
combating stigma and discrimination and insisted on the necessity of social justice
and human dignity for the promotion of public health (Ligon-Borden, 2003:318).
This is a legacy that survives as a central tenet of the approach espoused by UN












Figure 1.5: WHO Director-General Halfdan Mahler, under whom
Jonathan Mann directed the Global Programme on AIDS
Source: UN Photo/Pernaca Sudhakaran. ©United Nations 1987.
his tenure at the GPA is captured well in the following passage:
The new public health recognises that the positive impact of tradi-
tional public health work will be inherently limited and inadequate
without a commitment to changing societal conditions which con-
strain health and create vulnerability to preventable disease, disability
and premature death. This is the precise point where the human rights
framework becomes critical.
…
We suggest that a society in which human rights are promoted and
protected, and in which human dignity is respected is a healthy society;
that is, a society in which people can best achieve physical, mental and
social well-being. (Mann, 1995:230-231).4
The GPA was funded mainly through direct contributions from wealthy coun-
tries, and therefore bypassed the usual WHO budgetary process. It focused on












providing planning and technical assistance to countries, especially poorer coun-
tries with emerging epidemics, and in many ways Mann came to be seen as the
leader of the global AIDSmovement. TheGPA further worked directly with coun-
tries, sending consultants from Geneva to assist in planning interventions, thereby
bypassing (and raising the ire of) the WHO’s powerful regional directors (Piot,
2012:159), in addition to its high profile and extra-budgetary resources leading to
friction and jealousy (Lisk, 2010:20). As long as Mann could count on Mahler’s
support, he survived the infighting, but after the election of Hiroshi Nakajima (a
former regional director for the Western Pacific) as Director-General in 1988, his
position became increasingly difficult. Nakajima sought to scale down the GPA
and limit Mann’s authority, for example by placing the GPA under the supervi-
sion of a GeneralManagement Committee with representation of the UN agencies
that had sponsored the GPA’s creation—UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO
and the World Bank (Lisk, 2010:20-21). This ultimately resulted in Mann’s resig-
nation in March 1990 and his replacement by Michael Merson, the former head
of the WHO’s Control of Diarrhoea Programme. Piot (2012:181) describes the
news of Mann’s resignation as a “blast of icy air,” since “Jonathan was our moral
leader; for some he had acquired the status almost of a saviour.” AlthoughMann’s
leadership of the GPA was by no means flawless—the structural and institutional
weaknesses of the GPA arguably strengthened the hand of his critics and probably
contributed to its eventual demise—real progress had been made and a human
rights approach to the fight against AIDS had been established. After leaving the
WHO Mann returned to academia. He was appointed the first Francois-Xavier
Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights at Harvard University in 1993,
and remained a prominent voice in the fight against AIDS. He died tragically in
the 1998 crash of Swissair Flight 111.5
Perceptions of the GPA’s dysfunction, lack of inter-agency cooperation and
other factors led the GPA’s General Management Committee to commission an
external review, which got underway in 1991. The External Review Committee’s
eventual report (WHO, 1992) included a range of recommendations, including
new mechanisms to ensure coordination of the global response within and out-
side the UN system and that a working group be established to take forward its












proposals. A twelve-member task force was established with representation from
donor countries, low-income countries, UN agencies and civil society, which by
1993 had developed a proposal for a new “joint and co-sponsored” programme, a
proposal that was officially put forward by Canada at that year’s World Health
Assembly. This type of programme was strongly favoured by donor countries
(Knight, 2008:23), and despite a huge amount of wrangling (and strong opposi-
tion from within the WHO and certain other UN agencies), the structure of the
new programme and its governance by a Programme Coordinating Board (PCB)
was finally agreed and endorsed by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
in 1994. The ECOSOC resolution called for the establishment of a Committee
of Cosponsoring Organisations (CCO), which started meeting in 1994 and final-
ised practical plans for the establishment of the new programme during 1995. It
was to be called the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
and Peter Piot, who had been recruited to the GPA by Mike Merson in 1992,
was appointed in December 1994 to lead the transition process and to become the
first Executive Director when UNAIDS officially opened for business on 1 January
1996.6
What became clear almost immediately was that Piot wished to continue and
deepen the approach pioneered by Mann in certain key respects, including a hu-
man rights focus and involving civil society (including activists) in decision-making.
As can be seen in figure 1.6, he shared a platform on World AIDS Day in 1995,
before UNAIDS had even opened its doors, with New York activist and Housing-
works founder Eric Sawyer and the Ugandan founder of TASO, Noerine Kaleeba.
In fact, involving civil society leaders became a key feature of his term of office at
UNAIDS. Representatives of the worst-affected andmost marginalised communit-
ies (including sexual minorities and ‘grass-roots’ African groups) were brought to
the table at the highest levels of the global AIDS response. He fought numerous
internal battles in order to ensure adequate civil society representation and parti-
cipation in UNAIDS processes and structures, including the PCB. In an interview
he told me:
I had a completely different view on what [UNAIDS’s] programme
6For a more detailed review of the complex set of events leading to the creation of UNAIDS,












Figure 1.6: Peter Piot with civil society leaders Eric Sawyer and
Noerine Kaleeba on World AIDS Day in 1995
Source: UN Photo/Milton Grant. ©United Nations 1995.
should be than most people. …Fundamentally, it came down to the
fact that I felt that this new programme should be accountable to—to
use a big word—the people. The first sentence of the UN Charter
reads “We the people…” Whereas the UN colleagues felt that that
the programme should be accountable to the UN system. The first
big fight I had was on the question, “who is my boss.” The cospon-
soring agencies wanted it to be the CCO [Committee of Cosponsor-
ing Organisations], in other words the UN system. And I said this is
not possible, then we’re judge and jury. I want to be accountable to
the member states and to people representing the fight against AIDS,
people affected by AIDS. So that was a fundamental difference in
opinion. …I had to go to ECOSOC to win that fight, because the
CCO disagreed with me, led by Nakajima and UNICEF.
…












be on the board [the PCB]. It was not something that came from an
ideological or very theoretical, political scientific type of position. I
just could not imagine that a programme dealing with AIDS would
not involve those who are affected, that they would not be represented
in the governance. …That was my own background. And it was both
from a perspective of justice and of effectiveness—how can you be
effective in your decision-making if you’re not involving those who
are actually on the front lines? It’s as simple as that.7
Within and around UNAIDS, calls for leadership on AIDS became increasingly
frequent, including prominently from Piot himself. But what does ‘leadership’ ac-
tually mean? And can calling for leadership have any impact if we cannot define
exactly what it means? I turn to these questions in the next section.
1.1.3 The problem of ‘AIDS leadership’
Already while working at the GPA, Piot became convinced that leadership was a
critical factor in successfully responding to a complex global challenge like AIDS:
I started to become interested in decision-making at the highest level. I
could see how political AIDS is, because it’s not just amatter ofmaking
sure the labs function and the condoms are available and the drugs stay
cold: you need the political heavy lifting to have an impact. Budgets
must be voted, and political will and leadership are vital. (My emphasis.
Piot, 2012:207).
Reviewing references to ‘leadership’ in UNAIDS speeches and documents re-
veals that it has been used primarily in this sense of ‘political commitment’ from
political leaders: i.e. a willingness to face up to and address the issue of AIDS,
and to do the ‘political heavy lifting’ required for an effective policy response. For
example, an early collection of prevention ‘best practice’ case studies argued that
“Political action and leadership is clearly needed to set the direction for a national
response” and that “in many countries a lack of political will has delayed a co-
herent response dealing with the epidemic” (UNAIDS, 1998b:6). A case study of












Senegal’s response to the epidemic contrasted the willingness of Senegalese politi-
cians to address AIDS with the inaction of politicians in other countries (UNAIDS,
1999:11), while also praising religious and community leadership.
A call for leadership onAIDS is therefore in the first place simply a call for polit-
ical leaders to confront the challenge of AIDS, to place it on the national agenda
and speak about it (Piot was hugely frustrated in early days of UNAIDS when
most African countries exhibited a near-complete denial of the issue8). But the call
for leadership is not restricted to governmental leadership and commitment from
political leaders. It is also used in a second and wider sense—as something that is
required at all levels and in all domains of society. In a 2007 interview, Piot said:
Our point is that leadership is not only something for prime ministers
or for the top. It is on all levels. …Fostering informal leadership is one
of our main activities. I think it is one of the most important achieve-
ments of UNAIDS, to put AIDS on the agenda on various levels: in
business, in trade unions, in women’s organisations. (Vandenbruaene
and Piot, 2007:438).
More formally, he has argued with former UNAIDS staffer (and Senegalese
Health Minister from 2001 to 2003) Awa Marie Coll-Seck that government in-
terventions need to be complemented by a broader societal mobilisation against
AIDS (Piot and Coll-Seck, 2001). AIDS leadership in the view of UNAIDS un-
der Piot was therefore something that always included civil society leadership. This
includes AIDS activism such as the gay-led activism of the 1980s9 and TAC’s act-
ivism, as well as the less radical work of care, support and combating stigma by
organisations like TASO. In a speech in 2008, Piot explicitly linked leadership on
AIDS and state-civil society cooperation:
I arrived here yesterday from South Africa, where I saw very positive
signs of strong new leadership on AIDS. The National AIDS Council
has a clear agenda, and it is good to see government and civil society
really rallying together to achieve this. (Piot, 2008).
8Interview, P. Piot (20 December 2010).
9In the same interview quoted earlier, Piot argued that “leadership in theMSM [Men who have
Sex with Men] communities was the driver of the response to AIDS in the eighties” (Vandenbru-












‘Leadership’ with respect to AIDS is therefore used in both a narrower and in
a wider sense, while it is also used with modifiers like ‘political’ and ‘community’ in
various contexts. These distinctions are not always clear and the term is neither ex-
plicitly defined nor is a real theory of leadership advanced. Furthermore, the term
has definite normative content: the call for leadership is a call for a particular kind
of leadership, not the leadership of South Africa’s AIDS-denying president Thabo
Mbeki, but rather of Senegal’s Abdou Diouf.10 While the distinction between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ leadership may seem clear in this instance, leadership can also
be much more ambiguous, as the case study of Uganda in chapter 5 will demon-
strate with respect to Yoweri Museveni. The normative content of the notion of
leadership has not been spelled out in a systematic fashion, and over-simplification
can be dangerous.
Even in the scholarly literature, case studies have frequently used the concept of
leadership in a fairly off-hand way, not explicitly defin d (see, for example Putzel,
2004). Bor (2007) has made an attempt to systematically examine national lead-
ership on AIDS, but equates leadership with political commitment to addressing
HIV/AIDS. In his cross-national analysis, he uses a measure of political commit-
ment as the main indicator of leadership, defining ‘political commitment’ as fol-
lows: “‘Political commitment’ refers to the extent to which top-level government
leaders (viz. heads of state and their appointees) support AIDS as a priority on the
national agenda” (Bor, 2007:1586).11 However, a ‘political commitment’ defini-
tion of AIDS leadership is problematic for several reasons. It fails to differentiate
between commitment to specific policies and to the issue more broadly, between
commitment at the discursive level and at the level of implementation and between
commitment to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ AIDS policy (ThaboMbeki displayed extraordin-
ary commitment to AIDS denialism, at great political cost).
There is therefore a need to address the lack of explicit conceptualisation and
theorisation associated with the concept of ‘AIDS leadership’. It would perhaps be
unreasonable to chide Piot and others involved in the day-to-day struggle against
AIDS for this lack of theorisation, but without adequate theory, it is hard to ima-
gine how it can be studied empirically. We will need to conceive of AIDS lead-
10See, for example, Piot (2012:196).












ership in a way that accommodates (at the very least) the distinctions mentioned
above and that also allows objective measures of the quality of leadership—i.e. ac-
tual polices, their implementation and the results of those policies; what leaders do
and not just what they say.12
This thesis is therefore an attempt to conceptualise and reflect upon the broader
notion of leadership in the AIDS response, particularly as it pertains to ‘civil soci-
ety leadership’ in Sub-Saharan Africa. But in looking at civil society leadership, I
necessarily also have to look at efforts in the intergovernmental and governmental
domains, and at transnational, national and local levels. In an attempt at deal-
ing with the complex nature of the AIDS response, I opt for rich historical ac-
counts punctuated by more restricted analyses employing quantitative techniques
and programmatic outcomes as measures of performance, such as the proportion
of people in need who are being reached by prevention of mother-to-child trans-
mission (PMTCT)13 and antiretroviral treatment. It is not a philosophical reflec-
tion on the idea of AIDS leadership, but an empirical and grounded account that
hopes to clarify through concrete discussion.
I focus on the examples of Uganda and South Africa both in order to investigate
how one should think conceptually about civil society mobilisation around AIDS
and investigate empirically whether civil society mobilisation makes a difference to
the quality of the national and international response. Both of these countries had
large-scale HIV epidemics (Uganda’s earlier than South Africa’s) and both have
prominent civil society movements active on AIDS: Uganda’s TASO and South
Africa’s TAC. However, the countries also differ in important respects, including
level of development and reliance on foreign assistance, institutional arrangements
like the openness of the political system and the response of their respective gov-
ernments during the worst periods of the AIDS epidemic. These two examples
are returned to repeatedly during the course of my investigations of country-level
12Measuring the quality of ‘AIDS leadership’ is difficult and raises a number of serious meth-
odological issues. These will be discussed in greater detail later. Suffice it to say that my focus is
on measurable results of national HIV prevention and AIDS treatment programmes (for example
HAART and PMTCT coverage), while taking into account factors that influence these outcomes
but fall outside the immediate control of leaders (such as the size of the epidemic, national income,
international assistance, etc.). See chapter 2 for a more detailed treatment of these issues.
13Administering a short course of one or more antiretroviral drugs can substantially reduce the












national leadership, civil society opposition to state policy, state-civil society co-
operation and the impact of civil society mobilisation on communities with respect
to HIV prevention.
For the sake of clarity, two further things should be emphasised at this point.
First, the response to AIDS operates at transnational, national and local levels,
with complex interactions between activities at these levels. For example, much
of the progress in rolling out treatment in poor countries has been driven at the
transnational level, with universal guidelines issued by theWorldHealthOrganisa-
tion, targets set at UNAIDS, transnational activism driving drug prices down and
funding for the roll-out provided through the Global Fund and PEPFAR. Actual
delivery takes place in national health systems and local health facilities, some-
times monitored by local activists. Second, the response to AIDS is complex and
may include a wide range of interventions, not necessarily in a coordinated fash-
ion. Efforts to prevent HIV infection may include public awareness and behaviour
change campaigns, promotion of HIV testing, distribution of prevention techno-
logies like condoms and emerging technologies like microbicide gels, PMTCT by
means of antiretroviral drugs and medical interventions like medical male circum-
cision. Sometimes these efforts are aimed at specific high-risk populations (like sex
workers or men who have sex with men), at other times at the general population.
Sometimes AIDS treatment is even considered a prevention intervention (since
it reduces the risk of transmission). The emphasis on these various prevention
and treatment interventions varies substantially between different contexts and at
different times, depending on perceived priorities, interpretation of the scientific
evidence and political and cultural sensitivities. The AIDS response is therefore
complex and differentiated, making defining and measuring ‘leadership’ a difficult
task indeed.
1.2 Approaching ‘civil society leadership’ on
AIDS
I will not put forward a detailed theoretical framework here. Instead, I will briefly












literature on AIDS activism and mobilisation, and raise a number of overarching
issues to be considered. A more detailed theoretical consideration of AIDS activ-
ism, which draws on the sociological literature on social movements and activist
networks, is included with the first empirical case study (chapter 3).
1.2.1 What is required of theory?
The topic of AIDS activism cuts across disciplines, is complex, under-theorised
and does not lend itself to neat theoretical explication. I will therefore consciously
draw upon an eclectic mix of conceptual and theoretical frameworks. A key over-
arching theoretical question is the (age old) question of structure and agency, and in
particular how much explanatory weight should be attached to choices made by
individual agents (leaders), and howmuch to the contextual factors that impose in-
centives and constraints on agents. Any sophisticated and helpful account of civil
society leadership on AIDS must grapple with this structure-agency problematic.
Rather than ‘solving’ the problem, the framework we adopt must be able to ac-
count for both structural factors and individual agency in explaining processes and
outcomes.
As I have already argued, individuals and their particular, contingent experi-
ences seem to have had a major influence on the development of AIDS activism.
The case studies will demonstrate that relationships between concrete individuals,
the emotions that drive activism and solidarity, and psychological factors (at both
the group and individual levels) cannot be escaped. These issues are best addressed
in detailed historical narratives such as those later in this thesis, but it is import-
ant to emphasise early on that our theoretical choices must be able to account for
individual agency. Sociological approaches such as the sociology of social move-
ments (upon which I draw extensively) often employ structural explanations to the
exclusion of individual idiosyncrasies and moral purpose that sometimes transcend
context and structure. On the other hand, structural factors should not be ignored
in favour of a ‘big man theory of history’ that boils down to pure agency. This
approach is particularly prevalent in the literature on leadership from the man-
agement and applied ethics fields (see appendix A). The synthesis approach that I












erates at the nexus of structure and agency, allowing us to think about leaders both
in terms of their ‘structural’ position in the network and about the propagation of
influence and impact through the network.
A second issue that I believe to be of some significance is the ability of theory
to inform a politically and ethically engaged discussion. On the one hand this
involves accounting for the moral concerns of agents (‘ethical leadership’), on the
other it is not possible to reflect on AIDS activism while not (at least implicitly)
adopting ethical and political positions oneself. Through this entire project runs a
concernwith social justice, equality and human rights and it would be disingenuous
to pretend to complete scholarly detachment (and in any event such detachment
would probably not be desirable, even if achievable).
The sociology of political contention is of a largely descriptive and explanatory
character, so I also draw to some extent on the political philosophy of civil soci-
ety, which exhibits a greater normative focus. Some scholars from this tradition
have shown some empirical interest in real social movements, while at the same
time making politico-philosophical interpretations. For example Smith (1998:2–3)
argue that new social movements “[politicise] new areas of the social” and I have
employed a similar perspective in interpreting TAC as an example of the kind of
political contestation central to what Laclau and Mouffe term ‘radical democracy’
(Grebe, 2009a).
It seems to me that a hybrid approach, which exhibits both a political engage-
ment and an empirical focus centred around a ‘network perspective’ is most ap-
propriate for framing the empirical investigation of AIDS activism and civil society
leadership. While sociological models are very useful as an explanatory framework
(particularly in a comparative context), a more political-philosophical approach is
also required, in part because any study of AIDS activism necessarily has to ad-
opt a position on whether AIDS activism should be encouraged (and what kind
of activism is likely to be beneficial). An apolitical and a-ethical analysis may at
first seem more defensible, but would be severely impoverished, particularly in the
context of HIV/AIDS, which is a deeply political and ethical question.14
14This question echoes in some ways the theoria/praxis debates in critical philosophy. I would
here align myself with thinkers like Horkheimer who argued that neither empirical social research












1.2.2 The literature on AIDS activism
Given the fact that AIDS first (visibly) emerged among gay men in the United
States, and shortly thereafter in other parts of the world, it is not surprising that
political mobilisation around AIDS in the 1980s drew on the gay liberation move-
ment—which has since expanded to a rights movement of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) communities and other sexual minorities (Pax-
ton, 2012:145). I discuss the ways in which later global and third-world activism
linked up with and drew on the experiences of Northern AIDS activism rooted in
the gay rights movement in chapter 3. The literature on early AIDS activism is
therefore intertwined with the literature on LGBTI activism, sexual rights, queer
studies and similar areas with an identity politics focus. This is also the case with
later studies of AIDS and LGBTI rights movements in Latin America (de la De-
hesa, 2010) and Asia (Weiss, 2006), and even sex workers in Southeast Asia (Pisani,
2009), where the focus remains on mobilising around minority identities and social
exclusion.
In the view of Paxton (2012:145), in Sub-Saharan Africa, “identity politics
has relied upon a person’s HIV status itself to be the marker of identity, rather
than on another socio-personal identity which has a high degree of co-incidence.”
While this is undoubtedly true (the Treatment Action Campaign’s ‘HIV-Positive’
T-shirts are perhaps, on one interpretation, a visible emblem of identity-based
mobilisation), it is important to point out that the mobilisation strategies of African
movements sometimes go significantly beyond identity politics—and in fact TAC’s
leadership explicitly rejects identity politics.15 For more on this issue see chapter 3.
The identity politics theorisation of AIDS activism draws, at least implicitly, on the
‘new social movements’ perspective that will be discussed later, together with cer-
tain notions of symbolic politics. While I have in the past applied this perspective
to South African AIDS activism (drawing on Judith Butler’s notion of the ‘rear-
ticulation of political signifiers’), I also emphasised the importance of avoiding the
essentialising impulse central to identity politics (Grebe, 2009a). Identity politics is
therefore not a sufficient frame for thinking about political mobilisation on AIDS
in Africa.












Other theorisations of Northern AIDS activism include Deborah Gould’s fo-
cus on the role of emotion in her sympathetic accounts of the history of the ACTUP
movement in the United States (Gould, 2002; 2009) and Steven Epstein’s epi-
stemic framing in his detailed (and excellent) account of the politics of knowledge
of the early AIDS epidemic and activist attempts to influence the research and
treatment agenda (Epstein, 1996). Gould (2009:3) calls her book an “enquiry into
the affective stimuli and blockages to political activism” and mentions emotions
such as “rage, anger, indignation, hope, pride and solidarity.” These emotions are
probably universal drivers of political mobilisation—especially around a deadly
and neglected disease—and are certainly echoed in the accounts of many TAC
activists (see chapter 3). This is a dimension that seems highly relevant to the
mobilisation of activists, especially their personal motivations when they are tak-
ing risks, and in particular to the more confrontational forms of activism (direct
action, civil disobedience, etc.). Emotion and affect will therefore feature in my
accounts, but does not become a primary frame for theorising civil society leader-
ship, in part because significant parts of the mobilisation described were not of the
highly confrontational sort (especially in the chapter on Uganda).
Epstein draws significantly on the sociology of science and knowledge, par-
ticularly as it pertains to the construction of ‘credibility’. Both Youde (2007a)
and Didier Fassin (Fassin and Schneider, 2003; Fassin, 2007) later applied sim-
ilar frames to the South African AIDS denialist controversy. The notions of ‘epi-
stemic communities’ and ‘counter-epistemic communities’ (Youde, 2007a:43-48)
are potentially very useful in explaining the emergence and political longevity
of anti-scientific accounts of AIDS and an account that is sensitive to the black
South African experience of colonialism, apartheid and racist abuse—“the fester-
ing wounds of the past” (Fassin, 2007:122)—may go some way towards explaining
the vehemence of Mbeki and his supporters’ AIDS denialism. However, neither
of these studies were explicit accounts of AIDS activism and therefore, while useful
in reflecting on this particular dimension, do not provide a framework for theor-
ising civil society leadership on AIDS more broadly. In some ways, despite Youde
and Fassin’s focus on South Africa, Epstein’s fusion of science studies and social
movement research in order to explore the “role of movements in the construction












knowledge that TAC engaged in. Certainly TAC drew substantially on the ex-
periences of American AIDS activists (and replicated their focus on learning the
science of HIV) and on its links with scientists to bolster the scientific credibility
of its claims (see chapters 3 and 4). I do reflect to some extent on the politics of
knowledge in chapter 4, but the focus is on the effectiveness of TAC’s contesta-
tion of the Mbeki administration’s epistemic frame. More generally, I consider the
science-vs.-denialism clash in South Africa primarily as an explanation for why rather
than how activists mobilised, and it is therefore not a primary theoretical frame.
Probably the most important study of global AIDS activism published to date,
Raymond Smith and Patricia Siplon’s Drugs into Bodies draws on multiple theoret-
ical frames, including McAdam’s political process model of social movement mo-
bilisation and Keck and Sikkink’s ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (Smith and
Siplon, 2006:73-80). They analyse both domestic AIDS activism in the United
States (the first wave of activism) and the global AIDS treatment movement that
emerged later (the second wave), showing how the latter drew on the former, but
constructed a global coalition around a vision of universal access to AIDS treat-
ment. The success of this broadening of the scope of treatment activism, and its
inclusion of a globally distributed and disparate set of actors, points to the greater
applicability of Keck and Sikkink’s framework, which attributes the success of hu-
man rights activism networks precisely to the linking of separate issues under an
umbrella of universal claims, than McAdam’s model, which attributed the decline
of the civil rights movement to a “loss of focus” (Smith and Siplon, 2006:159-
160). They also employ Keck and Sikkink’s work to think about ‘issue framing’
in activist claims, including the construction of “a compelling story of heroes and
villains” (Smith and Siplon, 2006:160). I take my cue from them in making use
of both the social movement literature (see section 3.2.1) and ‘transnational ad-
vocacy networks’ (see section 3.2.5) for theorising AIDS activism. I further adopt
and make central to my analysis their focus on the construction of transnational
networks of activists (and attempt to develop this network perspective further) as
well as attempting to employ a conception of ‘coalition politics’ (Smith and Sip-
lon, 2006:161) in thinking about both domestic and transnational activism. In
a sense I merely adapt and apply their framework to the study of transnational












haps what could be thought of as a third wave of activism—concurrent to the
second—characterised by domestic activism in the developing world and South-
South transnational networks in addition to North-South collaboration).
I will not review in detail here the literature on the two movements used in the
case studies in this thesis (that fits more properly in the relevant chapters). How-
ever, a number of recurring themes do occur in the literature that may be useful in
theorising AIDS activism more generally. It should be noted that the literature on
TASO is very limited, and generally does not consider the organisation primarily as
a social movement. There is therefore very limited theoretical insight to be gleaned
from this literature. However, a number of authors have reflected on TAC as a
social movement, primarily within the context of post-apartheid politics in South
Africa. The first recurring theme is an emphasis on the continuity between TAC
and the earlier anti-apartheid struggle (Friedman andMottiar, 2006; Mbali, 2006;
Robins, 2004) and the second relates to TAC’s ‘framing’ of its claims in terms of
a ‘human rights discourse’ (Johnson, 2006; Mbali, 2006). These points, while un-
doubtedly accurate, do not really provide much of a theoretical framework, and
are perhaps too rooted in the specific historicity of South African politics to be of
much wider applicability. This is true also of Mbali’s more recent work in which
she has, however, started to apply ideas like resource mobilisation and networks
(Mbali, 2010).
Perhaps the boldest attempts to engage theoretically with the phenomenon of
treatment activism in South Africa have come from Steven Robins (2004; 2006;
2008), who employs what might be termed a discursive-identity perspective that
emphasises both the deployment of “global discourses of science, medicine, liberal
rights and social justice together with grassroots mobilisation” and “new forms of
biological and therapeutic citizenship, gendered identities and political subjectiv-
ities” (Robins, 2008:101). It is worth noting that political subjectivity has been
considered with respect to North American AIDS activism, for example by Brown
(1997), who argues that AIDS activism in Vancouver constituted a kind of ‘radical
citizenship,’ implying a new way of thinking the relationship between individu-
als and the state. These perspectives have some value for making sense of AIDS
activism, but, as with accounts focusing on symbolic politics, have often exhibited












glamorising activist movements and ignoring concrete contexts.
1.3 Research design and methodology
The fact that ‘AIDS leadership’ is under-theorised and highly context-sensitive
means that any theoretical framework imposed on the questions raised above is
unlikely to be fully satisfactory and we cannot hope for it to do much more than
frame a historical analysis. I therefore opt for a rich and detailed empirical ac-
count or ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) that nevertheless supplements historical
and qualitative methodologies with econometric analyses. Some chapters utilise
primarily the former and others primarily the latter. The primary methods used
in each chapter are briefly described in the chapter outline pr vided below.
In line with the recommendation of George and Bennett (2004:6), I attempt to
employ the case study method and quantitative methods in such a way that they
complement one another—i.e. I hope to compensate for the limitations of each
by using the other. Therefore, while case studies are better suited to “closely ex-
amin[ing] the hypothesised role of causal mechanisms in individual cases” and for
“addressing causal complexity” (George and Bennett, 2004:19), quantitativemeth-
ods may well be better suited to exploring potential relationships between partic-
ular well-defined factors. For example, in chapters 3 and 5, the complex politics
of civil society mobilisation on AIDS and its relationship with governmental AIDS
responses are carefully examined using a case study approach. On the other hand,
evaluating TAC’s potential impact on specific parameters relevant to HIV preven-
tion in Cape Town (for which survey data exists) is more suited to a quantitative
approach and is consequently studied using statistical models in chapter 4.
1.4 Chapter outline
Chapter 2: Civil society and national leadership on AIDS:
Do NGOs make a difference?
This chapter focuses on the empirical question of whether civil society mobilisa-












on national AIDS leadership, particularly cross-country quantitative analyses like
those of Bor (2007) and Nattrass (2006; 2008b) that seek to explain differential
outcomes (e.g. varying levels of HAART coverage) when controlling for non-
leadership drivers (such as national income and disease burden) in terms of political
factors.
However, like Sullivan Robinson (2011), the models reported here are restric-
ted to Sub-Saharan Africa, owing to limitations in the data on civil society avail-
able. This results in a very small N (42-46 countries). In order to cope with this lim-
itation, the models are highly parsimonious. Two sources of data on NGOs active
on HIV/AIDS are used: (1) A directory of African NGOs compiled by the United
Nations in 2003 and also used by Sullivan Robinson (2011) and (2) a global on-line
survey of HIV/AIDS civil society organisations conducted under the auspices of
UNAIDS as part of the aids2031 project.16 A series of cross-country regression
analyses is used to analyse the potential relationship between an active civil society
(especially in the AIDS sector) and HAART coverage and MTCTP coverage.
Chapter 3: SouthAfrica: Civil society leadership as contest-
ing government policy
This chapter provides a detailed historical case study of the Treatment Action
Campaign (TAC) in South Africa. A theoretical framework for thinking about
civil society mobilisation on AIDS is also developed, after a review of the social
movement and related literature, that draws on ideas from a range of disciplines
and traditions, and which conceptualises civil society mobilisation as the mobilisa-
tion of ‘networks of influence’.
TAC came to prominence (in fact, became the world’s most prominent AIDS
activist organisation) in the context of state-supported AIDS denialism and gov-
ernment resistance to evidence-based responses such as antiretroviral treatment.
The chapter describes TAC’s forceful campaign against denialism and for access
to treatment, a campaign that is widely (though not necessarily accurately) cred-
16Prof. Nicoli Nattrass and I participated in the aids2031 project’s ‘Leadership Working Group’
and ASRU conducted contract research for aids2031. I helped design, implement and analyse the













ited with the dramatic policy turnaround that occurred in 2003/4. The case study
draws on extensive interviews with former and present TAC leaders and members
to provide a detailed historical narrative of the emergence and impact of TAC,
describing how TAC’s founders drew on their experiences and networks from the
anti-apartheid struggle to build the movement. It also describes how the move-
ment’s influence was built using new local and transnational support networks
and how it succeeded in leveraging ‘networks of influence’ (which also included
scientists, bureaucrats and politicians) to contribute to the formation of a moral
consensus on treatment access and the construction of an inclusive civil society
coalition that pursued policy change.
Chapter 4: Civil society leadership and HIV prevention in
South Africa
This chapter revisits the ‘civil society leadership’ of TAC, this time employing
quantitative analysis to investigate whether TAC’s mobilisation in Cape Town
(where the organisation originated and is strongest) impacted appreciably on HIV
prevention efforts.
Drawing on and extending joint research with Nicoli Nattrass (Grebe and Nat-
trass, 2012), the chapter uses multivariate logistic regression (in a sample of young
adults in Cape Town, collected as the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study)
to explore the potential impact of contact with TAC (together with other socio-
economic, cultural, psychological and political determinants) on conspiracy be-
liefs about the origins of AIDS. Further, it investigates the impact of both AIDS
conspiracy beliefs and contact with TAC on condom use. It finds that indeed,
never having heard of TAC substantially and significantly increased the odds of
believing AIDS conspiracy beliefs for Africans and, controlling for demographic,
attitudinal and relationship variables, AIDS conspiracy beliefs drove unsafe sex
among African women and AIDS denialism and never having heard of TAC were
significant determinants of unsafe sex among African men. The chapter provides
some evidence that TAC’s opposition to anti-science and AIDS denialist rhetoric
coming from the Mbeki administration had a real and measurable impact on the












Chapter 5: Uganda: Civil society leadership ‘in partnership
with the state’
The second detailed historical case study focuses on The AIDS Support Organisa-
tion (TASO) in Uganda. TASO emerged much earlier than TAC, at the height of
the Ugandan AIDS epidemic. In contrast with TAC, the Ugandan state was rel-
atively supportive, but TASO also adopted a largely non-political stance focusing
on delivering services to people living with and dying from AIDS, rather than on
contesting policy.
The chapter also draws on extensive interviews with former and current TASO
leaders, employees and ‘clients’ as well as others in the Ugandan AIDS sector to
draw a rich narrative of the emergence and activities of the organisation. It tells
the story of a surprisingly professional and effective organisation in a very poor
country with a high burden of disease, but also illustrates how historically-specific
structural and institutional factors constrain ‘political opportunities’, with the or-
ganisation showing some timidity in challenging government policy even where
the tendencies have been undeniably problematic. TASO currently provides the
bulk of antiretroviral therapy in Uganda, relying on foreign donors like PEPFAR
to fund their services and on the Ugandan government for access to state health
care facilities, further limiting its political freedom of action. TASO nevertheless
shares some characteristics with TAC in that it draws extensively on local and in-
ternational support networks.
Chapter 6: Conclusion: The global AIDS movement in an
era of resource constraints and shifting priorities
This chapter briefly reviews some of the main insights from the thesis and discusses
future challenges for the global AIDS movement.
Appendix A: The leadership literature: structure, agency,
‘systemic leadership’ and institutions
This appendix briefly reviews the ‘agential’ and ‘systemic’ perspectives in the lead-












former, in which the emphasis is on ‘character’ and the individual traits of effective
and ethical leaders. However, it then draws on both the emerging relational model
of leadership and the literature on institutions in order to propose a ‘relational
model of transformative leadership.’ This model of leadership is better suited to
thinking about ‘AIDS leadership’ than traditional perspectives, since it emphasises
both structure (the relationships, networks and institutional contexts within which
leaders are embedded) and agency (the choices of individual leaders). This con-
ception of individual leadership informs the discussion in the empirical case studies
of chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Appendix B: An epidemiological model for HIV incidence,
prevalence and mortality trends in Uganda (1974-2004)
This appendix describes an epidemiological model for the HIV and AIDS epidem-
ics in Uganda from 1974 to 2004. It employs UNAIDS’s Epidemiological Projec-
tion Package (UNAIDS, 2011a), a tool for country-level estimation and short-term
projection of HIV/AIDS epidemics by fitting a standard epidemiological model on
observed HIV surveillance data. The primary source of surveillance data is HIV
seroprevalence among antenatal clinic attendees in Uganda, both at urban and
rural sites. The urban and rural epidemics are modelled separately. The model
is calibrated using a population-based seroprevalence survey conducted in 2004.
It does not incorporate the impact of antiretroviral therapy (which started becom-
ing widely available in the mid-2000s), but does allow for credible estimation of
HIV epidemiological trends for the reported period. Adult HIV prevalence is es-
timated to have peaked in 1988 (at 20.03%) and adult HIV incidence in 1984 (at
4.03%), while Uganda’s prevalence declines of the early 1990s appear to have res-
ulted largely from deaths outstripping new infections from 1991 (continuing to do
so until 2004). These estimates help contextualise the discussion of political and
civil society leadership in Uganda in chapter 5 by calling into question the praise
heaped on the Museveni government on the basis of the supposed success of pre-














Civil society and national
leadership on AIDS: Do NGOs
make a difference?
2.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates national leadership on AIDS bymodelling programmatic
outcomes and how this may be affected by civil society mobilisation. It draws on
the existing (limited) literature on cross-country comparisons of ‘AIDS leadership’
using quantitative methods and attempts to improve upon existing approaches that
do not include measures of civil society activity. Developing such measures of civil
society mobilisation presents a significant challenge owing to very limited availab-
ility of data.
An argument that runs through most of this thesis is that the political pressure
civil society places on national political leaders (and governments on the whole)
results in a greater commitment to, and better performance in, the execution
of measures to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS. Specifically, I investigate by
means of cross-national regression analysis how the presence of larger numbers of
non-governmental organisations may impact on HAART coverage (i.e. the pro-
portion of people in need of antiretroviral treatment who receive it) and better












transmission of HIV to their babies who receive it) in Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. HAART coverage is a good indicator of the quality of the treatment response
and data is available for most African countries. PMTCT coverage is more lim-
ited as an indicator of prevention efforts, but the quality of the available data is
relatively good, as opposed to indicators such as condom distribution and beha-
viour change campaigns that are much less easily available and hard to compare
between countries (or male medical circumcision, which is too new and not widely
implemented across the continent).
A number of attempts have been made to measure and model national ‘AIDS
leadership’ through cross-country quantitative analyses, using a variety of meas-
ures and approaches. The most important attempts are those of Nattrass (2006);
Bor (2007); Lieberman (2007); Desmond et al. (2008); Nattrass (2008b;c); Schward-
mann (2008); Haacker (2009).
Nattrass (2006) makes use of cross-country Ordinary Least Squares regression
analysis to explore which factors ‘explain’ HAART coverage. Her analysis high-
lights that especially regional and economic factors are important, and that, con-
trolling for per capita income, HIV prevalence and other factors, Sub-Saharan
African countries fare better than predicted (Nattrass, 2006:335). She also found
that being an established democracy improved HAART coverage, controlling for
other relevant factors, but it was not clear whether this resulted from democracies
making better use of available resources or from international donors’ preference
for democratic countries. She included in her final model Log of GNP per capita
(PPP), share of per capita income spent on health, being in the Latin American and
Caribbean region, being in the Sub-Saharan African region, differential between
urban and rural HIV prevalence, being an established democracy and log of adult
HIV prevalence, of which all except HIV prevalence turned out to be significant
and positive (Nattrass, 2006:331).
Nattrass (2008b) deepens her investigation of government leadership on AIDS
by specifically investigating whether country reputations for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ lead-
ership are warranted. Employing similar regression models, but adding measures
of international assistance on AIDS, she finds that both being a PEPFAR focus
country and having received Global Fund grants during the first round were stat-












log of adult HIV prevalence and the proportion of HIV-positive persons living in
urban areas. In models not controlling for region, being an established democracy
was associated with better HAART coverage and ‘language fractionalisation’ with
poorer HAART coverage, but when region is controlled for, these effects fall away
and being in Latin America and theCaribbean or inWest Africa significantly bene-
fits HAART coverage. She does not, however, attempt tomodel ‘AIDS leadership’
directly, instead reporting the regression residual of the models (i.e. the difference
between the HAART coverage predicted by the model and real HAART cover-
age) and suggesting that this residual may represent a leadership deficit or benefit,
given that predicted HAART coverage is what could be expected given “‘object-
ive’ constraints/opportunities facing governments” (Nattrass, 2008b:404). While
this is an innovative approach, and does seem to confirm that some countries with
reputations for good leadership performs better than expected (e.g. Uganda and
Thailand) and with poor reputations poorer than exp cted (South Africa), this is
also a highly unorthodox approach. It is in fact not possible to determine what
proportion of the regression residual for each case represents ‘random error’ (ε)
or unobserved factors, and it is further quite possible that unobserved factors other
than ‘leadership’ may be driving the bulk of the residual.
Bor (2007), in contrast with Nattrass, tries to model ‘AIDS leadership’ directly
by means of a ‘political support’ score constructed as part of the 2003 AIDS Pro-
gram Effort Index in 54 developing countries. He defines ‘political commitment’
as follows: “‘Political commitment’ refers to the extent to which top-level govern-
ment leaders (viz. heads of state and their appointees) support AIDS as a priority
on the national agenda” (Bor, 2007:1586). Bor elects to model ‘political commit-
ment’ in part because, unlike epidemiological outcomes, it is not influenced by
contextual factors outside the control of governments, like institutional capacity,
(Bor, 2007:1586) and can therefore be seen as a ‘purer’ measure of political leader-
ship comparable over a larger number of cases. His findings include that political
commitment does not seem to be greater in democracies than in autocracies ormo-
tivated by competitive elections (Bor, 2007:1598) but that a free and independent
media does seem to predict for political commitment on AIDS (Bor, 2007:1597),
that leaders are less responsive to AIDS where income inequality is high and that













I am, however, unconvinced of the value of modelling ‘political commitment’
on AIDS rather than programmatic outcomes. Apart from problems with using
the API political support score acknowledged by Bor (2007:1588), such as that it
is based on the subjective evaluations of a small number of key informants (and is
therefore vulnerable to bias), there are other reasons to reject this as a measure of
‘AIDS leadership’:
1. It has not been updated since 2003 (which is not long after many developing
countries started to ramp up, with the support of international donors, anti-
retroviral therapy provision—and which may very well have reinvigorated
AIDS efforts across the board, including prevention efforts. AIDS treatment
may have given political leaders the opportunity to sell their achievements to
electorates and the public, which it is harder to do when no or little treatment
is being provided, resulting in greater ‘political commitment’ as reflected in
the willingness of leaders to speak about HIV/AIDS. I therefore expect res-
ults for 2003 to differ significantly from results obtained from more recent
data.
2. Serious questions are raised about the reliability of the data by the fact that
South Africa scored close to the regional average for East and Southern
Africa on this measu e (79 compared to 80) and substantially higher than
the regional average for Latin Americana and the Caribbean (69) and Asia
(66). South Africa is a single case, but given its prominence as an example
of abysmal leadership on AIDS (and borne out in outcomes like HAART
coverage in Nattrass’ work), this seems to undermine the credibility of the
index substantially.
3. Even when countries show strong ‘political commitment’ on AIDS, but
are unable to translate that commitment into positive outcomes (such as
HAART coverage, condom distribution or reductions in incidence or pre-
valence), this still suggests poor ‘AIDS leadership’ (as long as one controls
for the contextual factors that impact on those outcomes, such as resource












Lieberman (2007) is mainly interested in the effect of ethnic division on coun-
tries’ AIDS policy responses, hypothesising that ethnic fractionalisation renders
elites less willing to mobilise around risk from a stigmatised condition (fearing that
their ethnic group would suffer reputational harm). He models a range of de-
pendent variables in cross-national regression analyses, including government and
donor expenditure on AIDS, mentions of AIDS in budget speeches, HAART cov-
erage and an AIDS Policy Index. He finds strong evidence for his central hypo-
thesis, including that ethnic fractionalisation is associated in multivariate models
with lower HAART coverage and poorer AIDS Policy Index scores (Lieberman,
2007:1423).
The only earlier study I am aware of that has attempted to model the poten-
tial effect of civil society mobilisation on HIV/AIDS outcomes is one by Sullivan
Robinson (2011). She hypothesises that the prevention and treatment activities
of local Non-Governmental Organisations should mitigate the effects of the HIV
epidemic and uses cross-national regression analysis (for African countries) both
to identify factors that predict the number of NGOs active in HIV/AIDS work
and to investigate the relationship between the number of local HIV NGOs and
HIV/AIDS outcomes, namely change in HIV prevalence between 2001 and 2009
and HAART coverage in 2009. She finds that number of HIV NGOs per 10 mil-
lion population is not statistically significantly related to change inHIV prevalence,
but that whether the country had an International Planned Parenthood Federation
affiliate founded by 1986, HAART coverage and whether the epidemic peaked
prior to 1999 are associated with reductions in HIV prevalence and whether the
country is a PEPFAR focus country associated with increased prevalence1 (Sullivan
Robinson, 2011:27). She also found that the number of HIV NGOs per 10 mil-
lion population and being a PEPFAR focus country were significantly associated
with better HAART coverage, while cultural fractionalisation and being a former
British colony were associated with poorer HAART coverage (Sullivan Robinson,
2011:27).
1This is not surprising, given that PEPFAR has funded large-scale antiretroviral treatment pro-














The primary hypothesis I test in this chapter is that NGOs active on AIDS result in
better HIV prevention and AIDS treatment responses, because they (1) put pres-
sure on national governments to improve the response to AIDS and (2) provide
donor agencies with reliable partners for implementing treatment and prevention
programmes. I would therefore expect a positive association between the number
of NGOs active on AIDS in a country and (1) HAART coverage (as an object-
ive measure of the treatment response) and (2) PMTCT coverage (as an objective
measure of the prevention response). In order to test this hypothesis one must
control at least for a number of factors that could be expected to constrain the
ability of governments to implement programmes, including disease burden (in
countries with large epidemics it would be more difficult to achieve high HAART
and PMTCT coverage), level of development (both in terms of institutional capa-
city and resource availability) and external resources for AIDS (countries receiving
large quantities of external aid for AIDS programmes could be expected to do bet-
ter).
However, an equally credible hypothesis—and one that runs completely
counter to the first—is that civil society responds to the need for effective responses
to AIDS, including a large epidemic and weak government responses. If this hy-
pothesis holds one would expect a negative association between treatment and
prevention performance and the number of NGOs active on AIDS. This leaves us
with a murky picture that the data may or may not be able to clarify. If the data
suggests such a negative association, a different set of models may be required
predicting the number of NGOs (rather than predicting HAART and PMTCT
coverage) in order to investigate this potential relationship.
A third possibility is that only some NGOs and only in some contexts make a
difference to the quality of AIDS responses by governments. For example, it may
be that social movements or activist organisations aremore likely to have an impact
by placing pressure on governments than NGOs that simply provide services or
who are aid/charity-oriented rather than activism/advocacy-oriented. It is further
possible (in fact likely) that institutional arrangements significantly determine the












hamper the ability of civil society to impact on governments’ responses.
2.3 Methods and measures
2.3.1 Dependent variables and countries included
The models presented in this chapter use Ordinary Least Squares regression ana-
lysis of country-level data for Sub-Saharan African countries to predict HAART
coverage and PMTCT coverage. In both cases data for the dependent variables
are sourced from the WHO. Coverage rates are logged since an increase of one
percentage point is much more significant at lower coverage rates than at high
coverage rates.
As indicated earlier, HAART coverage is considered an indicator of the qual-
ity of the treatment effort and PMTCT coverage of the prevention effort and the
models should be read jointly. However, PMTCT coverage may in some coun-
tries be a better indicator of the quality of the overall AIDS response than HAART
coverage, since the resource and infrastructural requirements are much lower (and
consequently these services were rolled out earlier in developing countries), mean-
ing that (1) poor performance is more likely to reflect a failure of ‘AIDS leadership’
and (2) it should be less sensitive to the availability of foreign assistance (which in
some African countries like Uganda fund the bulk of AIDS efforts).
In line with my critique of the AIDS Program Effort Index used by Bor (2007),
I prefer programmatic outcomes (HAART and PMTCT coverage) as an indicator
of country-level leadership rather than a political or policy indicator.
AIDS spending, which is used by Lieberman (2007), may very well be a useful
measure of AIDS leadership, but like ‘political support’ countries may be unable to
translate fiscal commitment into positive outcomes. Since I amprimarily interested
in whether civil society mobilisation results in better quality government responses,
HAART and PMTCT coverage (when one controls for for appropriate contextual
factors) is likely to be a better indicator.
One major weakness of the models reported in this chapter is the small N (42
countries) resulting from the restriction to Sub-Saharan African countries. This












organisations included in the models are only available for African countries (see
next subsection). However, I also agree with Sullivan Robinson (2011) that re-
stricting the analysis to Sub-Saharan Africa removes a number of interpretational
problems given the highly characteristic nature of the African epidemic, although,
for the same reason, I diverge from her in not including countries to the north
of the Sahara. Partly in order to cope with this limitation, the initial models are
highly parsimonious and are only modestly expanded later.
2.3.2 Measures of civil society mobilisation on AIDS
The key factor investigated for its potential effect on HAART coverage and
PMTCT coverage is the existence of civil society organisations actively mobilising
around the AIDS response.
Two sources of data onNGOs active onHIV/AIDS are used: (1) A directory of
AfricanNGOs compiled by theUnitedNations in 2003 (UnitedNations, 2003) and
also used by SullivanRobinson (2011) and (2) a global on-line survey ofHIV/AIDS
civil society organisations conducted under the auspices of UNAIDS as part of the
aids2031 project.2
The UN directory of African NGOs was compiled by sending questionnaires
to African NGOs through UN networks in African countries. Following Sullivan
Robinson (2011:14), I define civil society organisations active on HIV/AIDS as
those that reportedHIV or AIDS as an ‘action area’. Organisations whose primary
purpose is not HIV/AIDS are therefore included in the analysis. It is important to
mention that the database is unlikely to be exhaustive, and the use of UN networks
may introduce bias (for example excluding organisations that have not received
funding from large international donors or worked on UN-sponsored projects),
although the responses would hopefully be similarly biased across countries. Since
more populous countries could be expected to have larger numbers of NGOs than
less populous ones, the number of NGOs in the directory active on HIV/AIDS
was added up for each country and then divided by the population of each country
2Prof. Nicoli Nattrass and I participated in the aids2031 project’s ‘Leadership Working Group’
and ASRU conducted contract research for aids2031. I helped design, implement and analyse the
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(according toWorld Bank data in 2006) in tens ofmillions. This variable is reported
asHIVNGOspermillion pop. in themodels and included inmodels 1, 3, 7 and
9. Bivariate analysis of HAART coverage and PMTCT coverage vs. the number
of HIV NGOs in the UN directory strongly suggest that there exists a relationship
(see Figures 2.1 and 2.2 for the clustering of Sub-Saharan African countries around
a fitted bivariate regression line).
The aids2031 Online Civil Society Survey (hereafter CSS) was conducted by
contacting NGOs on the UNAIDS and United Nations Non-Governmental Li-
aison Service (UN-NGLS) databases of HIV/AIDS NGOs via email and request-
ing that an online questionnaire be filled out by a knowledgeable representative of
the organisation. Both transnational and local NGOs were included in the survey
(although international NGOs would be counted under the country in which their
headquarters are located for the purposes of this analysis). Like with the UN dir-
ectory it is important to emphasise the limitations of this survey, especially the fact
that it is not based on a representative sample (andmay suffer from bias). While the
researchers attempted to recruit as many as possible respondents (each represent-
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ing a CSO) from as many different countries as possible, the survey was collected
online (which may bias the results against CSOs without internet access, such as
those from rural Africa) and was only available in English (which may bias results
against, especially Latin American, Francophone African and Eastern European
CSOs).
The primary variable constructed using CSS data is simply the number of re-
sponses from NGOs headquartered in a country, divided by the population in
2006 (from the World Bank) in tens of millions and reported as CSS responses
per million pop. in the models and included in models 2, 4, 8 and 10. In addi-
tion, because of a concern that this variable may not be the best way to capture the
level of civil society activity on HIV/AIDS in a country, two further variables were
constructed based on the CSS data and investigated (in models 5 and 6). These
are:
• Number of ‘true CSO’ responses from a country. In this case organisations
that are not considered likely to mobilise a civil society constituency (such
38
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as quasi-government organisations) are excluded. The variable is simply the
number of CSOs who responded to the survey from the designated categor-
ies, on the assumption that this number would be a rough indicator of how
much activity exists in civil society on AIDS. It is reported as CSS ‘True
CSO’ responses per million pop.
• Number of reported CSO employees in responding organisations (the total
for each country) divided by population. This was attempted as a better in-
dicator of the level of resources and activity from civil society in each country.
It is reported as CSS NGO employees per million pop.
2.3.3 Other potential predictors and controls
As argued above, HAART and PMTCT coverage are only a meaningful indicat-
ors of national AIDS leadership if we control for the contextual factors that could
be expected to influence it, including the size of the epidemic (since it would be
more difficult to reach a high proportion of those in need of treatment where HIV
prevalence is high) and level of development and resource availability. However,
I attempted to keep models as parsimonious as possible, first running models with
very few controls and then somewhat expanded models that include controls the
literature suggests should influence ‘AIDS leadership’ and performance. The fol-
lowing controls were included in all models:
• Log of adult HIV prevalence in 2008. As mentioned previously, this is
an important control since it is much more difficult to achieve high HAART
and PMTCT coverage in large epidemics (reflected in higher HIV preval-
ence rates). The prevalence rate is logged since an increase of one percentage
point is much more significant at lower prevalence than at high prevalence.
Source: World Health Organisation.
• Log of GNI per capita at purchasing power parity (2008) as an indic-
ator of level of development and resources available. This is an important
control since countries with higher national incomes would find it easier to












of US$1 PPP average income at lower incomes is more significant than at
higher incomes. Source: World Bank.
• PEPFAR focus country. This is a dummy variable capturing whether the
country is a focus country of the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief and is included as an indicator of the level of external resources for
HIV and AIDS interventions. PEPFAR is the largest donor for HIV/AIDS
in Sub-Saharan African countries, and while there is a correlation between
large epidemics and being a PEPFAR focus country (the inclusion of an
HIV prevalence control isolates this effect to some degree), other factors
also influenced selection. It is reasonable to assume that PEPFAR focus
countries would have more resources available to combat HIV/AIDS than
non-PEPFAR countries. Source: PEPFAR (2009).
These further controls were included in the expanded models (7-10), based on
the literature that suggests political stability and democracy are associated with
better outcomes and ethnic or linguistic divisions with poorer outcomes:
• Free or partly free (FH 2008). This is a dummy variable indicating
whether the country was classified as at least ‘partly free’ by FreedomHouse
in 2008 and is included as an indicator of civil rights and democracy (in the
broader non-institutional sense), since it may be expected that (1) democra-
cies would place greater incentives on political leaders to respond effectively
to AIDS—although Bor (2007) found this not to be the case for his API
measure of political commitment, Nattrass (2006) did find that democracies
achieve better HAART coverage—and (2) greater levels of political freedom
would provide civil society organisations with greater freedom to pressurise
governments.
• Stable state (Norris 2006). This is a dummy variable derived from data
from Norris’s cross-national dataset, indicating political stability and the ab-
sence of war (Norris, 2009). It is included since countries facing conflict and
instability may be expected to fare less well in implementing HIV/AIDS












• Press Freedom > 50 (FH 2006). This is a dummy variable indicating that
the country scored 50 or higher Freedom House’s 2006 press freedom in-
dex. It may be expected that in countries with a freer press leaders would
face greater pressure to perform in HIV/AIDS interventions, and in fact
Bor (2007) found an association between press freedom and political com-
mitment to AIDS.
• Ethnic fractionalisation (Alesina 2002). This is an ethnic fractionalisa-
tion index (0-1) derived from Alesina (2002) and sourced from Norris (2009)
and is included in order to account for the potential effect of ethnic divi-
sions on the willingness of political leaders to vigorously pursue HIV/AIDS
policies as postulated by Lieberman (2007).
One further control that I considered including, because Bor (2007) found in-
come inequality to be associated with weakened commitment to AIDS, is the Gini
coefficient. However, including it in the models brings the N down to 29 because
data is not available for all Sub-Saharan African countries. In these models all
variables lose significance and they are therefore not reported.
An appropriate time-ordering of variables is difficult in these models. The civil
society on-line surveywas only conducted in 2010, and the latest availableHAART
coverage data dates from 2009. I will therefore have to assume (not unproblem-
atically) that the responses provided in 2010 reflect accurately the situation long
enough in the past that civil society organisations could have influenced govern-
ment policies and implementation that ultimately would have partly determined
HAART coverage. In the case of the UN directory data (collected in 2003) the
time-ordering is appropriate. In the case of economic variables, such as income
per capita, the latest available data was used so as to describe current conditions
in each country. Political variables (such as ‘political rights’ and ‘freedom of the
press’ scores) were taken from a few years before the HAART coverage variable
in order to ensure proper time-ordering.
I did not include or remove variables from the analysis simply on the basis of
significance—unlike, say, Bor (2007), who uses reverse stepwise regression—and
make use of simple linear regressions (Ordinary Least Squares) with independ-












should influence HAART coverage, while trying to keep models as parsimonious
as possible. Variables that are not statistically significant are not removed from
the model, since they are still necessary in order to parse out potential effects that
could be inappropriately picked up in other variables, resulting in false significance
or incorrect sizes of coefficients.
2.4 Results and discussion
Models 1-4 (Table 2.1) are highly parsimonious models for HAART coverage (1
and 2) and PMTCT coverage (3 and 4).
The UN directory variable (HIV NGOs per million population) is significantly
associated with improved HAART coverage and PMTCT coverage in models 1
and 3 (b = 0.059; p = 0.016 and b = 01.00; p = 0.005), but the CSS responses
indicator is significantly associated with worse performance on HAART coverage
(model 2, b = −0.023; p = 0.028) but shows no effect on PMTCT coverage.
HIV prevalence and per capita income are significantly associated with better
HAART coverage in model 2, and per capita income with better PMTCT cover-
age in model 4, but are not significant when used with the UN directory variable
in models 1 and 3, suggesting that the latter variable may be picking up income
and prevalence effects to some extent.
Being a PEPFAR focus country is associated (highly significantly) with im-
proved PMTCT coverage (b = 0.803; p = 0.001 in model 3 and b = 0.649; p =
0.005 in model 4), but surprisingly, not HAART coverage.
Models 1 and 2 explain about 35% and 31% of the variance in log of HAART
coverage, while models 3 and 4 explain about 46% and 38% of the variance in log
of PMTCT coverage.
Models 5 and 6 (Table 2.2) repeat models 1 and 2, but use alternative variables
constructed from the Civil Society Survey.
The CSS ‘True CSO’ variable, like the raw CSS responses variable is signi-
ficantly associated with poorer HAART coverage (model 5), while the CSS NGO
employees variable is not significant (model 6). The predictive power of the mod-













Models 7-10 (Table 2.3) expandmodels 1-4 by introducing further control vari-
ables.
None of the additional control variables are significant in any of the models,
except for political freedom, which is—surprisingly—marginally significantly asso-
ciated with worse HAART coverage in model 7 (b = −0.259; p = 0.097). Being a
PEPFAR focus country also becomes a significant predictor of improved HAART
coverage in model 7 when the additional controls are added (b = 0.323; p =
0.083).
However, the significance and sign of the predictor variables I am mainly in-
terested in are not altered. HIV NGOs per million population (from UN dir-
ectory data) remain significantly associated with improved HAART coverage
(b = 0.065; p = 0.029 in model 7 and b = 0.091; p = 0.012 in model 9), while
number of CSS responses per million population remains a significant predictor
of worse HAART coverage (b = −0.017; p = 0.077) in model 8 and insignificant
in model 10.
The explanatory power of the models are not greatly improved by the addition
of the further control variables.
2.5 Conclusions
While the results in models 1 and 7 seem to confirm Sullivan Robinson’s results
and those in models 2 and 9 to provide additional evidence for the positive impact
of HIV/AIDS NGOs on policy performance, the fact that the contrary result is
found with a different indicator in models 2 and 8 casts doubt on the veracity of
the result. Models 1, 2 7 and 9 seem to support the first hypothesis—that NGOs
active on AIDS result in better HIV treatment and prevention responses. How-
ever, models 2 and 8 may support the second and incompatible hypothesis that
civil society responds to poorer government responses. The models do provide
strong evidence of the impact of donor funding on both HAART and PMTCT
coverage, but particularly the latter, as indicated by the large size and significance
of the coefficients for PEPFAR Focus country.
Thesemodels and the available data therefore do not allow us to come to strong












active on HIV/AIDS in a country may have on the quality of that country’s pre-
vention and treatment response. However, the limitations of the data and contra-
dictory results suggest that further work is needed. In addition, it seems plausible
that both effective and ineffective civil societymobilisation are included in the relat-
ively undifferentiated measures dictated by the available data, and that some civil
society organisations may well be effective even if we cannot discern the factors
determining effectiveness using this analysis. The case studies presented in the fol-
lowing chapters suggest that this is indeed the case, and may help to tease out some
of the relevant factors. It is to be hoped that future quantitative work may provide
the evidence across countries that would be required in order to confidently gen-













Table 2.1: Parsimonious models for HAART and PMTCT coverage in
Sub-Saharan African countries
Dependent vars: Log of HAART coverage (2009) and Log of PMTCT coverage (2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HAART HAART PMTCT PMTCT
Independent variable b/(SE)/p b/(SE)/p b/(SE)/p b/(SE)/p
Log of Adult HIV Prevalence (2008) 0.119 0.177* 0.063 0.154
(0.104) (0.091) (0.118) (0.106)
0.261 0.060 0.599 0.154
Log of GNI per capita at PPP (2008) 0.042 0.089* 0.067 0.167*
(0.053) (0.052) (0.078) (0.091)
0.430 0.092 0.397 0.075
PEPFAR Focus country (2009) 0.234 0.133 0.803*** 0.649***
(0.156) (0.161) (0.218) (0.220)
0.142 0.413 0.001 0.005
HIV NGOs per million pop. 0.059** 0.100***
(0.023) (0.033)
0.016 0.005
CSS responses per million pop. -0.023** -0.000
(0.010) (0.016)
0.028 0.982
Constant 3.137*** 2.909*** 2.459*** 1.901**
(0.418) (0.414) (0.610) (0.706)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011
Observations 42 42 42 42
Adjusted R-squared 0.350 0.313 0.455 0.383
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors.












Table 2.2: Modelling HAART coverage in SSA using Civil Society
Survey indicators
Dependent var: Log of HAART coverage (2009)
(1) (5) (6)
Independent variable b/(SE)/p b/(SE)/p b/(SE)/p
Log of Adult HIV Prevalence (2008) 0.119 0.177* 0.173*
(0.104) (0.091) (0.091)
0.261 0.060 0.066
Log of GNI per capita at PPP (2008) 0.042 0.089* 0.101*
(0.053) (0.052) (0.054)
0.430 0.092 0.067
PEPFAR Focus country (2009) 0.234 0.133 0.145
(0.156) (0.161) (0.162)
0.142 0.413 0.376
HIV NGOs per million pop. 0.059**
(0.023)
0.016
CSS ‘True CSO’ responses per million pop. -0.023**
(0.010)
0.029
CSS NGO employees per million pop. -0.000
(0.001)
0.914
Constant 3.137*** 2.909*** 2.806***
(0.418) (0.414) (0.418)
0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 42 42 42
Adjusted R-squared 0.350 0.313 0.300
p 0.000 0.000 0.018
Robust standard errors.












Table 2.3: Expanded models for HAART and PMTCT coverage in
Sub-Saharan African countries
Dependent vars: Log of HAART coverage (2009) and Log of PMTCT coverage (2009)
(7) (8) (9) (10)
HAART HAART PMTCT PMTCT
Independent variable b/(SE)/p b/(SE)/p b/(SE)/p b/(SE)/p
Log of Adult HIV Prevalence (2008) 0.136 0.202** 0.076 0.165
(0.095) (0.087) (0.118) (0.108)
0.159 0.026 0.522 0.134
Log of GNI per capita at PPP (2008) 0.019 0.047 0.077 0.125
(0.062) (0.076) (0.096) (0.105)
0.762 0.545 0.429 0.242
PEPFAR Focus country (2009) 0.323* 0.172 0.796*** 0.606**
(0.181) (0.177) (0.248) (0.232)
0.083 0.340 0.003 0.014
Free or partly free (FH 2008) -0.259* -0.255 0.299 0.288
(0.152) (0.154) (0.265) (0.288)
0.097 0.106 0.268 0.324
Stable state (Norris 2006) -0.292 -0.070 -0.135 0.120
(0.230) (0.269) (0.326) (0.297)
0.213 0.797 0.681 0.688
Press Freedom > 50 (FH 2006) -0.204 -0.240 0.063 -0.012
(0.224) (0.243) (0.285) (0.313)
0.369 0.330 0.827 0.970
Ethnic fractionalisation (Alesina 2002) -0.037 -0.125 -0.511 -0.646
(0.269) (0.263) (0.407) (0.473)
0.891 0.638 0.218 0.181














(7) (8) (9) (10)
CSS responses per million pop. -0.017* -0.003
(0.009) (0.017)
0.077 0.878
Constant 3.621*** 3.615*** 2.503** 2.441**
(0.643) (0.735) (0.962) (1.018)
0.000 0.000 0.014 0.022
Observations 42 42 42 42
Adjusted R-squared 0.396 0.355 0.492 0.447
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors.













South Africa: Civil society
leadership as contesting
government policy1
3.1 Introduction and background
Judging by the prominence it later attained, it is hard to believe that the Treatment
Action Campaign (TAC) was founded by a small group of friends in 1998. It is now
widely considered the most important AIDS activist organisation in the world and
certainly the most successful of South Africa’s post-apartheid social movements
(Friedman andMottiar, 2006). This chapter provides an account of TAC’s origins
and its efforts to build a coalition around the moral imperative of AIDS treatment
access. In order to build a coalition capable of challenging the power of mul-
tinational pharmaceutical companies and the intransigence of the South African
government, TAC’s founders drew on their experiences and networks from the
anti-apartheid struggle and built an extensive transnational support network. The
main contribution of the paper is to trace these old and new networks and show
their part in TAC’s influence on AIDS policy in South Africa.
During the first five years of its existence TAC came to embody the demand
1The fieldwork for this chapter was generously funded by the aids2031 initiative. A shorter













Figure 3.1: AIDS denialism at the highest level
Source: www.zapiro.com. ©2000-2012 Zapiro. Printed with permission from Zapiro.com.
for access to antiretroviral drugs by poor South Africans. That AIDS policy
was highly politicised and hotly contested is perhaps not surprising, given then-
President Thabo Mbeki’s public questioning of conventional AIDS science and
his government’s resistance to using antiretrovirals for either prevention or treat-
ment. The scale of the human tragedy raised the temperature of public debate to
a level not reached by ‘everyday’ political issues and the moral imperative of an
issue that is literally one of life and death emboldened social actors who may not
otherwise have taken a stand.
Mbeki started publicly questioning the viral aetiology of AIDS, as well as the
safety and efficacy of proven antiretroviral treatment shortly after assuming the
Presidency in 1999. He had been in contact with a number of notorious AIDS dis-
sidents and later established a Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel, inviting roughly
equal numbers of conventional scientists and dissidents, even though the latter
are seen as an insignificant fringe movement in AIDS science. The Minister of
Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, became his staunch ally in battles with act-
ivists and the medical and scientific establishments and promoted nutritional and












Figure 3.2: A cabinet revolt leads to policy change
Source: www.zapiro.com. ©2002-2012 Zapiro. Printed with permission from Zapiro.com.
African and international clinicians and public health experts, the Mbeki govern-
ment refused to implement a PMTCT programme until compelled to do so by the
country’s highest court in a case brought by TAC. South Africa came to be seen
as the prime example of ‘bad’ political leadership on AIDS during a period that
policy was driven by ‘AIDS denialism’.2
The cabinet finally decided to implement a national antiretroviral treatment
programme in 2003 after a protracted struggle by activists. While this policy
change cannot be attributed solely to TAC’s campaign, it is nevertheless widely
credited with helping to shape the public debate and generating substantial pres-
sure on the state, without which the change may very well have come much later.
It did so despite being a small and young movement facing strongly vested in-
terests and powerful adversaries, notably the state and multinational pharmaceut-
ical companies.
While mainly offering a historical narrative of the emergence and influence
of TAC, this chapter also draws on a range of theoretical approaches in order to
explain its apparent success. The main theoretical anchor points are the ideas of
‘transnational networks of influence’ and of ‘coalitions’ in support of AIDS treat-
ment access. Both ideas are useful in illuminating the processes by which South
African AIDS activists gained influence, managed to frame the question of AIDS
2For detailed accounts of AIDS denialism and its consequences in South Africa, see Nattrass












treatment politically andmorally, and helped to generate the pressure that forced a
change in policy. This includes the mobilisation of influence, both through narrow
activist networks and broader networks in which a diverse set of actors particip-
ated, among them local and international activists, AIDS scientists and clinicians,
individuals within allied civil society organisations, members of the South African
political elite as well as individuals within state institutions.
In the next (rather long and dry) section I will review the literature on the
sociology of social movements and on ‘activist networks’ in order to propose a
theoretical framework for thinking about TAC’s mobilisation and impact. After
that I return to the remarkable story of one of the world’s most prominent activist
movements.
3.2 Theorising civil society mobilisation on
AIDS
I have alluded to the lack of theorisation and general conceptual fuzziness as-
sociated with the notion of ‘AIDS leadership’. The relationship between activ-
ism and the broad societal response to HIV/AIDS (‘civil society leadership’ on
AIDS) is deeply contextual and its analysis requires rich empirical (‘thick’) descrip-
tion. But any such empirical project is necessarily shaped—consciously or un-
consciously—by a set of prior theoretical assumptions. Since even the the most
practically-oriented and historically anchored empirical studies are ‘theory-laden,’
it is useful to identify the most appropriate theoretical tools with which to approach
the topic.
The most prominent of the sociological theories is social movement theory, a pre-
dominantly American approach (or, more accurately, set of related approaches).
The best-known variants are the ‘political process’ model of which McAdam is the
leading exponent and the European tradition articulated under the rubric of ‘new
social movements’ by scholars like Touraine (1981), Castells (1998), Johnston et al.
(1994), Offe (1985) and Kriesi (Kriesi et al., 1995; Kriesi, 1996).
Both of these variants are discussed in some detail below, followed by an eval-












that have been quite prominent in the literature of the last decade are the study of
transnational advocacy networks—still primarily a descriptive approach, but one which
attempts to overcome some of the theoretical weaknesses of the more traditional
sociological approaches—and a view emphasising global civil society.
3.2.1 Social movement theory
It is debatable whether AIDS activism can be considered a social movement in the
classical conception, but it is certainly a form of contentious political activity that
falls within the range of phenomena normally studied in social movement theory.
Ballard et al. (2006:3) define social movements as “politically and/or socially dir-
ected collectives, often involving multiple organisations and networks, focused on
changing one or more elements of the social, political and economic system within
which they are located.” In this they follow Tilly (1985, quoted in Ballard et al.,
2006:2), who emphasises “demands or challenges to power-holders in the name
of a social category that lacks an established political position” and Jelin (1986,
quoted in Ballard et al., 2006:3), who considers both a high degree of popular par-
ticipation and the participants “establishing themselves as collective subjects, that
is, as a group or social category” essential characteristics of social movements.
Social movement theory is closely associated with traditional political soci-
ology. It focuses on the structural preconditions and means for collective action
and emphasises three broad sets of factors in the analysis of social movements.
These are (1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting
the movement; (2) the forms of organisation (both formal and informal) available
to participants; and (3) the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and
social construction that mediate between opportunity and action, known as ‘fram-
ing processes’ (McAdam et al., 1996:2). While this tradition is rooted in the study
of revolutionary movements and popular insurgencies, its proponents claim that it
is applicable also to the so-called ‘new social movements’ (i.e. those that demand
rights or equality without aiming at the overthrow of the state) and even ‘new-new
social movements’ (the transnational movements pressing for fairer globalisation
etc.). For example, Ballard et al. (2006:3) argue that analyses of political oppor-












oretical perspectives and work together to “bridge” approaches to old and new
social movements. However, critics argue, in my view correctly, that it retains a
state-centric view of politics (Taylor, 2004:4).
A basic assumption of social movement theory is that a given challenger faces
political opportunities and constraints, and that changes in these opportunities and
constraints on the one hand determine whether a movement emerges and, on the
other, shape the ebb and flow of movement activity over time (McAdam et al.,
2001:41). McAdam et al. (1996:3) point out that earlier (largely American) schol-
ars attempted to explain the emergence of movements according to changes in
institutional structure or informal power relations, with later (largely European)
scholars bringing a comparative perspective to bear, i.e. to investigate how differ-
ences in the political characteristics of the nation-states within which they oper-
ate impact upon the structure, extent and success of social movements (see Kriesi
1989, Kitschelt 1996, Koopmans 1992 and Duyvendak 1992, cited in McAdam
et al., 1996:3). McAdam (1996:27) identifies four dimensions of political oppor-
tunity that constitute a relative consensus among authors in the field: “[1] the
relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system; [2] the stabil-
ity or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically under-gird a
polity; [3] the presence or absence of elite allies; and [4] the state’s capacity and
propensity for repression.” The emphasis throughout is on national political con-
text and the way this context is presumed to shape social movements. This reflects
the state-centric bias of this approach, although it must be said in the defence of
social movement theorists that some have acknowledged this problem and attemp-
ted to broaden their conception of opportunity structures. For example, Tarrow
(1996:54) defines political opportunity structure as “consistent—but not necessar-
ily formal, permanent or national—signals to social or political actors which either
encourage or discourage them to … form social movements” (my emphasis). He
concedes that transnational social movements present a challenge and that “na-
tional regularities in state structure must be seen as no more than the initial grid
within which movements emerge and operate” (Tarrow, 1996:53).
The forms of organisation available to and employed by movements are con-
sidered key to explaining their impact. These are often termed ‘mobilising struc-












engage in collective action” (McAdam et al., 1996:3). A closely related term is that
of ‘repertoires of contention’ which refers more explicitly to the types of activit-
ies (marches, sit-ins, etc.) employed by activist movements (cf. McAdam et al.,
2001:43). McAdam et al. (1996:3-4) trace these ideas to two distinct theoretical
perspectives, namely. that of resource mobilisation theory (which shifted the fo-
cus from grievance-based conceptions of social movements to mobilising processes
and their organisational manifestations); and that of the political process model
which emphasised grassroots settings (such as the workplace or neighbourhood)
and local institutions (e.g. black churches in the civil rights movement). Perhaps
the clearest conceptualisation is provided by Tarrow (1998:123) who distinguishes
between three aspects of movement organisation: (1) formal hierarchical organisa-
tion (the dominant aspect in the literature), which refers to the formal organisation
that attempts to give expression to a movement (sometimes referred to as Social
Movement Organisations or SMOs); (2) the organisation of collective action at the
point of contact with opponents (branches or even cells, informal social networks,
clubs, etc.), which may be controlled by formal organisations, coalitions of organ-
isations or no one in particular; and (3) connective structures that link leaders to
followers, different parts of movements, organisations supporting a movement, etc.
The analysis of networks presented in this chapter — which argues that they are
critical to explaining both the organisational forms and forms of action of AIDS
activism and the impact of activism— takes its cue from this conception of mobil-
ising structures, but also goes beyond it. This is discussed in greater detail later.
The third factor emphasised by social movement theory—‘framing processes’
— is described as “fram[ing] specific grievances within general collective action
frames which dignify claims, connect them to others, and help to produce a col-
lective identity among claimants” (McAdam et al., 2001:41). In this view, shared
meanings and definitions are critical in mediating between opportunity, action
and organisation; this requires at least feeling both aggrieved and optimistic that
collective action can improve the situation (McAdam et al., 1996:5). Framing pro-
cesses are the processes by which these shared meanings are established. This
aspect served as a corrective to the resource mobilisation perspectives which ac-
corded very little significance to ideas and subjective motivations. While David












McAdam et al. (1996:5) and Ballard et al. (2006:6) point to the important role of
new social movement scholars such as Alain Touraine in focusing attention on
the importance of subjective elements such as identity and meaning. (This is per-
haps not surprising, given that many of these new social movements—e.g. those
agitating for sexual liberation—were characterised by distinctive cultural aspects,
and many of their demands were underpinned by strong identity claims.) The
concept of framing processes is used, then, to describe both the conscious efforts
of movement leaders and participants to construct shared understandings and the
underlying cultural resources which they employ. Says Tarrow:
It is participants’ recognition of their common interests that trans-
lates the potential for a movement into action. By mobilising con-
sensus, movement entrepreneurs play an important role in stimulating
such consensus. But leaders can only create a social movement when
they tap more deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity. (Tarrow,
1998:6)
The above quote illustrates many of the problems with social movement theory.
First, reducing the motivations of participants to ‘interests’ reveals an economistic
bias that fails to accord with social movements — particularly in its transnational
form—that succeed in building alliances between interest groups and individuals
and organisations not motivated directly by their own interests. It fails to take
seriously the moral claims of movements. As both Taylor (2004:6) and Keck and
Sikkink (1998:1) have pointed out, these actors’ motivations can not be reduced
to their narrow interests as sociological and economic models tend to do. Says
Keck and Sikkink (1998:8–9): “they are organised to promote causes, principled
ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes
that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their ‘interests.”’
Second, there seems to be an overemphasis on consensus and identity. This
runs counter to both the empirical reality of movements that are often formed
through ad hoc, temporary and fluid networks of diverse groups and individu-
als, and the theoretical current underlying the network conception of movement
formation and action that I prefer. Social movement theorists may respond that












should be considered ‘true’ social movements. For example, Ballard et al. (2006:3)
question whether all contemporary social struggles in South Africa should be con-
sidered social movements, since some may not be popularly located or do not suffi-
ciently establish a collective identity. But this emphasis on collective identity rather
limits the applicability of the theory, particularly when it comes to transnational
networks (which play a crucial role in AIDS activism), since these are often based
on alignments of purpose rather than the establishment of collective identities. Of-
ten organisations, groups and individuals link up and act in a coordinated fashion
merely strategically. This is not to deny that in some movements collective iden-
tities are fundamental. Clearly, shared identity formation was a key part of the
gay movement as it emerged in the US from the 1960s and was still critical in
the mobilisation of early AIDS activism. It may even be the case that the activist
movement would not have emerged (or would have been less strong) had it not
been rooted in a well-established gay movement and could that movement not
have mobilised identity-related sentiment. But a network approach would reject a
conception of movements as monolithic entities brought about only by evacuating
difference and diversity. Rather, it points to the many ways in which seemingly
insurmountable differences and divergent interests are overcome by means of tem-
porary and strategic alliances mobilised through networks that are capable of ac-
commodating diversity precisely because they do not necessarily imply closely-knit
integration between all participants. Rather, the pattern is one of complex webs of
more and less integrated sub-networks (which may include very dense conglomer-
ations indeed, including ones framed by identity) with greater and lesser degrees
of proximity and identification.
Nonetheless, social movement theory does provide analytical tools that are use-
ful in conceptualising the processes at work in activist movements—as long as we
do not reduce the movements to these processes. Perhaps my argument is less
one against social movement theory as one against simplistic and reductionist in-
terpretations and applications thereof. And many of its insights are undeniably
accurate. So, while I will argue that the political process model is not sufficient
for our purposes, it would be absurd to suggest that there is no place for categor-
ies such as ‘political opportunities’ in our analysis. Obviously, the TAC’s highly












government to alter its AIDS policy, is to exploit the political opportunity afforded
it by the institutional arrangement of a separation of powers established by consti-
tutional democracy in South Africa (namely the power of the Judicial branch of the
state vis-à-vis that of the Executive). Without the fundamental transformation of
the state in the early 1990s such a strategy could never have been successful, and
in this sense the state-centric political process model is perfectly applicable. But
the emergence and success of AIDS activism cannot be explained simply in these
terms.
3.2.2 ‘New’ social movements
As already mentioned, the new social movements tradition acted as a corrective to
the cruder forms of social movement theory—particularly resource mobilisation
theory—by emphasising the centrality of cultural and identity aspects in collective
action. According to Buechler (1995:442), new social movement theory, among
other things, “problematize[s] the often fragile process of constructing collective
identities and identifying group interests, instead of assuming that conflict groups
and their interests are structurally determined” as well as recognising “a variety
of submerged, latent, temporary networks that often under-gird collective action,
rather than assuming that centralized organizational forms are prerequisites for
successful mobilization.” Manuel Castells, for example, criticises resource mobil-
isation theory for “incorporating [the social movement] into the political process
aimed fundamentally at the state” (Castells, 1983). Both an anti-institutional ori-
entation and group identity are seen as products of the group process and emergent
from the movement’s internal dialogue (Hannigan, 1985:449).
While these theorists reject simplistic notions of ‘structural determinants’ of
movements, there is nevertheless an overriding focus on a societal totality that
acts as a context for collective action (Buechler, 1995:459). For example, Alain
Touraine (1981:6–7), probably the most prominent theorist of new social move-
ments, attributes the introduction of cultural aspects into social struggles to certain
fundamental changes occurring in post-industrial (‘programmed’) society, includ-
ing the loci of domination expanding beyond the economic sphere. Both Touraine












employing an evolutionary theory of social transition that is essentially speculative
and lacks evidence (Hannigan, 1985:448). Even if the state-centric bias of classical
social movement theory is addressed, therefore, a certain domestic bias is retained.
Buechler (1995) questions the fundamental category of ‘new social movement’
and argues that it obscures continuities and exaggerates differences between past
and present movements, though he acknowledges that there has been a shift in
emphasis and orientation in many contemporary social movements. I am inclined
to agree, and consider the new social movement perspective a theoretical advance
over the cruder forms of social movement theory as well as a recognition within the
sociological tradition of non-structural and dynamic aspects of movement forma-
tion and collective action.
In their most recent writings, some of the key exponents f social movement
theory have attempted to formulate a more dynamic model. McAdam et al.
(2001:43-50) do this by reconceptualising opportunity structure as the “attribution
of threat and opportunity”; mobilising structures as the “social appropriation” of
organisation and membership; strategic framing as “social construction” and rep-
ertoires of action as “innovative collective action.”
Nevertheless, I am not convinced that either the European new social move-
ment perspective or the recent attempts to reformulate classical social movement
theory address the fundamental theoretical weaknesses. My objections to the
model are three-fold. First, it does not take sufficient cognisance of the dynamic
forms of organisation—primarily the formation of transnational networks—that
are increasingly in evidence. Of course, these forms are not entirely new—they
have precursors as far back as the global campaign against slavery starting in the
eighteenth century (see Hochschild, 2006), but have been significantly enhanced
by the information and communication technologies that became prevalent in the
latter part of the twentieth century. Furthermore, it is not that these forms did
not exist before, but rather that they have now become the paradigmatic forms
of organisation. Increasingly they are essential for success. Second, this model
exhibits a state-centric and national bias and does not adequately account for the
transnational dimension. Third, its morally detached perspective fails to account
for the subjective motivation of actors beyond their ‘interests’ and itself pretends












It is therefore worth investigating a number of other perspectives for theoretical
tools appropriate to the study of AIDS activism.
3.2.3 The network perspective in the social sciences
Social network analysis has become an increasingly popular technique in the social
and behavioural sciences. It focuses on the webs of interrelationships between in-
dividuals. Individuals (‘actors’) are considered primarily as nodes in the network,
rather than as the repository of individual agency. A basic premise of network
thinking is that outcomes are shaped more by the ‘network effects’ that result cu-
mulatively from the relationships between nodes than by the characteristics of the
nodes themselves. Applied to social networks, this view holds that an individual’s
significance in a social configuration results from the ties (strong or weak, many or
few, etc.) between that individual and others in the network.
Social network analysis is closely related to the rise of ‘systems thinking’ and
‘complex systems’ in the sciences, particularly in biology, climate science, com-
puter science and engineering. For example, Cilliers (1998:12–13) distinguishes
between two approaches to modelling complex systems: the traditional analytical
approach (‘rule-based’ models) and connectionist models (e.g. neural networks).
The former assume that a system can be adequately described by specifying rules
analytically, whereas the latter acknowledges that a system may be too complex
to describe in such fashion and can be approached better through models that
replicate some of the features of complex systems (such as self-organisation). In
this way connectionist models may be able to account for certain ‘emergent prop-
erties’ of complex systems that analytical models are not. Formal social network
analysis makes use of statistical and mathematical techniques to describe the rela-
tional structure of networks and emphasises “explicit, mathematical statements of
structural properties, with agreed upon formal definitions” (Wasserman and Faust,
1994:17) in order to develop formal and testable models.
While the application of this type of detailed structural analysis to AIDS act-
ivism may well prove to be a productive exercise, I will attempt to do so in this
thesis (except to a very limited extent later in this chapter). Nevertheless, many of












defined ‘structural properties’) are useful for developing an understanding of how
activist networks form, organise themselves and produce social effects. In particu-
lar, as I will argue later in this section, a network perspective allows us to explain
how activist movements are sometimes able to wield influence far beyond what
would be expected from their position in the configuration of political power (if
the latter is understood in conventional terms).
I argued earlier that any study of AIDS activismmust take account of the role of
individuals, and my analysis does retain individual agency as an important factor.
Since a network perspective de-emphasises the characteristics of individuals in fa-
vour of network effects, it does not seem capable of helping us to accommodate
the individual aspect. But despite the tension between network theory and indi-
vidual agency, the former nevertheless suggest the possibility of an understand-
ing of the role of key individuals that derives from their ‘position in the network.’
For example, certain individuals—owing to their particular sets of relationships
with others—are uniquely able to bring together diverse groupings and to mobil-
ise strategic individuals and groups. Perhaps a classic example is Granovetter’s
description of “the strength of weak ties.” In Granovetter’s view, having a large
number of ‘weak’ connections to other individuals, i.e. to a generally more diverse
set of acquaintances, is more important in social mobilisation than the strength
of those connections. While ‘strong’ ties—such as close friendship and kinship —
may be highly effective in mobilising those individuals to whom one is so tied, these
have two disadvantages: (1) one is likely to have fewer such ties and (2) they are less
likely to enable mobilisation beyond a certain social grouping (such as a neighbour-
hood or ethnic community). The counter-intuitive conclusion is that the weak ties
between individuals in different groups are more important than the strong ties
within groups. There is strong empirical evidence supporting this analysis (see
Granovetter, 1973; 1983). While this perspective is usually applied at the group
level to explain why certain issues gain wider traction than others, it is applicable
also at the level of key individuals. Empirical studies of AIDS activism seem to con-
firm that a relatively small number of individuals can bring to bear the intergroup
linkages that are key to wide mobilisation, even if most movement participants rely
on strong ties to mobilise friends and family (see chapter 3). Both ‘bridging ties’












Cilliers (1998) points out in his philosophical study of complex systems that
while a complex systems perspective undermines traditional ‘structural’ models,
this does not preclude relatively stable patterns of interaction—and therefore re-
latively stable structure—from emerging in a complex system. This suggests that
in certain circumstances traditional non-network-oriented approaches may be ad-
equate, as long as one does not ignore network effects where they do occur. There
are therefore two reasons why a network perspective does not preclude an emphasis
on the role of individuals: (1) the influence of individuals can itself be understood
in network terms, and (2) when a network exhibits relatively stable patterns of in-
teraction, the role of particular nodes may not differ all that much from what a
traditional agential analysis would suggest. In other words, as I argued earlier,
structure and institutions constrain, but also enable purposive individual actions.
But a network perspective can also help us describe certainmobilising strategies
that have become possible owing to technological innovation, and that have proven
successful in recent struggles. Heckscher (2006) argues, for example, that there are
fundamental organisational reasons to adopt a network approach to mobilisation.
First, the traditional socialmovementmodel ofmass action based on cohesive solid-
arity such as class solidarity have in recent times been unable to sustain a militant
base that can energise organisation.3 And those struggles built on the identity-
based ‘new social movement’ model have remained local and isolated (Heckscher,
2006:329). In contrast, he argues, networks—formations that are fluid, open and
generally voluntary, without the stable structures and hierarchies of traditional
organisations—can be very effective in dealing with complex problems of organ-
isation, and be effective agents of social change (Heckscher, 2006:330).
It is by no means new to apply the idea of social networks to social move-
ments and mobilisation, but the idea has generally been employed in the context
of recruitment — i.e. how the social linkages between individuals and communit-
ies help or hinder recruitment of new members into movements (e.g. Tilly, 1978;
Snow et al., 1980; McAdam, 1982; cited in Olesen, 2006:10). Later in this chapter
I will develop a notion of ‘transnational networks of influence’ that draws on social
movement theory but applies it specifically to the mobilisation of transnational net-
3His analysis is applied particularly to American organised labour, though he makes general












works and that goes beyond active movement participants to explain the impact
and influence of activism.
3.2.4 ‘Transnational social movements’
Intellectuals broadly aligned with the left have often been rather pessimistic about
the impact of globalisation, believing that it reduces the opportunities for the social
regulation of the economy. In a globally integrated economy, capital is increas-
ingly ‘footloose’ and able to exercise ‘exit options.’ The so-called anti-globalisation
movement, too, is premised on this view, often aiming protest action at the institu-
tions perceived as undermining communities by furthering the unfettered flow of
capital, goods and services. But increasingly there is an alternative view, namely
that the growth of communication and movement across national boundaries (fa-
cilitated in part by new communication technologies and lower cost air travel) also
expands the opportunities for global movements for equity and justice. Theorists
as diverse as Manuel Castells, Ernesto Laclau and Antonio Negri have adopted
this more optimistic view (see Castells, 1998; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau,
1990; Hardt and Negri, 2000; 2004). The activist movements that have been most
successful at exploiting the opportunities created by economic and political glob-
alisation are those that themselves have a transnational character—or which are
able to ‘jump scale’ and draw on supportive international networks and resources.
International AIDS activism is probably one of the best examples of this.
Earlier I criticised social movement theory for its domestic bias. A number of
approaches have emerged that attempt to overcome this bias and account for the
emergence of ‘transnational social movements.’ These include what della Porta
and Tarrow (2005a:232–233) term ‘transnational relations’ from within the inter-
national relations tradition, such as Keohane and Nye (1972) as well as ‘global civil
society’ and ‘transnational citizenship’ approaches such as Edwards and Hulme
(1996), Wapner (1995) and Soysal (1994). In addition, some of the leading expo-
nents of social movement theory have also turned their attention to the transna-
tional domain, but argue that the essential insights of social movement theory re-
mains applicable. Tarrow and McAdam (2005:122) argue, for example, that “al-












processes from the social movement repertoire, like mobilisation, are so essential
to contentious politics that it is hard to understand these new phenomena as if they
were wholly new.” Others have attempted to apply the basic categories of social
movement theory (political opportunities, mobilising structures, framing processes)
to the transnational domain but also introduce concepts such as ‘issue networks’
(see, for example, Smith et al., 1997).
Most promising of the developments in traditional social movement theory is
the notion of ‘complex internationalism’ elaborated by della Porta and Tarrow
(2005a;b). Complex internationalism is a development of Keohane and Nye’s
concept of ‘complex interdependence’ and argument that “increasing international
interdependence produces sustained interactions …leading to the creation of in-
terstate and transgovernmental practises and institutions below and outside of the
state level of international relations” (cited in della Porta and Tarrow, 2005a:234).
They include nonstate actors in their schema and define ‘complex international-
ism’ as:
…the expansion of international institutions, international regimes,
and the transfer of resources of local and national actors to the in-
ternational stage, producing threats, opportunities and resources for
international NGOs, transnational social movements and, indirectly,
grassroots social movements. (della Porta and Tarrow, 2005a:235)
Unlike some in the social movement perspective, della Porta and Tarrow view
globalisation and transnationalism as introducing aspects that are new and that
require analytical reflection. They offer ‘complex internationalism’ as a synthetic
perspective that is neither exclusive nor all-encompassing (della Porta and Tarrow,
2005a:240). In this sense it is a useful perspective, but it does not yet draw on the
network perspective which I see as holding most promise for anchoring empirical
reflection on AIDS activism.
3.2.5 Transnational advocacy networks
An approach that draws on the network perspective, and that is also able to take
account of the transnational dimension of AIDS activism, is the study of ‘transna-












seminal study Activists beyond borders (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and also employed by
Smith and Siplon (2006). Their analysis is attractive since, unlike many others,
it goes beyond International NGOs (INGOs) and views also the networks which
domestically-focused movements leverage (and in which not all movement mem-
bers necessarily actively participate) as central. It may be productive to distinguish,
as Tarrow (2001:2) does, between three forms of transnational action: (1) Transna-
tional Social Movements; (2) International Nongovernmental Organisations; and
(3) Transnational Activist Networks. The third of these categories is most applic-
able to transnational AIDS activism. A second approach focusing on the transna-
tional domain, the study of ‘global civil society,’ is briefly discussed later in this
section.
According to Keck and Sikkink (1998:1), transnational advocacy networks
“multiply channels of access” to the international system by creating new links
among actors in civil societies, states, and international organisations. In this way,
civil society actors are able to exercise greater influence over policy. They define
networks as “forms of organisation characterised by voluntary, reciprocal, and ho-
rizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:8).
Their main argument is that the impact of activism at the domestic level is to a
significant extent a function of these transnational networks. Evans (2000) argues
that transnational networks enable what he terms ‘counter-hegemonic globalisa-
tion.’ Concrete examples of success often cited include the human rights move-
ment, the women’s mov ment, the environmental movement and the impact of
anti-sweatshop campaigns. Importantly, they conceive of networks as deliberately
constructed organisational structures: “claims around issues amenable to interna-
tional action do not produce transnational networks. Activists … do” (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998:14). It is a distinct advantage of their analysis that individual agency
is not ignored and that networks are not reduced to the automatic result of struc-
tural factors. Furthermore, their emphasis on active participation in transnational
network formation and information flows accords with the empirical findings that
certain individuals and relatively small networks of key activists play a critical role
in mobilising AIDS activist movements.
Four tactics are typical of these networks: (1) information politics (quick generation












greatest impact); (2) symbolic politics (employing actions and stories that make sense
of a situation to an audience that is often far away); (3) leverage politics (calling upon
powerful actors to affect a situation that less powerful network participants are
unable to influence); and (4) accountability politics (holding powerful actors to their
previously stated positions or policies) (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:16–25).
This conception of transnational advocacy networks is powerful, and appro-
priately refers to the links between actors within various spheres of the interna-
tional system. However, in its application Keck and Sikkink often revert to a more
simplistic conception of the operation of networks: namely that they increase the
leverage of domestic civil society actors over national governments via the so-called
‘boomerang pattern’ (see figure 3.3):
When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked,
the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational net-
works may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly
search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states
from outside. (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:12)
Clearly, this pattern does have some applicability to AIDS activism. In
De Waal’s view, for example, this is responsible for much of the success of AIDS
activism in Africa, where domestic activists have been able to exploit transna-
tional networks comprising international NGOs, international (interstate) organ-
isations—including those forming part of the UN system such as UNAIDS and
the WHO—and donor governments as a means of leverage over their own gov-
ernments, even where those governments have not been susceptible to traditional
pressure exerted within the domestic political system.
African governments are … located in new webs of accountability,
reaching downwards to new domestic players (CSOs4 and citizens
in international agencies), sideways to other African governments,
the African Union and subregional organisations, and upwards to a
changed and permeable set of foreign institutions. African citizen act-
























Source: Adapted from Keck and Sikkink (1998).
clusively on domestic institutions and processes that are fragile and
easily manipulated. (De Waal, 2006:58-59)
3.2.6 Transnational networks of influence
However, transnational networks are more complex than the triangular concep-
tion of influence that the boomerang pattern suggests. While the boomerang pat-
tern is undeniably discernible, it is but one manifestation of what could more ap-
propriately be termed ‘transnational networks of influence.’ The boomerang con-
ception neglects factors other than pressure applied by other states. In my view
the network model should be expanded to include not only networks of activists
and NGOs, but also other actors, so that we are describing webs of influence that
may include (in the case of AIDS activism) scientific communities, international
bureaucrats, diplomats, but even extending to individuals and institutions within
the target state. Often pressure is brought to bear via such complex webs of in-
fluence, rather than through direct movement-to-state or state-to-state pressure.
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While Keck and Sikkink (1998:117) do consider the ‘vulnerability’ of the target
state to pressure a key factor in network effectiveness, the empirical research draw-
ing on the framework developed in this chapter demonstrate that allies, or at least
sympathetic individuals within the target state, are often decisive (see chapter 3).
The proposed conception of networks of influence is also more compatible with
the general network perspective and with the theoretical innovations it allows.
Furthermore, as will become clear in the case studies, relationships (often quite
close personal ones) between key players in activist movements—both within coun-
tries and across borders—have played a very significant role in the formation of
transnational networks of influence (see Smith and Siplon, 2006). While McAdam
and Rucht (1993, cited in Keck and Sikkink, 1998:9) acknowledge that “some issue
areas reproduce transnationally the webs of personal relationships that are crucial
in the formation of domestic networks,” I will argue that these ‘webs of personal
relationships,’ are in fact key to both the emergence and the influence of networks.
In other words, the dense networks of friendship, love and political comradeship
among gay men that contributed to the rapid emergence of AIDS activism in the
United States are discernible to an extent even in international activist networks.
3.2.7 Global civil society?
A term increasingly common in both popular and theoretical discussions of the in-
ternational dynamics of contestatory politics—particularly where this involves act-
ivists and NGOs—is that of ‘global civil society.’ However, there is by no means
consensus on how this should be approached theoretically. Tarrow (2001:2) cau-
tions against making too direct a jump
…from globalization or some other such process to transnational so-
cial movements and thence to a global civil society. [Theorists who
do so] fail to adequately distinguish social movements, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and transnational networks and do not
adequately specify their relations with each other or with states and
international institutions.
He further cautions that states remain dominant in most areas of policy, that












transnational networks and NGOs are not the only agents operating transnation-
ally—pointing out that states and state-led institutions often fund and control non-
state transnational actors like NGOs (Tarrow, 2001:2-3).
It is important to look critically at the dynamics of the alignments and disalign-
ments that occur within global activist networks and networks of influence. Tvedt
goes so far as to liken the adulatory accounts of NGOs as the world’s conscience to
the ‘glorious narratives’ of nineteenth century European historians and argues, in
the same vein as Tarrow, that international relief and development NGOs should
not be analysed as global civil society but in fact form part of a new, broader so-
cial system embedded in the international state system (Tvedt, 2004:135-136). An
uncritical assumption that international NGOs form part of a global civil society
that acts as counterweight to the power of other (less democratic) transnational
actors—including states, international organisations and multinational corpora-
tions—would be naive.
It seems to me that global civil society, if we are to use the term at all, is best
conceived of as the contested and fragmentary terrain of transnational contentious
political and social action. It is not clear that the notion of global civil society
significantly adds to the theoretical toolbox we can apply to transnational AIDS
activism, and it certainly carries the danger of implying a unified counterweight
to less benevolent transnational actors. But the notion is useful insofar as it ac-
knowledges the critical international dimension to civil society struggles and the
increasing importance of the transnational domain for activists.
3.3 Origins of the Treatment Action Campaign
On 10 December 1998 (International Human Rights Day), Zackie Achmat and a
handful of friends and comrades from the anti-apartheid struggle in Cape Town
in the 1980s founded the Treatment Action Campaign. The group stood on the
steps of St George’s Cathedral in Cape Town, handing out pamphlets to passers-
by that called for greater access to antiretroviral treatment. Many of these people
told the group that they had never known AIDS could be treated: ‘Passers-by were
surprised. Not many of them knew that you could treat AIDS. They didn’t realise












Figure 3.4: Government inaction on AIDS
Source: www.zapiro.com. ©2003-2012 Zapiro. Printed with permission from Zapiro.com.
Shortly before, at anti-apartheid and gay rights activist Simon Nkoli’s me-
morial service in November 1998, Achmat had called for the creation of a cam-
paign for access to antiretroviral treatment. In his speech he acknowledged that
‘government cannot do everything’, but appealed to the government to work with
the new campaign to bring down the cost of treatment so that it could be made
available more widely.5 This statement reflects his expectation that the campaign
would face strong opposition from the pharmaceutical industry, whose pricing
policies (enabled by patent protection) presented the most salient obstacle to the
wider availability of antiretroviral drugs.6 As it turned out, a larger obstacle be-
came government intransigence.
It is significant that the initial announcement was made at the funeral of
Nkoli, whose death the organisation later described as a ‘defining moment’ (TAC,
2001:2). Nkoli died of AIDS, unable to access appropriate treatment. He was
considered especially courageous for having come out as gay to his ANC com-
rades at the time that he stood trial for his anti-apartheid activities. (In November
1986, a number activists from the Vaal triangle, Nkoli among them, and senior
United Democratic Front leaders, were charged with treason in the so-called Del-
mas treason trial (Seekings, 2000:145).)
5Part of the speech can be seen in the video documentary ‘TAC: The first five years…’ (Lewis,
2003).












Though they were not close, Achmat knew and worked with Nkoli, who be-
came leader of the Gay and Lesbian Organisation of the Witwatersrand (GLO), in
early 1990s gay rights activism.7 Nkoli’s death shook his friends and colleagues and
brought home to many the stark reality of the high cost and difficulty of obtain-
ing correctly administered treatment. Achmat cites Nkoli’s experience of ‘having
intermittent treatment and having tried Virodene8 and so on and [having] kidney
failure and died as a consequence of not having proper medical treatment, not
having medical treatment through a public healthcare programme’ and the con-
trast with that of Edwin Cameron (who recovered rapidly from AIDS after going
on ART in 1996) as crucial in his forming an understanding of what antiretroviral
therapy could do.9
TAC’s relatively inauspicious beginnings already reflect some of the most im-
portant characteristics of the movement: the critical role played by deeply com-
mitted activists schooled in the political lexicon of the anti-apartheid struggle, its
drawing on experience gained during earlier political activities (including Trotsky-
ist revolutionary activity and gay rights activism), the reliance on personal rela-
tionships and strong ties of affection and trust, the centrality of moral appeals and
strongly symbolic gestures, and the framing of its claims in terms of human rights
discourse (see Johnson, 2006).
But I will argue that there is a further crucial source of TAC’s impact: its con-
struction and leveraging of (transnational) networks of influence. These involve the
effective mobilisation of international solidarity and influence through the building
of activist and support networks, but also draw on the informal but robust networks
(both inherited from individuals and meticulously built over time), which connect
the movement to individuals from diverse fields such as science, international or-
ganisations, foreign governments, state institutions and political parties, including
the African National Congress. These connections allowed it to influence, gather
information from and mobilise support from many individuals who would not or
7 Interview, Z. Achmat (30 April 2008).
8Virodene was a supposed anti-HIV agent ‘discovered’ by a South African medical technician,
that was initially enthusiastically endorsed by Mbeki. Upon closer scrutiny from the medicines
regulatory authority, the substance turned out to be an industrial solvent with no evidence for its
safety or efficacy and the body refused permission for clinical trials. See Myburgh (2007a;b;c;d;e).












could not openly support the organisation.
3.4 From the struggle against apartheid to act-
ivism under democracy
TAC cannot be understood without looking at the continuities between it and
its historical precursors, in particular the anti-apartheid struggle (and the variety
of Trotskyist agitation in which many of its founders engaged), gay activism and
American AIDS activism. However, it is by no means the passive recipient of
political history: while consciously drawing upon its history, it also continuously
(and strategically) refashions that political legacy. This continuity has been fairly
well covered in the existing literature, especially by Friedman and Mottiar (2005;
2006), Robins (2004) and Mbali (2006). In order to properly situate my account of
TAC’s building and leveraging of networks, I will briefly review this literature and
provide further depth (especially by highlighting the founders’ history of Trotskyist
organising), drawing on extensive key informant interviews.
Many of TAC’s early leaders were veterans of the anti-apartheid struggle. Sev-
eral authors (Friedman andMottiar, 2005; Robins, 2004), as well as TAC’s leaders
themselves,10 have pointed to what one could term TAC’s ‘struggle heritage’ as
central to its self-conception as well as to its engagement within the South African
polity. The continuity with this history is evident in its political style and strategy
and its use of symbolism and culture —what Robbins has called the ‘creative re-
appropriation of locally embedded political symbols, songs and styles of the anti-
apartheid struggle’ (Robins, 2004:665). TAC employs the political lexicon of the
struggle: as at political rallies of liberationmovements like the ANC-alignedUnited
Democratic Front during apartheid, speakers at TAC events commonly start with
the right-fisted salute and the cry ‘Amandla!’ (power), which the audience answers
with ‘Awethu!’ (to the people). Members address each other as ‘comrade’, sing
struggle songs (the words of which have been altered to refer to TAC’s demands)
and toyi-toyi11 at protest marches. Being situated within this tradition also provides
10Interviews, Z. Achmat (16 June 2007) and M. Heywood (17 December 2007 and 10 January
2008).












TAC with legitimacy that opposition politics in South Africa generally lacks.
Friedman and Mottiar point to the similarity between the tactics employed in
the struggle against apartheid and those employed by TAC (Friedman and Mot-
tiar, 2006:25). These include the use of the courts, international solidarity, broad
alliances and (occasionally) civil disobedience. Its focus on mass mobilisation is
arguably related to the involvement of key leaders in the campaigns of the United
Democratic Front during the 1980s.
TAC has framed its struggle with a ‘human rights discourse,’ arguing that ac-
cess to life-saving treatment is a fundamental human right (Mbali, 2006). That this
is the primary framing of TAC’s demands becomes apparent with even a cursory
review of its pamphlets, posters, documents and public statements. This rights-
based discourse also represents the intersection of what I call the ‘politics of moral
consensus’12 and a key TAC strategy, namely the use of litigation to enforce the
legal rights conferred by the new South African Constitution. By frequently stating
that the rights it insists upon are guaranteed by theConstitution, it both strengthens
the moral force of its appeal by locating it within the trajectory of South Africa’s
liberation and makes clear that its challenge is not to the legitimacy of the govern-
ment or the state, but to government policies.
TAC’s appeals to the traditions of the ANC-led liberation struggle and to a
universal human rights discourse were crucial to the legitimation of its demands
within the political context of post-apartheid South Africa. Zackie Achmat him-
self has acknowledged that TAC risked losing the support of its own members if
it were ‘seen to be threatening democratically elected leaders’ (quoted in Fried-
man and Mottiar, 2005). This was especially important in order to withstand the
direct attacks upon its legitimacy and credibility, fuelled by Mbeki and his circle’s
apparent view of TAC as a front for international pharmaceutical companies in a
CIA-supported campaign to promote the view that HIV causes AIDS. In an in-
famous caucus meeting of ANC parliamentarians in September 2000, Mbeki is
reported to have said, ‘The Treatment Action Campaign is leading the statements
and vitriol against one. They are funded by pharmaceutical companies in the US’
ing of political slogans or singing, traditionally used during political protests in South Africa.
12 This formulation is derived from Achmat’s own statement that TAC owes much of its impact













(Feinstein, 2007). This allegation has resurfaced repeatedly, and was actively pro-
moted by AIDS denialists like Matthias Rath and Antony Brink.
But, as Friedman and Mottiar point out, it is not merely a question of main-
taining legitimacy; TAC strategically exploits its struggle heritage:
TAC’s location, albeit in ambiguous fashion, in the ANC tradition
also gives it an important asset: it enables it to use the imagery of the
ANC’s anti-apartheid struggle as an important ‘discursive tool’ in its
attempt to achieve legitimacy and moral support. It has referred, for
example, to its civil disobedience campaign as a ‘Defiance Campaign’,
evoking a celebrated ANC campaign against apartheid laws in 1952.
(Friedman and Mottiar, 2005:522)
The location of TAC within ANC tradition is certainly ambiguous given the as-
sociation of its founders with earlier ‘entryist’ attempts to influence the ANC and
shift it towards revolutionary socialist politics. Zackie Achmat, Mark Heywood,
Jack Lewis, Deena Bosch, Laddie Bosch, Sharon Ekambaram and Herman Reu-
ter are early TAC activists who were members of the ‘Marxist Workers’ Tendency
of the ANC’ (MWT). The MWT was a Trotskyist group, closely associated with
the Militant Tendency in the United Kingdom, active in exile and underground
in South Africa during the 1980s.
According to Heywood, those early TAC cadres drew on their shared exper-
ience, and specifically a common ‘method of analysis and work’ developed in the
course of their revolutionary activity.13 This included a common analysis of the
state and state power, derived to a significant extent from Marxist thinking14 and
a shared emphasis on the importance of mass mobilisation.
Arguably, TAC’s loyalty to the ANC as the primary liberation movement,
while at the same time not shying away from holding the party and the ANC gov-
ernment to account (including a willingness to engage in open conflict), also derives
13 Interview, M. Heywood (10 January 2008). Both Heywood and Achmat pay pay tribute to
Rob Petersen (who later practised as an advocate in Cape Town, but in exile in London at the
time) as a political mentor to whom they owe much of their strategic thinking.
14 It should be noted that most of these former MWT members no longer pursue revolutionary













from the early cadres’ experiences in the MWT. Lewis recalls the view that revolu-
tionary activity had to be undertaken under the ANC umbrella, but that they also
had an awareness of the ‘problematic’ ANC leadership.15 Despite its attempt to
operate within the ANC, the MWT was not tolerated by the ANC. While Achmat
himself was never formally expelled from the ANC, almost the entire MWT lead-
ership (including Rob Petersen, Martin Legassick and Paula Ensor) were. Many
former members routinely refer to the attitude of the ANC’s exiled leadership to
left-wing dissent as ‘Stalinist’.
Interestingly, TAC was not the first health-focused initiative by former MWT
members. The Bellville Community Health Project (part of the Progressive
Primary Healthcare Network), run by Achmat, Lewis and Deena Bosch in the
early 1990s, provided experience with and knowledge of health policy questions
and, more importantly, experience with health-focused communitymobilisation.16
Even the focus on drug prices and the use of generic competition to bring them
down derives to some extent from this experience.17
Mbali attempts to show how earlier traditions of both gay rights activism and
anti-apartheid activism shaped TAC (Mbali, 2006). This is an important correct-
ive to the usual tendency of concentrating only on the struggle heritage, and taken
together with the heritage of global AIDS activism in the American AIDS activist
movement, which built on the gay rights struggles of the 1970s, calls into ques-
tion the radical separation of identity-based ‘new social movements’ and the ‘new
new social movements’ of which contemporary AIDS activism is arguably an im-
portant example. In any event, TAC’s struggle is clearly not rooted in identity
politics, and a nuanced historical perspective must acknowledge both continuities
and discontinuities with identity-based struggles.
Mbali argues that ‘the emergence of anti-apartheid, gay rights activism situated
in universal rights-based discourse provided the basis for such gay rights activists
to form broad-based, human rights-focused alliances, such as TAC, in the post-
apartheid era’ (Mbali, 2006:134). Certainly it is true that some of the strategies
that TAC employed with great success—such as constitutional litigation—can be
15 Interview, J. Lewis (24 November 2007).
16 Interviews, Z. Achmat (16 June 2007); J. Lewis (24 November 2007); D. Bosch (26 November
2007).












traced to key activists like Achmat’s role in prior gay rights activism. Achmat led
the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) at the time that
it launched two landmark cases in the early post-apartheid period, successfully
challenging—on the grounds of non-discrimination provisions in the in the new
South African Constitution—the continued criminalisation of ‘sodomy’ and the
unequal treatment of foreign same-sex partners of South Africans (compared to
heterosexual spouses).18
The anti-apartheid struggle, left-wing organising, gay rights activism and the
new struggle for access to AIDS treatment were linked in the minds of the early
TAC activists, and they relied both on the skills they had acquired and the rela-
tionships that had been established during the earlier struggles in embarking on
the new.
3.5 Mobilising through networks
3.5.1 Personal networks: a resource for movement build-
ing
The interlinked networks of activists that early TAC leaders had built up prior to
TAC’s founding became an important resource in the building of TAC, particu-
larly with respect to (1) a shared political outlook, (2) a network of people that could
be drawn on to mobilise resources for the new campaign and (3) relationships of
trust which could underpin leadership in the fledgling movement. Heywood ex-
plains it as follows:
I think the [MWT] experience was important, and I think part of the
experience was that a group of us had already established a way of
working together and a certain level of trust. And I think there was
a kind of unconscious method that had been developed, a political
method, a way of thinking about the government, about the state,
about social organisations, about social mobilisation and so on. You
18 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another vMinister of Justice andOthers
1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) (S. Afr.); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others












know the [Marxist Workers’] Tendency people provided the initial
cadre that was needed to get TAC up and running. Let me just
say that it was never a deliberate plan; it wasn’t as if we reconstruc-
ted the Tendency grouping for TAC. It was just the group of people
whom Zackie, in particular, drew on when we started up TAC. That
group of people and their connections, people like myself, Sharon
[Ekambaram] came in early, Laddie Bosch, Deena Bosch, and other
people…19
Achmat argues that the ‘institutional memory of activism’ is a resource that the
organisation actively tapped: ‘You require a body of educated activists … a body
with a knowledge that is institutionally transmitted.’20 While he underplays the im-
portance of individuals in making this knowledge available to the organisation (‘not
through any individual, but through our collective knowledge’21), he nevertheless
acknowledges the importance of certain key individuals:
…I think that we have a very powerful team of leaders and there is
complexity in that team as it’s operated over the years. You will have
someone like me, who is probably a very domineering and dominat-
ing personality, who makes, who has a long experience, at the time
of the start of TAC about twenty-five years experience in politics …
and you’d haveMarkHeywoodwith also about twenty years of experi-
ence, and you’d have Theo Steele [senior trade union leader and early
TAC activist] with thirty years of experience in politics, you’d have
someone like Hermann Reuter with twenty years in politics, you’d
have someone like Sipho Mthathi with about five years in student
activism … and then a serious history in TAC. So you’d have any
number of people from Nonkosi Khumalo [now TAC Chairperson],
later Vuyiseka Dubula [now TAC General Secretary], Nathan Gef-
fen [now TAC Treasurer] who did not have any political experience,
but brought enormous scientific experience and technical capacity to
19 Interview, M. Heywood (10 January 2008).
20 Interview, Z. Achmat (16 June 2007).













In addition to the skills and experience they bring, individuals can make available
to the movement their established networks. The social networks of individuals
are both a means by which the movement is initially launched (until it is estab-
lished enough and has gained enough momentum to start drawing people in) and
a strategic resource available to the movement. Both the history of TAC’s origins
and the reflections of the activists themselves, point to trust as a critical element
of the networks used to build up a movement. The high level of trust often de-
rives from the blurring of personal and professional relationships. It is impossible
to spend time with the TAC leadership without forming the impression that there
exists genuine friendship between most of the individuals involved, and a number
of key leaders are even present or former romantic partners.
Certainly the relationships of trust built up duringMWT activities (particularly
between Achmat and Heywood) were a key resource in building the new move-
ment. While both underplay this dimension, it is clear from what they do say that
there is an unusual rapport between the two and a meeting of minds that resulted
in their becoming the strategic and tactical ‘masterminds’ of TAC. Sharon Ekam-
baram, an early TAC activist andMWTmember who is alsomarried toHeywood,
describes their relationship thus:
Mark and Zackie have an incredible connection, and it just cannot be
explained. I think it’s one of the strengths of TAC in that while they
have disagreements, they can discuss almost everything, you know, it’s
just… I don’t know if it’s the same now, but for a while they couldn’t
go without a day, talking three or four times, but work-related…23
For most of the first decade of TAC’s existence, the leadership of the organisa-
tion (including senior staff members and elected officials) exhibited an exceptional
degree of deference to Achmat and Heywood on matters of political strategy.24
22 Interview, Z. Achmat (16 May 2008).
23 Interview, S. Ekambaram (11 January 2008).
24 The author directly observed this, and it is confirmed by several interviews (J. Berger, 16
December 2007; D. Bosch, 26 November 2007; V. Dubula, 18 April 2008; S. Ekambaram, 11












Significant strategic decisions such as the initiation of legal action or civil disobedi-
ence often resulted from ideas raised by either Achmat or Heywood with consensus
rapidly emerging in theNational Executive Committee (NEC)—the highest policy-
making body of TAC between National Conferences, later renamed the National
Council—and the Secretariat (elected officials who make day-to-day decisions).
TAC leaders acknowledge the existence of an informal ‘core group’ of leaders
around Achmat and Heywood that during the early years effectively made the im-
portant decisions. Later, this group generated most of the strategic thinking that
informed important decisions of the formal structures. Nathan Geffen recounts
how important decisions were usually made informally, often over the phone, by
a small number of individuals who formed the core of the movement.25 (It should
be noted that the character of leadership has shifted substantially in recent years
with the transition to a new generation of leaders and Achmat’s withdrawal from
TAC’s day-to-day work.)
Both the trust that underpinned decision-making, and the fact that this did not
necessarily imply unanimity is illustrated by the example of the decision in 2000 to
import generic fluconazole from Thailand in defiance of Pfizer’s patent. Planning
for this action (named the Christopher Moraka Defiance Campaign in honour
of a TAC activist who died of AIDS-related cryptococcal meningitis, unable to
afford the life-saving treatment (see Cameron andGeffen, 2005)) proceeded largely
without Heywood’s involvement. Upon learning of it he was not convinced of its
wisdom, fearing that neither TAC’s membership nor the general public would
understand it.26 He acknowledges that Achmat had to ‘push that through’, but
cites it as one of a number of occasions where Achmat’s decisive leadership proved
vital to TAC’s success.27
However, as the organisation grew, structures became more formal, members
organised in branches becamemore influential, new leaders rose through the ranks
and a significant staff complement managed an increasing number of formal pro-
grammes with large budgets. Opposition from the rank and file or in the NEC
has overturned significant proposals put forward by Achmat and Heywood. For
25 Interview, N. Geffen (19 April 2008).
26 Interview, N. Geffen (19 April 2008).












example, a proposal to accommodate a key ally, the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU), during the 2003 civil disobedience campaign (by re-
naming the campaign a ‘mass protest campaign’) was rejected by members and
NEC delegates during deliberations.28
Despite the fact that theTAC leadership drew heavily on pre-existing networks,
it became increasingly diversified, and what Achmat refers to as second and third-
generation leaders increasingly became part of the web of trust-based relationships
which drove TAC’s strategic decision-making. Heywood acknowledges that the
building of this second layer of leadership was a deliberate strategy of the earlier
leaders, because ‘we realised that TAC needed a local and black leadership, partic-
ularly HIV-positive persons’.29 It was remarkably successful at pulling individuals
like Mandla Majola, Vuyiseka Dubula and many others into both formal and in-
formal decision-making processes. Majola is an early TACmember recruited to its
first branch in Gugulethu and who then helped organis its earliest branches in the
African townships of Cape Town. Majola later became National Organiser and a
very prominent leader before returning to local activities as a ‘district organiser’.
Dubula is a young TAC leader who only joined the organisation in 2002 and later
joined the Western Cape provincial staff. She was elected General Secretary—the
most senior executive position in the organisation—at its 2008 National Confer-
ence and is now considered one of the most prominent AIDS activists in the world.
That early leaders were serious about building a new generation of TAC leaders
is illustrated by the fact that both Achmat and Heywood relinquished their senior
positions (as Chairperson and National Treasurer respectively) and did not make
themselves available for re-election at the 2008 Conference. Achmat stood unop-
posed for the position of Deputy General Secretary. Nonkosi Khumalo, a former
TAC staff member who had later moved to the Heywood-led AIDS Law Project
(now renamed Section27) was elected Chairperson.
This is not to suggest that the growth of TAC and the bureaucratisation of the
organisation did not produce tensions and difficulties. The tension between the
requirements of an NGO bureaucracy administering formal programmes and ac-
countable to donors on the one hand and a democratic membership-based political
28 Interviews, Z. Achmat (16 May 2008); N. Geffen (19 April 2008).












organisation proved very difficult to manage at times. There have been tensions at
the regional level between paid staff members and elected leaders serving on bodies
like the Provincial Executive Committees (now Provincial Councils).30 Tensions
also arose over salary differentials between national and regional staff or perceived
unnecessary interference in the work of regional staff members by national man-
agers.31
While tensions within both the senior leadership and the national manage-
ment team arose periodically, these have in the main been managed successfully.32
During 2007 a serious disagreement arose between the organisation’s first elected
General Secretary (Sipho Mthathi) and members of her management team on the
one hand, and other elected members of the Secretariat, including Achmat, on
the other. This led to a breakdown of trust that resulted in Mthathi and several
other senior staff members leaving the organisation. In response to the crisis, an
Organisational Review Commission was established, which recommended signi-
ficant restructuring of the governance and management structures of the organisa-
tion, including a stronger oversight role for the National Council and Secretariat,
aimed at preventing similar incidents (Achmat, 2008:15). The organisation’s Na-
tional Conference adopted these proposals inMarch 2008. Achmat has repeatedly
blamed weak management systems for these problems,33 and in his last report as
Chairperson to the organisation’s 2008 National Congress stated:
Historically, TAC leadership and management survived through trust
and cohesion that was built through struggle and friendship. The dra-
matic growth of TAC and the new and complex political tasks, as well
as the day-to-day permanent crisis of implementation of HIV preven-
tion and treatment required a different approach.
…A skilled political leadership in TAC has managed many of these is-
sues over more than nine years. … To support skilled political leader-
ship and a motivated membership, TAC requires a professional man-
30 Interviews, V. Dubula (18 April 2008); M.Majola (21 April 2008); P. Ramothwala (11 January
2008).
31 Interviews, V. Dubula (18 April 2008); P. Ramothwala (11 January 2008).
32 Interview, N. Geffen (18 April 2008).












agement and reliable systems that can function in the absence of indi-
viduals in leadership or staff. (Achmat, 2008:15-16)
The difficulties are arguably a result of a hybrid leadership model in which co-
hesion is maintained both through informal trust-based relationships and formal
authority. Despite the difficulties, TAC has managed to make a relatively success-
ful transition from small and highly flexible activist grouping held together by trust
and a strong commitment to common goals, to a formal and bureaucratised or-
ganisation that nevertheless retains many characteristics of the former. The hybrid
model has therefore served it well, but difficulties are likely to persist as it tries to
incorporate the strengths of both ‘activist movement’ and ‘corporate NGO’ lead-
ership models. Many other AIDS activist organisations, including ACT UP34 in
the United States, failed to make similar transitions and as a result failed to sustain
themselves (see Epstein, 1996; Smith and Siplon, 2006). Others, like Gay Men’s
Health Crisis, remain strong, but do not have the political and radical character
of true activist organisations.
3.5.2 Mobilising civil society alliances and international
solidarity networks
It is clear that personal networks and relationships constituted a key resource in
building the movement. This included the establishment of alliances with other
civil society organisations. Heywood’s position as director of the AIDSLaw Project
(ALP)—at that stage a project within the respected Centre for Applied Legal Stud-
ies (CALS) at the University of the Witwatersrand, but which has since become
independent and has been renamed Section27—provided access to resources that
the fledgling TAC would not have been able to mobilise on its own. The associ-
ation with Wits and CALS also helped legitimise it, especially in the eyes of donors
and scientists. Heywood had in fact been hired to the ALP by Achmat, who be-
came its director in the early 1990s, before leaving to become director of the Na-
tional Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE). Important relationships
were formed during this time, including through participation in consultative struc-
34 The name ACT UP is sometimes explained as an acronym for AIDS Coalition To Unleash












tures established by the Department of Health after the new government came to
power in 1994, such as an NGO funding committee and other regular meetings
between then-director of HIV/AIDS Quarraisha Abdool Karim and civil society
representatives.35 Later, after Abdool Karim had left government service and re-
turned to academic research at a prominent HIV/AIDS research centre at the
University of KwaZulu-Natal, the relationship with her would remain important.
She provided crucial expert testimony in TAC’s litigation to compel the govern-
ment to provide PMTCT. Some time after Achmat left the ALP,Heywood became
its director and continued to develop its role as a major advocate for progressive
legal reform and HIV/AIDS policy.
When TAC was founded, the intention was not to ‘go it alone’, but rather
to build a broad front of progressive organisations pushing for access to AIDS
treatment. It was envisaged that TAC would be a campaign operating within the
National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS (NAPWA) and supported
by a range of organisations. Achmat attributes TAC’s later split from NAPWA to
entrenched interests that resisted its radicalisation and transformation into a mass-
based movement. White middle-class gay men dominated NAPWA at the time,
and the organisation’s work reflected this bias.36 Achmat andHeywood, supported
by NAPWAmembers like Mercy Makhalamele and Prudence Mabele, attempted
to gain political control of NAPWA. According to Achmat they met with fierce
resistance from NAPWA leaders, including its director Peter Busse and the chair
of its board, Mary Crew .37
Despite the failure to transform NAPWA, the campaign continued to make
use of resources provided by existing civil society organisations and to build up a
network of supporters. TAC operated largely from the NCGLE offices at first,38
and later made use of the resources of the AIDS Consortium, a consortium of
HIV/AIDS organisations in Johannesburg.39 The founders took care to build
relationships with the leaders of civil society organisations, in particular the la-
bour movement, and courted religious leaders. This approach was clearly rooted
35 Interview, Q. Abdool Karim (9 June 2008).
36 Interview, Q. Abdool Karim (9 June 2008).
37 Interview, Z. Achmat (30 April 2008).
38 Interview, Z. Achmat (30 April 2008).












in earlier political experience and echoed the activities of the NCGLE under
Achmat’s leadership. Says Achmat:
…that was also part of my training in the Marxist Workers’ Tend-
ency, of understanding that you need to construct the broadest coali-
tion possible to deal with a particular issue. … [W]e understood from
Marxism and the ‘united front’ tactics of Marxism that you construc-
ted the broadest possible alliance under the leadership of the working
class, and that’s where I learnt my politics from. But also from the
UDF, and the days before the UDF, the same approach…40
Some of the new organisation’s most reliable allies were drawn from Anglican and
Catholic church leaders, the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Trade Uni-
ons (COSATU)—the largest trade union federation in South Africa—and a num-
ber of NGOs like the Children’s Rights Centre. TAC has since been at great pains
to cultivate and sustain its alliances. In fact, until recently its constitution provided
for representation on its National Executive Committee for various ‘sectors’, like
labour, the faith-based sector, women’s sector and people living with HIV/AIDS
(PWAs) (TAC, 2008).
It is unlikely that the activists would have been able to establish alliances with
the labour movement had it not been for the Struggle background of many of
the early TAC activists (who would otherwise have lacked credibility with trade
union leaders). Heywood acknowledges this: ‘Zackie in particular, and myself
to a lesser extent, were known before TAC, so quite a lot of the people that we
encountered in the early days through TAC didn’t see us as Johnny-come-latelies
who had suddenly arrived on the scene. They knew us from our involvement
before, and trusted us from our basic credentials…’41 Building these alliances was
a deliberately executed strategy:
…from the very beginning we made a point of involving these organ-
isations in TAC so that they could assess for themselves the bona fides
of TAC because they had been involved in trying to put the thing to-
gether.
40 Interview, Z. Achmat (30 April 2008).













And you have to invest in these relationships. Very deliberately I keep
contact with Vavi [General Secretary of COSATU], with Madisha
[President of COSATU at the time] and so on. Even when we don’t
need them or they don’t need us, we talk to them, keep them in the
picture so that there’s a kind of thread that runs through the years.42
This strategy of building alliances with other civil society organisations and mak-
ing use of international solidarity networks was already evident in one of TAC’s
earliest major campaigns, namely against the pharmaceutical industry’s efforts to
undermine a piece of legislation designed to enable the government to force down
the cost of medicines. The Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act,
passed in 1997, aimed at allowing the government to reduce the cost of patented
medicines by allowing for ‘parallel importation’ (import of the originator com-
pany’s product by other parties than its designated distributor) and, depending on
interpretation, compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents. Almost immedi-
ately the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa (PMA) star-
ted opposing the Act, filing notice of motion in 1998 challenging the constitution-
ality of the Act, as well as its compliance with the Trade-Related Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS) agreement that forms part of the World Trade Organisation-
administered international trade regime, and of which South Africa is a signatory.
Only in 2001 did the case come to Court, but after less than a month and a very
vigorous campaign by TAC and its allies (both South African and international),
the parties settled out of court in what is widely seen as a clear defeat for the phar-
maceutical companies (Cleary and Ross, 2002). TAC actively solicited the support
of its trade union and other civil society allies and also solicited support from inter-
national allies in the form of ‘global days of action’, etc., in order to bring pressure
to bear on the multinational pharmaceutical companies in their home countries
and on their supporters in the U.S. government. Commentators have variously
ascribed the retreat by the PMA to activist pressure (Friedman and Mottiar, 2005)
and to the public relations disaster the case turned into for the companies (Van
Niekerk, 2005).












Figure 3.5: The South African government out of step with the world
Source: www.zapiro.com. ©2000-2012 Zapiro. Printed with permission from Zapiro.com.
A key moment in the establishment of TAC’s international solidarity network
was the XIII International AIDS Conference, held in July 2000 in Durban. The
conference is widely remembered as a turning point in the global AIDS response,
with the moral imperative of wider availability of antiretroviral drugs taking centre
stage at the conference.43 A number of factors contributed to this: the impact
of speeches by former South African president Nelson Mandela, teenage activist
Nkosi Johnson and HIV-positive judge Edwin Cameron, the fact that the confer-
ence was held for the first time in a developing country, but also the visibility of
activists and the appeal they made for treatment access.44 In his speech, Cameron
drew a sharp contrast between his own situation as a wealthy African who is able
to purchase life-saving treatment and the millions of AIDS patients in Africa con-
demned to death by the fact that they cannot do so, saying:
Amidst the poverty of Africa, I stand before you because I am able
to purchase health and vigour. I am here because I can pay for life
itself. To me this seems a shocking and monstrous iniquity of very
43 Interviews, G. Gonsalves (20 December 2007); S. Abdool Karim (9 June 2008); H. Coovadia
(10 June 2008).












Figure 3.6: President Mbeki: a lone voice for unreason
Source: www.zapiro.com. ©2000-2012 Zapiro. Printed with permission from Zapiro.com.
considerable proportions—that, simply because of relative affluence,
I should be living when others have died; that I should remain fit and
healthy when illness and death beset millions of others. (Cameron,
2000)
Activists and increasing numbers of doctors and scientists echoed this strong moral
appeal at the conference. TAC organised a ‘Global March for HIV/AIDS Treat-
ment’, which was attended by several thousand protesters and actively supported
by a wide range of local and international organisations. The march was the point
where TAC started garnering wide international attention and was the most sig-
nificant public action yet for the young movement.
TAC drew heavily on its civil society network, particularly its extensive links
with South African trade unions, NGOs and CSOs, to mobilise support for
the march and its demands.45 The marchers prominently carried banners of
many organisations not directly involved in the field of AIDS.46 While the prin-
cipal focus of mobilisation was local,47 the activists also drew on (relatively new)
links with international activists to mobilise support for the march. It was en-
dorsed by at least 258 organisations from across the world: activist organisa-
45 Interview, M. Heywood (10 January 2008).
46 See http://www.tac.org.za/photos/durb1.jpg, retrieved on 7 July 2008.












tions, NGOs, academic groupings and trade unions from countries like the US,
Canada, the UK and Europe, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Malaysia, Thai-
land, Bangladesh, Mexico, Senegal, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Namibia, as well as
many from South Africa (Health GAP Coalition, 2000). American activist or-
ganisations—principally Health GAP, ACT UP Philadelphia, Treatment Action
Group (TAG) and Gay Men’s Health Crisis (GMHC)— actively mobilised for the
Global March in the weeks leading up to the conference, issuing appeals for sup-
port, press releases and setting up a website with campaign materials in English,
French and Spanish.48 This international mobilisation substantially enhanced the
legitimacy of the activists’ demands in the eyes of the watching world media.
According to prominent international AIDS activist Gregg Gonsalves, working
for the New York-based Treatment Action Group (TAG) at the time, the Durban
conference was a galvanising moment for the international treatment access move-
ment, with many US-based groups (like the AIDS Healthcare Foundation) diver-
sifying their programmes based on ‘political solidarity’ with TAC and patients in
the developing world.49 For American activists, the Global March explicitly linked
back to the political marches at earlier conferences, like the Sixth International
AIDS Conference held in San Francisco in June 1990 that was the site of sub-
stantial activist mobilisation (see, for example Orkin, 1990). American activists
‘reconnected to their own anger’ from earlier struggles, an anger that had been
dissipating as treatment became widely available in the US. But Gonsalves attrib-
utes the greatest impact to the ‘vibrancy’ and ‘political culture’ of TAC, which
ignited the international activist movement.50
From this point onward, TAC and its leaders played an increasingly central
role in the international network of activists at the heart of the global treatment
access movement, as the African epidemic became a key focus for American and
European activists. As Smith and Siplon have argued:
The protest march was notable not only in demonstrating the ability of
the South African AIDS activist Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)
48 The website is no longer active, but is archived on the Internet Archive at
http://web.archive.org/web/20000815095002/http://durban2000march.org/, retrieved on 7
July 2008.
49 Interview, G. Gonsalves (20 December 2007).












to mobilise thousands of grassroots activists from deeply impoverished
communities … [but also to] work within the global treatment activist
movement that had furnished organisations and individuals that had
supported TAC in this project. (Smith and Siplon, 2006:81-82)
TAC’s most significant achievement in organising the action was perhaps its abil-
ity to connect the widely divergent social spheres of South African communities
most affected by HIV/AIDS (its grassroots activists consist largely of poor and
unemployed Africans, primarily women), the South African workers’ movement,
transnational social justice movements, aid-oriented Western NGOs such as Me-
decins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and American AIDS activists rooted i the militant
activism and service response mobilised in urban gay communities in the United
States during the 1980s.
To be sure, TAC leaders like Achmat had recognised early on that a South
African campaign for access to antiretroviral treatment could not succeed without
a global campaign. This was partly necessary in order to exercise pressure on the
South African state (through the so-called ‘boomerang effect’), but more import-
antly, in order to address impediments like the intellectual property provisions of
the international trade regime that operate at the global level. Achmat credits Eric
Goemaere of MSF with helping him see this.51 Goemaere came to South Africa in
1999 and later set up the first public sector antiretroviral treatment programme in
Khayelitsha outside Cape Town in partnership with TAC. At Goemaere’s instig-
ation, Achmat attended an MSF conference on access to medicines in Amsterdam
in late 1999 at which he met activists already active on intellectual property rights
issues, notably Jamie Love and Thiru Balasubramaniam of the Consumer Project
on Technology (CPT, nowKnowledge Ecology International) as well as American
AIDS activists Asia Russell and Paul Davis fromACTUPPhiladelphia.52 After the
conference, Achmat and other TAC activists maintained contact with these inter-
national activists—principally by email, including through the IP-Health mailing
list moderated by Love.53
51 Interview, Z. Achmat (16 May 2008).
52 ACT UP Philadelphia is one of the few ACT UP chapters still active.
53 Interview, Z. Achmat (16 May 2008). The IP-Health list has a public archive available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/. A review of the archive confirms that Achmat was












TAC later made use of these contacts in mobilising international support dur-
ing the PMA case described earlier (Smith and Siplon, 2006:98). Activists, for
example, targeted the Gore presidential campaign in an attempt to end the US
Government’s measures against South Africa and in support of the pharmaceutical
industry (which included placing South Africa on a so-called intellectual property
‘watch list’). Love and CPT also assisted during a complaint laid by TAC with the
South African Competition Commission for ‘excessive pricing’ practises by Glaxo
SmithKline (GSK), which led to a settlement in which GSK agreed to voluntarily
licence its products to generic manufacturers.54 The transnational activist network
to which TAC leaders belonged was decisive in changing the intellectual prop-
erty framework that was hampering access to antiretroviral drugs. Particularly the
TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) agreement, which required
World Trade Organisation members to implement patent provisions, including
on pharmaceuticals, was an impediment to the availability of generic ARVs. Gen-
eric drugs were seen as essential for greater access given the extremely high prices
charged by originator companies at the time (see Berger, 2002; ’t Hoen, 2002). An
important milestone was the Doha Declaration (adopted during the WTO Min-
isterial Meeting in Doha in November 2001), which recognised the right of de-
veloping countries experiencing public health emergencies to override intellectual
property rights on pharmaceutical products.55 While the Brazilian government
took the lead in pushing for the adoption of the declaration, and MSF’s interna-
tional campaign was important in creating a climate in which developed countries
could not oppose it, Achmat argues that the Doha declaration could not have oc-
curred without the PMA case and the attention TAC and its allies’ campaign fo-
cused on the relationship between intellectual property rights and access to AIDS
treatment.56
While the building of an international solidarity network was therefore driven
54 Interview, J. Berger (16 December 2007).
55 Specific measures available include compulsory licences and par-
allel importation. The full text of the declaration is available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/Min01/DEC2.doc,
retrieved on 14 January 2008; An explanation of the declaration is available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm, retrieved on 14 Janu-
ary 2008.












by strategic considerations, personal connections were important even here. Early
in 2000, Achmat visited the United States and was put in touch with Gregg Gon-
salves and Mark Harrington of the Treatment Action Group (TAG) in New York
by Loring McAlpin, a mutual friend who had met Gonsalves and Harrington
through ACT UP New York.57 Joint TAC/TAG ‘treatment literacy’ workshops
were held early in 2000 in Johannesburg and Cape Town and included Amer-
ican and South African activists as well as medical professionals like Dr Herman
Reuter.
According to Gonsalves, it is possible to distinguish between between two ‘gen-
erations’ of American activists with whom TAC established links around the time
of the Durban conference. The ‘first generation’ —activists who had been active
in ACT UP and the American AIDS activism of the 1980s (including people like
Gonsalves and Harrington)—were at the time less active in international struggles.
A ‘second generation’ of activists, which included people like Asia Russell and Paul
Davis of ACT UP Philadelphia and Alan Berkman of Health GAP, had a greater
interest in global treatment access and a better understanding of the intellectual
property and trade policy issues.58 While TAC leaders had met the ‘second gen-
eration’ activists first, they ended up forming closer relationships with ‘first gen-
eration’ activists, mediated to a significant extent by Gonsalves. Gonsalves has
remained the most important link between TAC leaders and American activists.
More recently, he played a central role in forging relationships between TAC act-
ivists and Asian, African and Eastern European activists, for example organising
the International Treatment Preparedness Summit in 2003, out of which the in-
ternational activist alliances International Treatment Preparedness Coalition and
Pan African Treatment Access Movement developed. He later moved to South
Africa and helped organise the AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa.
The closer relationship with ‘first generation’ American activists may in part
be explained by the strong personal bond that developed between, in particular,
Achmat and Gonsalves. It is probably also related to greater personal identifica-
tion resulting from shared experiences, including gay activism and first-hand ex-
perience of the HIV epidemic (like Achmat, Gonsalves and Harrington are HIV-
57 Interview, G. Gonsalves (20 December 2007).













A further network that was significantly strengthened during and after the
Durban AIDS Conference is the activist-scientist networks that helped TAC act-
ivists establish their credibility in scientific debates and contributed to the politi-
cisation of scientists. A key moment was when South African president Thabo
Mbeki shocked delegates at the Conference by citing poverty (as opposed to HIV)
as a leading cause of death and stating ‘we cannot blame everything on a single
virus’ (T. Mbeki (2000), cited in Nattrass, 2007:68), which prompted many scient-
ists to align themselves with the activist movement.60 For some scientists like Prof
Hoosen Coovadia, the denialist attack on science and evidence-based health policy
did more to politicise their thinking than the moral claims around treatment ac-
cess.61 Hundreds of leading AIDS scientists signed the Durban Declaration —ad-
dressed to PresidentMbeki and also published inNature62—affirming the scientific
consensus on the viral aetiology of AIDS. Gonsalves points also to Cameron and
Mandela’s speeches at the conference as key moments in the ‘radicalisation’ of the
scientific AIDS community.63 But sustained political engagement by the scientific
community from 2000 onwards is attributable to a significant extent to their parti-
cipation in the emerging ‘transnational network of influence’ involving key South
African andAmerican activists (as well as, especially later, from elsewhere in Africa,
Asia and Europe).
These activist-scientist networks (particularly with respect to North American
scientists) drew on strong linkages established earlier between activists like Gon-
salves and Harrington and the scientific community during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, when new drug development, testing and registration, participation
in clinical trials, etc. were cent- ral to activist efforts to promote greater access
to treatment (more so than pricing and intellectual property). Epstein (1996) and
Smith and Siplon (2006) provide excellent overviews of this period of American
treatment activism. Gonsalves, for example, was a member of ACT UP New
59 Achmat himself mentions being personally affected by HIV as a factor in the rapport between
‘first generation’ American AIDS activists and TAC activists.
60 Interview, S. Abdool Karim (9 June 2008).
61 Interview, H. Coovadia (10 June 2008).
62 Nature 406 (6 July 2000), pp. 15-16.












Figure 3.7: The scientific community calls the South African
government to account
Source: www.zapiro.com. ©2000-2012 Zapiro. Printed with permission from Zapiro.com.
York’s Treatment and Data Committee from 1990 and Harrington from even
earlier. The committee worked to open up scientific structures, with members
for example ‘crashing’ an AIDS Clinical Trials Group Network (ACTG) meet-
ing in 1989, prompting it to set up a Community Constituency Group(Epstein,
1996:286).
Leveraging these international networks has become an important strategy in
TAC’s mobilisation since 2000, with international solidarity campaigns, includ-
ing frequent calls for ‘Global Days of Action’, playing a significant role in its cam-
paigns.64 For example, TAC’s complaint over Glaxo SmithKline’s pricing policies
and its campaign to get the South African government to commit to a public sec-
tor antiretroviral treatment programme drew heavily on its international solidarity
network.
3.5.3 Influencing the state
In order to make sense of the networks described in this paper, they should be un-
derstood in a more inclusive and dynamic sense than that of ‘transnational activist
networks’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). My alternative—‘transnational networks of
influence’—includes the sort of networks that Keck and Sikkink describe, but ex-












pands the notion to include actors such as scientific communities, diplomats and
bureaucrats active in international organisations and even extending into the in-
stitutions of the target state. When from these networks emerge a consensus on a
set of moral or policy ideas and when they are deliberately employed to influence
the broader society (in particular the state, as the embodiment of society’s policy
decision-making), it makes sense to think of them as the foundations of ‘coalitions’
in the sense used by Leftwich and Hogg (2007), i.e. sets of actors or groups acting
in accordance with shared goals (also see Yashar, 1997:15).
The networks of influence that formed the basis of the emerging AIDS treat-
ment coalition extended into the South African state and the ruling party. A num-
ber of ANC parliamentarians were sympathetic to TAC (or at least open to its
messages), even at the height of government denialism, including Barbara Hogan,
Pregs Govender, Andrew Feinstein and Essop Jassat. Mark Heywood maintained
a cordial relationship with Nono Simelela (Chief Director: HIV/AIDS during the
period of greatest conflict between TAC and the government) and she even atten-
ded a conference organised by the organisation.65 The President of the Medical
Research Council (MRC), Malegapuru Makgoba, displayed a high degree of in-
dependence from the government, and at times aligned himself with TAC. For
example, during a controversy over the MRC’s 2001 report into mortality (Dor-
rington et al., 2001), which the government tried to suppress, he refused to with-
draw the report, despite intense pressure (see Nattrass, 2007:92-93).
Clearly, the South African state did not operate as a monolithic entity that
simply resisted or yielded to external pressure. Confusion and reversals in South
African AIDS policy may be explained in part by shifting patterns of power and
influence within state, ruling party and civil service institutions. An example of
policy confusion resulting from internal disagreement was when the Treasury in-
creased the budget for HIV/AIDS programmes substantially in the 2003/2004
budget—apparently with a view to funding a national antiretroviral treatment pro-
gramme —but well before the cabinet had agreed to such a roll-out and while the
President and Minister of Health maintained their staunch opposition to such a
programme. Even the decision to implement the programme taken in August of
that year is widely considered a cabinet revolt (Nattrass, 2007) of which neither












the Minister nor the President was supportive. Despite the antiretroviral treat-
ment programme, the Minister continued to express scepticism about antiretro-
viral drugs and support for alternative and untested ‘treatments’ (see Geffen, 2005;
2010).
A rapprochement occurred between activists and the government in 2006
during the Minister’s prolonged illness. Under the leadership of Deputy Minis-
ter of Health Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, with the support of Deputy President
PhumzileMlambo-Ngcuka, a newNational Strategic Plan forHIV/AIDS—which
included ambitious targets for the expansion of antiretroviral treatment and other
policies to which the Minister was known to be hostile—was adopted in what the
media often described as a ‘palace coup’. Following her return, the progress was
rapidly reversed and tensions flared up, culminating in the dismissal of the Deputy
Minister by Mbeki.
The state mirrored within itself the complexities and tensions of the political
battles surrounding the societal response to AIDS, and the emerging AIDS treat-
ment coalition had both allies and opponents within state institutions at all levels.
The extent of disagreement within the African National Congress with Mbeki
and Tshabalala-Msimang’s approaches became clear after Mbeki was removed
from power and his successor immediately dismissed Tshabalala-Msimang from
her post and replaced her with well-known TAC ally Barbara Hogan.
3.5.4 Illustrating networks of influence
In order to illustrate the ‘network of influence’ forming the basis of an AIDS treat-
ment coalition sketched in the preceding sections, a number of a simplified network
diagram is presented. Figure 3.8 shows the most important links in the network
around the Treatment Action Campaign.66 It should be noted that this is not
intended to be an exhaustive network analysis (for which I do not possess suffi-
cient data), but rather to illustrate the points made in this paper. The nodes and
relationships (‘edges’) included in the network diagram reflect the author’s inter-
pretation of the recollections of key informants that were interviewed in the course
66All visualisations and analysis conducted using Visone version 2.3.4 (Baur et al., 2002; Brandes












of this research. Interviewees were asked extensively about the relationships they
formed and which relationships they consider important to their work, but since
informants were selected not primarily with a network survey in mind, there is a
substantial risk of selection bias. The attempt to deduce the relative importance
of nodes in the network structure based on this data therefore implies a certain
circularity. Nevertheless, I believe the exercise to be useful, if only for illustrative
purposes.
For reasons of economy, certain organisations are included as nodes in the
network (represented by diamonds in the diagram) even though the real unit of
analysis is individuals (represented by rounded squares in the diagram).
Figure 3.9 shows the same network, but reordered using a ‘stress minimisation’
algorithm and uniform link length, so as to better reveal the position of nodes in the
network. The size of node representations are scaled according to their ‘between-
ness centrality’, which is one measure of the importance of a node in ‘brokering’
interconnections between disparate network components. It immediately becomes
clear that certain individuals, notably Zackie Achmat, Nathan Geffen and Gregg
Gonsalves (represented by the nodes labelled ‘ZA’, ‘NG’ and ‘GG’), are unusually
important in connecting the various clusters of the network. How few nodes have
significant brokerage roles is further illustrated in Figure 3.10. These results match
the perceptions of many of the informants interviewed.
3.6 Towards consensus on AIDS treatment ac-
cess
I have argued that the unique personal histories, personalities and individual social
networks of certain individuals are critical to understanding the achievements of
TAC. In addition, I have pointed to its embeddedness in the political traditions of
South African liberation politics and the important role of the ‘network of influ-
ence’ that the organisation was able to build and sustain in explaining its success
at fostering a wide consensus that treatment access is a moral right.
These arguments are supported by the evidence from the history of AIDS act-












Figure 3.8: Network of influence around the Treatment Action Campaign
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drew extensively on personal networks to mobilise resources for the movement
and also built activist and solidarity networks in order to mobilise support and in-
fluence. It is also clear that the history of AIDS activism is intimately tied to a
number of key personalities and that even where ‘structural’ patterns can be dis-
cerned (such as the utilisation of transnational networks of influence), these were
often made possible by the unique connectedness and unusual capabilities of those
individuals.
But in order to understand the impact of TAC, we must look beyond net-
works—which functions mainly to mobilise resources (including symbolic and in-
formational resources) to the emergence of coalitions based on consensus. TAC’s
campaigns were informed by a desire to produce a ‘moral consensus’ on treat-
ment access and in my view was instrumental in establishing an AIDS treatment
coalition built on this emerging consensus.
Despite the visibility of mobilisation in the form of street protests and (on a
limited number of occasions) direct action and civil disobedience, TAC’s strategy
was not primarily to compel a change of course through direct pressure, but rather
to drive home its moral claims. Protest action is then but one component in a
larger strategy aimed at building a moral consensus in society and thereby exerting
both direct and indirect pressure. This is evident from its tendency to pursue its
campaigns through a variety of strategies, often aimed at legitimating a central
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moral claim rather than simply exerting pressure. For example, its campaigns
against ‘excessive pricing’ and ‘patent abuse’ by pharmaceutical companies were
anchored by strong moral appeals.
It mobilised alliances with other civil society actors—particularly those with a
high degree of popular legitimacy—and framed its moral claims within a ‘rights-
based discourse’ that enjoys wide legitimacy in South Africa and internationally.
It is particularly powerful in the South African context where the human rights
framework expressed in the post-apartheid Constitution is the outcome of a long
popular struggle. (This human rights orientation arguably found its most compel-
ling expression in the litigation by which TAC forced the South African govern-
ment to make PMTCTwidely available.) The fact that it could claim to speak for a
broad social alliance, rather than simply on behalf of those who are HIV-positive,
significantly enhanced its moral authority. Its opponents’ attacks on its legitim-
acy and credibility —most notably the Mbeki camp painting it as controlled by
pharmaceutical companies and racists—failed largely because it had successfully
established its legitimacy by these means.
TAC’s moral and symbolic victories in the ‘the court of transnational public
opinion’ (Olesen, 2006), and its building of an inclusive coalition in support of treat-
ment access, may have been decisive in the defeat of state-supported AIDS denial-
ism and the wide introduction of antiretroviral therapy in South Africa. However,
the movement is now faced with a new set of challenges: ensuring continued pro-
gress in antiretroviral treatment delivery, revitalising a weak public healthcare sys-
tem and improving HIV prevention. Paradoxically, the end of denialism removes
a source of public support and attention, while the new generation of leaders must
continue to deal with the difficulties of bureaucratisation. While it has a rich polit-














Civil society leadership and HIV
prevention in South Africa1
4.1 Introduction
This chapter revisits the ‘civil society leadership’ of the Treatment Action Cam-
paign described in chapter 3. Specifically, it examines whether TAC’s mobilisa-
tion in Cape Town impacted appreciably on HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. Since
Cape Town was the first city in which TAC built its movement, and the Khayel-
itsha township outside Cape Town probably remains its strongest support base
(it was also the site of the TAC ally MSF’s antiretroviral treatment clinic around
which much of the community mobilisation and treatment education activities
took place), it is appropriate to evaluate the organisation’s impact in this com-
munity. The analyses and arguments in this chapter draw on a joint paper with
Nicoli Nattrass (Grebe and Nattrass, 2012), although it significantly extends them
and shifts the focus to the impact of TAC.
The quantitative analyses presented here explore the potential impact of TAC
on both beliefs about HIV/AIDS and sexual behaviour in a sample of young
adults (mostly African and coloured) collected as part of the fifth wave (2009) of
the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS).2 The sample, measures and statistical meth-
1This chapter draws substantially on a joint paper with Nicoli Nattrass previously published in
the journal AIDS and Behavior (Grebe and Nattrass, 2012).












ods employed in this analysis are described in detail in the Methods section (sec-
tion 4.3 on page 109). Before doing so, however, I will set out the background
to this in the form of a brief description of TAC’s activities that can reasonably
be expected to have impacted on beliefs about HIV (specifically the conspiracy
beliefs about the origins of AIDS that were promoted by Thabo Mbeki and his
health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) and sexual behaviour (specifically
the use of condoms during sexual intercourse). Why should AIDS origin conspir-
acy beliefs be considered an appropriate outcome to measure ‘civil society lead-
ership’? First, these conspiracy beliefs beliefs are highly relevant to HIV/AIDS
prevention efforts: they imply a general scepticism towards the mainstream sci-
ence on HIV/AIDS and may lead individuals to reject the HIV prevention mes-
sages based on a conventional scientific approach. AIDS conspiracy beliefs have
been associated in earlier research in the United States with lack of condom use
(Bogart and Thorburn Bird, 2003; Bogart and Thorburn, 2005; Ross et al., 2006;
Bogart et al., 2010a), not testing for HIV (Bohnert and Latkin, 2009) and not ad-
hering to antiretroviral treatment (Bogart et al., 2010b), while in South Africa they
have been associated with never testing for HIV (Bogart et al., 2008; Tun et al.,
2010). A bivariate analysis of the CAPS data confirms an association between
AIDS conspiracy beliefs and never having tested for HIV (see Results—section 4.4
on page 114). Second, TAC actively contested the AIDS denialist and conspiracy
theory-infused discourse onHIV/AIDS ofMbeki and his supporters. Amodel that
predicts AIDS conspiracy beliefs and that includes contact with TAC therefore al-
lows one to evaluate the success of TAC in combating this anti-science discourse
(that had the power of high office of state behind it). Further, investigating the po-
tential impact of TAC on condom use allows one to evaluate the success or failure
of TAC’s direct HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. It is therefore en evaluation of the
success of TAC’s ‘leadership’ both in the discursive ‘information war’ and in HIV
prevention at community level.
The analyses take the form of multivariate logistic regressions, first on AIDS
conspiracy beliefs and then on reported condom use at the most recent sexual en-
counter. In each case, a series of models are first presented that are stratified on
race and gender (like in Grebe and Nattrass, 2012) and then with a number of












in order to elucidate the substantial race and gender differences observed in the
influence of measures on the dependent variables. A number of bivariate analyses
are also reported. Why the interest in race and gender? The literature suggests
a link between race and AIDS conspiracy beliefs in the United States (e.g. Bog-
art and Thorburn Bird, 2003; Ross et al., 2006). But, even a cursory overview of
the CAPS data shows that Africans in the sample are much more likely to hold
AIDS conspiracy beliefs (19.7% of African respondents scored averages of ‘agree’
or ‘strongly agree’ on an index of AIDS conspiracy beliefs while the proportion
of non-Africans was only 2.6%) and that men are much more likely to endorse
conspiracy beliefs than women (25.8% of African men vs. 14.8% of African wo-
men). Niehaus and Jonsson (2005) found that conspiracy accounts in South Africa
were strongly gendered. Africans are also more likely to report using condoms
than non-Africans at their most recent sexual encounter (64.1% of Africans vs.
35.9% of non-Africans). Furthermore, TAC’s mobilisation was most vigorous in
African communities. So, we would expect race to be an important determinant
of both conspiracy beliefs and of condom use in the multivariate models. Further-
more, race and gender are likely to substantially affect the impact of familiarity
with TAC in the models.
Finally, before proceeding to setting out the background to the quantitative
analyses, it is important to define what is meant by ‘AIDS origin conspiracy be-
liefs’ and ‘AIDS denialism’. Then-President Thabo Mbeki and his health minister
promoted both AIDS conspiracy theories and AIDS denialist claims (see section
4.2). AIDS origin conspiracy theories refer to beliefs that AIDS was deliberately
man-made (often with the supposed aim of selectively killing black people), e.g. by
the American government or the CIA. The specific way in which AIDS conspiracy
beliefs were measured in the CAPS survey will be described later. AIDS denialism
refers to claims to the effect that AIDS does not exist, or is not caused by HIV.
For the purposes of this analysis, AIDS denialism can be defined as making both
the claims that (1) HIV is harmless and (2) that antiretrovirals do more harm than
good (both claims that Mbeki made). There is a strong link between AIDS deni-
alism and AIDS conspiracy theories: usually AIDS denialists explain the failure of
their views on HIV and AIDS to gain any traction within mainstream science as












governments and scientists. AIDS denialist beliefs and AIDS conspiracy beliefs
were positively correlated in the CAPS data (r = 0.282; p < 0.000).
4.2 Background: The challenge to AIDS science
and TAC’s resistance
4.2.1 Promotion of AIDS denialism and conspiracy beliefs
by political leaders
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, then-President of South Africa, Thabo
Mbeki, adopted a sceptical position with respect to conventional AIDS sci-
ence—including the viral aetiology of AIDS, the scale of the HIV/AIDS epidemic
and the efficacy of antiretroviral therapy (Nattrass, 2007; Geffen, 2010). The Pres-
ident’s early pronouncements, both public and private (he later ‘withdrew’ from
the public ‘debate’ about AIDS), were characterised by anti-colonial and anti-
Western rhetoric, designed to appeal to African nationalist sentiments and latent
anger about apartheid. The scientific view of AIDS as a viral epidemic was por-
trayed as rooted in racist Western stereotypes about the sexuality of Africans, anti-
retroviral therapy as toxic and onl promoted in order to advance the interests of
multinational pharmaceutical companies and the dismissal of untested traditional
remedies as indicating a racist disdain for ‘African solutions’. In this the Presid-
ent was strongly supported by his Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang,
who became the primary spokesperson for AIDS denialist arguments and argu-
ments against antiretrovirals and in favour of alternative interventions (including
nutritional supplements and African traditional medicine). She appointed, for ex-
ample, the unqualified AIDS denialist Roberto Geraldo as a ministerial adviser
(see Nattrass, 2007) and refused to take action against the vitamin entrepreneur
Matthias Rath when he illegally treated AIDS patients with vitamin supplements
and conducted unsupervised ‘clinical trials’ (Goldacre, 2010:131-146).
The President and supporters like Tshabalala-Msimang and the youth leader
PeterMokaba deployed arguments founded in a profound suspicion of the motives












Figure 4.1: Tshabalala-Msimang promoted conspiracy theories
Health minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang reportedly circulated extracts of a book written by American
right-wing conspiracy theorist William Cooper (see Nattrass, 2012:23)












ternational conspiracy led by the American CIA to further the interests of phar-
maceutical manufacturers) and allied themselves with various groupings represent-
ing nationalist-conservative and traditionalist interests, such as African traditional
healers, in contesting mainstream science. This is perhaps somewhat paradoxical
given the Mbeki administration’s perceived anti-populist, pro-business and pro-
bourgeois leanings. (Somewhat strangely, however, many of the central figures
in Mbeki’s conversion to AIDS ‘dissidence’ and in the promotion of alternative
‘cures’ or ‘treatments’ for AIDS were white South Africans like Anita Allen and
Anthony Brink or European immigrants like Tine van der Maas and Matthias
Rath. Furthermore, most of Mbeki’s arguments were derived from those of Amer-
ican and Australian AIDS denialists like Peter Duesberg, David Resnik and Eleni
Papadopulos-Eleopulos.)
Under Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang’s leadership, the state actively resisted
demands to provide antiretroviral drugs (both to prevent mother-to-child transmis-
sion of HIV and to treat AIDS) and the response to AIDS became highly politi-
cised with the Treatment Action Campaign leading an intense campaign against
state-supported denialism and in favour of science-based interventions. Despite
the debate acquiring racial overtones (perhaps not surprising given the highly ra-
cialised politics of South Africa), actively exploited by Mbeki and his allies, the
TAC (a largely black movement) allied itself with the largely white and middle-
class-dominated scientific establishment and media in intensely contesting state
denialism and the epistemological basis of it.
The science-based arguments of TAC and its allies eventually prevailed: the
state reversed its policy and implemented an antiretroviral treatment programme
in 2004, although the Health Minister’s support for it was at best half-hearted (and
neither she nor Mbeki ever recanted their denialist views) until Thabo Mbeki lost
power and his successor replaced her with Barbara Hogan, who held conventional
views on AIDS and who energetically pursued implementation of the antiretroviral
treatment programme. Hogan’s successor, Aaron Motsoaledi, is a doctor who
has continued to pursue science-based AIDS policy. It must, however, be noted
that models with conservative assumptions indicate that the refusal to implement
antiretroviral therapy resulted in at least 330 000 avoidable deaths in South Africa












burden of avoidable morbidity, by extension, would be even greater.
Nevertheless, it is to be expected that AIDS denialist arguments and AIDS
conspiracy theories, vigorously promoted by a number of powerful political lead-
ers, would have found some purchase in the broader population, especially among
those whose political attitudes rendered them a ‘natural constituency’ for Mbeki.
We attempted to capture this dimension in the regression analysis in Grebe and
Nattrass (2012) by including a variable indicating that a respondent expressed
greater trust in Tshabalala-Msimang on HIV/AIDS than in her successor Bar-
bara Hogan.3
4.2.2 Contesting denialism andmobilising through ‘treat-
ment literacy’
TAC was founded in Cape Town and built its first branches in the African town-
ships outside Cape Town, especially Khayelitsha, Nyanga, Langa and Gugulethu.
The mobilisation of communities was further strengthened by the fact that the first
public sector antiretroviral therapy clinic was set up in Khayelitsha byMedecins Sans
Frontieres (MSF) in partnership with theWestern Cape provincial government. The
partnership between TAC and MSF, described in chapter 3, meant that the or-
ganisations could cooperate in at empts to mobilise the residents of Khayelitsha to
access the health services offered and to build a cadre of activists to advocate for
expansion of treatment access. The organisations shared office space and volun-
teers, with most counsellors working in MSF’s treatment project being recruited
from among TAC activists. TAC also used MSF’s clinic as a recruiting ground
for its Khayelitsha branches and the organisations collaborated on ‘treatment lit-
eracy’ workshops, which reached a very substantial number of people over the
years. A good description of this model is provided in Jonny Steinberg’s book
Sizwe’s Test/Three-letter Plague, which provides a detailed account of the coopera-
tion between MSF and TAC in establishing an antiretroviral clinic in the rural
Lusikisiki district of the Eastern Cape and building an activist movement to help
spread the word about the benefits of antiretroviral treatment (Steinberg, 2008).
3This variable was first suggested byNicoli Nattrass in an unpublished draft paper written before












A major component of TAC’s community mobilisation work centred around
its patient and activist education efforts, usually referred to as ‘treatment literacy’.
This involved organising workshops in which TAC staff (the Khayelitsha office,
initially the provincial headquarters and later a district office, had a full-time ‘treat-
ment literacy coordinator’ from very early on), experienced volunteers and invited
experts (like doctors and nurses) taught the science of HIV pathogenesis and treat-
ment. This resulted in the remarkable phenomenon that many TAC activists with
no or very little formal schooling (and who had often never held formal employ-
ment) being comfortable speaking about the details of HIV/AIDS treatment, using
terms like ‘CD4-count’, ‘viral load’, ‘reverse transcriptase’ and the names of med-
ications as if these were everyday concepts. The founders of TAC saw these edu-
cation efforts both as a way of preparing the population for AIDS treatment—by
breaking down the fear and stigma surrounding the disease and promoting under-
standing of what treatment can and cannot do—and as an important mobilisation
tool. Jack Lewis, a TAC founder who also established and managed the Com-
munity Health Media Trust (now Community Media Trust), which produced au-
diovisual treatment literacy materials in close collaboration with TAC, describes
the rationale behind treatment literacy in a way that illustrates the political goals:
The point is that [in the absence of a structural social revolution], you
have to then content yourself with helping [each person] have an in-
dividual social revolution through the power of science. And that’s
what’s so fantastic about AIDS, you know, we’ve seen it in a man who
watched his wife die and was consulting traditional healers. And then
he meets TAC and MSF and he can now talk, certainly better than
all the nurses—99% of the nurses and most of the doctors—about
first-line and second-line treatment and side-effects and how different
combinations are put together, about ARV science and HIV science,
and he has the …the liberating effect on him as an individual. It’s stu-
pendous, there aren’t words to describe it, until you’ve seen for your-
self the power of this thing. Science is a fantastic liberating force, and
that is what people don’t understand about TAC. …If you could do
mass scientific literacy around health in general, and let people un-












cause a movement as well in many ways, because it’s a fantastically
powerful, liberating thing.4
These extensive efforts to promote a sophisticated and science-based understand-
ing of HIV/AIDS resulted in a substantial cadre of TAC activists living in the
African townships of Cape Town and equipped to counter misinformation spread
by political leaders, ‘alternative’ or traditional healers and entrepreneurs. TAC
members received regular education through their branches and were encour-
aged to engage their families, friends and neighbours on HIV/AIDS. Some were
recruited to act as more formal treatment literacy practitioners and after more
in-depth training received small stipends to conduct workshops in workplaces,
schools, clinics and HIV patients’ support groups. In addition, the organisation
engaged in a combined educational and propaganda effort in the media, which
had its most prominent expression in the television series Beat It! (later Siyangqoba
Beat It!), produced by the Community Media Trust (CMT) and broadcast on na-
tional television. The close links between CMT and TACmeant that the organisa-
tion received a mass media platform in which not only a scientific understanding
of the disease, but also TAC’s political perspective on it was promoted. This was
especially true for the first series of the programme, which was broadcast on the in-
dependent E-TV channel, during which the producers had the freedom to openly
criticise state policy and give TAC activists very prominent exposure5 (and which
coincided with the period of the worst state-supported AIDS denialism). For a
detailed history of Siyangqoba Beat It!, see Hodes (2010).
TAC saw this educational function as a key element of its work, and it is there-
fore not unreasonable to assume that it could measurably impact on the beliefs
about HIV and sexual behaviour of young adults in the city where it started its
work and has built the strongest structures.
4.3 Methods
This chapter presents results from a cross-sectional analysis of the December 2010
internal release of data from the fifth wave (2009) of the Cape Area Panel Study
4Interview, J. Lewis (24 November 2007).












(CAPS). The CAPS is a longitudinal study of young adults in metropolitan Cape
Town, South Africa.
For the first wave of the study, a two-stage sample was employed. Primary
sampling units (geographical Enumerator Areas as defined in the 2000 Census)
were stratified on main population group (African, coloured, white). PSUs were
then randomly selected within each stratum and households randomly within each
PSU. Weights were calculated to correct for sample design and household non-
response. A total of 4 752 young adults and adolescents were interviewed from the
selected households. The panel of selected households and young adults were then
re-interviewed in several waves (2003/4, 2006 and 2009). The fifth wave (2009)
collected a range of demographic, labour-market, health, sexual behaviour and
attitudinal information from 2 901 young adult respondents, ranging in age from
19 to 29.
The sample has become less representative over time, owing to attrition, es-
pecially among white respondents, but it is still broadly representative of urban
Africans and coloureds. Table 4.1 on page 122 summarises the race and gender
breakdown of the sample.
Weights were calculated and supplied with the dataset.6 These are to correct
for sample design and non-response (both initial and attrition) allowing analysis
that remains representative for urban Cape Town, assuming that household non-
response within each PSU and young adult non-response/attrition was random.
Weights were not calibrated for representativity on race, gender or other demo-
graphic variables. This is a somewhat problematic assumption, since non-response
and attrition may be related to factors such as labour market participation and so-
cial stability (e.g. propensity to migrate).
As in Grebe and Nattrass (2012), multivariate logistic regressions were used
to predict AIDS conspiracy beliefs and condom use behaviour. The first series of
models (models 1-5, reported in tables 4.2 and 4.3 are regressions on a binary de-
pendent variable with value 1 if the respondent scored more than 9 on an AIDS
conspiracy belief index generated by summing values of responses to three state-
ments about the man-made origins of AIDS (each on a 5-point Likert scale with
6Weights were calculated by Prof. Martin Wittenberg of UCT’s School of Economics and












1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree). The three statements are ‘AIDS was inven-
ted to kill black people’, ‘AIDS was created by scientists in America’ and ‘AIDS
was deliberately created by humans’. Models 1-4 are stratified by race and gender,
while model 5 is an unstratified model with gender interactions (run for Africans)
to investigate the size and significance of gender differences.
The second series of models (models 6-10 in tables 4.4 and 4.5) are regressions
on a binary dependent variable with value 1 if the respondent reported using a
condom during their most recent sexual encounter. Models 6-9 are stratified by
race and gender, while model 10 is an unstratified model with gender interaction
terms (run for Africans), to estimate the size and significance of gender differences
identified in Grebe and Nattrass (2012).
Unlike in Grebe and Nattrass (2012), all regression analyses were conducted
using Stata’s svy suite of commands, i.e. correcting for sample design and non-
response using stratification, PSU and weight variables. Notably, while this neces-
sarily affects variance estimates, the impact on which coefficients were statistically
significant was minimal, pointing to a surprising degree of robustness of the ana-
lyses previously reported.
4.3.1 Measures
Variables were selected for inclusion in the multivariate models on two grounds:
the existing empirical and ethnographic literature suggested that they would be
likely determinants; or as a control necessary for the intelligibility of another vari-
able. Stepwise regression or any other non-theoretical techniques were not used to
decide on the inclusion of variables in the models, nor were insignificant variables
excluded. The full review of existing literature and the detailed rationale for model
building are provided in Grebe and Nattrass (2012). The focus in this chapter is
on measuring the potential impact of TAC.
Seven socio-demographic indicators were included in the models both for
AIDS conspiracy beliefs and for condom use behaviour. These are: race (bin-
ary variable, 1=respondent is African), gender (binary, 1=female), age in years, log of
monthly household income per capita, employment status (binary, 1=employed),












pleted) and tertiary education (binary, 1=any tertiary education).
In the models for AIDS conspiracy beliefs were also included the following:
• A measure of mental health (binary, 1=respondent is seriously psychologically dis-
tressed), constructed using the 6-item ‘Kessler scale’ (Strine et al., 2005). The
scale asks how often people experience nervousness, hopelessness, restless-
ness, depression, worthlessness and that everything is an effort. Responses
(ranging from 0 for ‘never,’ to 4 for ‘all of the time’) are summed, with scores
of 13 and more typically regarded as indicating severe psychological distress
(Strine et al., 2005:1134). The variable assumes a value of 1 if the respondent
scored 13 or more on the Kessler scale and 0 for scores below that.
• Trust in Tshabalala-Msimang (binary, 1=respondent trusts Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang more than Barbara Hogan). Respondents were asked how much they
trusted the conspiracy-promoting Health Minister (Tshabalala-Msimang)
and her science-promoting replacement (Hogan) on AIDS (with response
scores ranging from 1 for ‘not at all’ to 5 for ‘very much’). The score for
Hogan was then subtracted from that for Tshabalala-Msimang. A binary
variable was then created, taking a value of 1 for a positive score (indicating
that Tshabalala-Msimang was trusted more on AIDS than Hogan) and 0 for
scores of zero or below. Unfortunately, this measure is likely to be confoun-
ded by the fact that Barbara Hogan is white, hence we include a measure of
racial attitudes as a control for this, which measures the difference between
the respondent’s scores on a social distance scale for blacks and whites: the
larger the value, the more the respondent ‘likes’ blacks relative to whites.
This variable is also a potentially useful determinant in its own right as one
would expect that those less well disposed to whites would be more predis-
posed to believe that AIDS may have been deliberately manufactured to
harm black people.
• Never heard of TAC (binary, 1=respondent has never heard of TAC), designed
to capture the influence of conspiracy-combating civil society. This variable
takes a value of 1 if the respondent indicated that they had never heard of the
organisation (and a value of 0 if they had). As this variable could be proxy-












binary control variable for being generally well-informed is included, taking
a value of 1 if the respondent reported ‘often’ getting news from newspapers,
television and radio.
• As measures of social inclusion, three binary variables were included, trust
(1=agrees most people can be trusted), voting (1= voted in the 2009 election) and reli-
gious membership (1=respondent is a member of a religious organisation).
For African respondents we include two further measures:
• Traditionalism (binary, 1=agrees a man is not a man until he has been through a
circumcision ritual). This indicator records whether respondents agree or dis-
agree with the statement that ‘a man is not really a man if he has not been
through a traditional circumcision ceremony’.
• Belief in witchcraft (binary, 1=agrees witchcraft should always be suspected when
a young person dies). This variable records whether respondents believe that
witchcraft ‘should always be suspected’ if a young person dies.7
In the models for condom use behaviour we include the following measures in
addition to the socio-demographic variables:
• Type of sexual relationship. This is captured in two binary variables indic-
ating whether respondents reported that the most recent sexual partnership
(i.e. the one for which they were also reporting condom use) was mono-
gamous (1=last sexual partnership was definitely monogamous) or concurrent (1=last
sexual partnership was definitely concurrent either for the respondent or for the partner).
• Knowing someone who died of AIDS (binary, 1=respondent knows someone who
has died of AIDS).
• Believing one can get HIV from condoms (binary, 1=agree that you can get HIV
from condoms).
• AIDS conspiracy beliefs (same as dependent variable in the first set of mod-
els).
7The insight that measures of social inclusion, traditionalism and belief in witchcraft were re-












• AIDS denialist beliefs (binary, 1=agrees both that HIV is harmless and that ARVs
do more harm than good). This is therefore a strong measure of AIDS denialism,
since the variable would only assume a value of 1 if the respondent agreed
with both denialist claims.
• Never heard of TAC and the control for being well-informed (same as in
models for AIDS conspiracy beliefs).
Coefficients are reported in exponentiated form (i.e. as odds ratios) and are
considered statistically significant if p < 0.10 (i.e. 90% confidence level). In addi-
tion to odds ratios and p-values, standard errors are reported in the tables. Unless
otherwise noted, all reported results represent the partial effect of variables in the
multivariate logistic regression models, controlling for all other variables included
in the relevant model.
4.4 Results and discussion
In this section, multivariatemodels for AIDS conspiracy beliefs and for condomuse
at last sex are presented that include ‘never heard of TAC’ as an explanatory vari-
able. However, much of the US and South African data on the impact of conspir-
acy beliefs pertain to their correlation with lower HIV testing rates (Bohnert and
Latkin, 2009; Bogart et al., 2008; Tun et al., 2010). The CAPS data is consistent
with these findings. A bivariate logistic regression analysis suggests a similarly neg-
ative relationship betweenAIDS conspiracy beliefs and ever having tested forHIV:
the odds of having ever been tested for HIV are significantly lower for respondents
who endorse AIDS origin conspiracy beliefs (odds ratio [OR] = 0.620; p < 0.000).
A similar bivariate logistic regression shows that those who had never heard of
TAC had reduced odds of ever having testing for HIV (OR = 0.691; p < 0.000).
Bivariate analyses also point to the impact of having no familiarity with TAC
on both AIDS conspiracy beliefs and condom use: a bivariate logistic regression
showed that respondents who had never heard of TAC had greater odds of en-
dorsing AIDS conspiracy beliefs (OR = 1.383; p = 0.008) and reduced odds of
reporting condom use at last sex (OR = 0.425; p < 0.000). This suggest both an












effect on conspiracy beliefs. However, to gain a more granular understanding of
these direct and mediated effects, we need to include both TAC and conspiracy
beliefs in the multivariate model for condom use.
Substantial race and gender differences were observed in the models predicting
AIDS conspiracy beliefs and in the models predicting condom use in Grebe and
Nattrass (2012), suggesting that the differing dynamics of belief formation about
AIDS and decision-making about safe sex need careful further study and must be
taken into account in AIDS prevention programmes. These are further elucidated
here by means of the new models using interaction terms.
4.4.1 Multivariate models for AIDS conspiracy beliefs
Four models predicting AIDS conspiracy beliefs are reported in Table 4.2 on
page 123: for the full sample, for Africans, and one each for African men and wo-
men. Table 4.3 on page 125 reports largely the same model for Africans (model
5), but instead of a gender-stratified model, gender is interacted on each of the
variables that seem to operate differently in men and women. This allows us to
evaluate of the impact of gender without sacrificing degrees of freedom through
gender stratification, and also allows us to see the size and significance of the dif-
ference between men and women with respect to variables that differed between
men and women.
Bivariate analysis showed that Africans were much more likely to endorse
AIDS conspiracy beliefs (19.7% of Africans averaged scores of ‘agree or strongly
agree’ on the index of AIDS origin conspiracy beliefs, the figure for non-Africans
was only 2.6%) and that levels of endorsement were higher amongst men (25.8% of
African men vs. 14.8% of African women). This is consistent with ethnographic
research by Niehaus and Jonsson (2005) and was borne out in the multivariate
models: Africans had substantially greater odds of endorsing conspiracy beliefs in
model 1 (OR = 6.771; p < 0.000), but the gender effect turned out not to be stat-
istically insignificant in the non-stratified models. Even so, as shown in models 3
and 4, there are major differences in what factors are associated with AIDS con-
spiracy beliefs for African men and women. For example, men who reported that












beliefs (OR = 0.487; p = 0.037), whereas women who did so had almost twice the
odds of those who did not (OR = 1.739; p = 0.039). This gender difference was
statistically significant in model 5. Women who kept up with the news had almost
3.9 times the odds of endorsing AIDS conspiracy beliefs than had men who kept
up with the news (OR = 3.826; p = 0.004).
Serious psychological distress was associated with AIDS conspiracy beliefs in
our sample (of the 7.6% of the sample so classified, 34.8% endorsed conspiracy
beliefs). The multivariate regressions confirm the association: being seriously psy-
chologically distressed more than doubled the odds of endorsing AIDS conspiracy
beliefs in the full sample (OR = 2.262; p < 0.000). The effect was consistent across
all models.
Being amember of a religious organisation (the case for 41% of the total sample
and 55% of the African sample) also significantly reduced the odds of endorsing
conspiracy theories for Africans (in model 2, OR = 0.583; p = 0.030).
Having a tertiary education, living in a better-off household and voting in the
last election all reduced the odds of endorsing AIDS conspiracy beliefs amongst
Africans, but these effects were driven by strong effects for women (whereas they
were statistically insignificant for African men). However, the effect of these vari-
ables turned out not to bemeasurably different for African women than for African
men, with none of the interaction terms in model 5 being statistically significant.
None of the other demographic and socio-economic variables (school grades
completed, employment status and age) were statistically significant in any model.
Controlling for the other variables in the model, Africans who score positively
on the witchcraft variable (7.3% of all Africans did) have more than 3 times greater
odds of endorsing AIDS conspiracy beliefs (OR = 3.393; p = 0.001). But there
are marked differences between African men and women, with women who score
positively on the witchcraft variable being much more likely to endorse conspir-
acy beliefs (men: OR = 2.443; p = 0.090; women: OR = 5.082; p < 0.000).
Likewise, Africans who score positively on the traditionalism measure (the case for
88% of Africans) have substantially greater odds of endorsing conspiracy beliefs
(OR = 3.114; p = 0.009). This effect is was significant for African women but not
men. However, interacting witchcraft beliefs and traditionalism on gender did not












the interaction terms being statistically significant in model 5.
Trusting Manto Tshabalala-Msimang more than her successor is a strong pre-
dictor of endorsing AIDS conspiracy beliefs, with those who do having almost
three times the odds in the full sample (OR = 2.905; p < 0.000), but driven
by an especially strong effect for African men (OR = 7.682; p < 0.000). The
coefficient for African women was not statistically significant. In line with model
4, model 5 shows that African men who trust Tshabalala-Msimang more than
Hogan have more than 7 times the odds of endorsing AIDS conspiracy beliefs
than those who don’t (OR = 7.653; p < 0.000). Women who trust Tshabalala-
Msimang more than Hogan have significantly reduced odds of endorsing conspir-
acy beliefs compared to men who do—and this difference was highly significant
(OR = 0.232; p = 0.003).
The impact of never having heard of TAC is also strong and statistically signi-
ficant in all but one of the models. About a quarter of the African sample (24.9%)
and 42.3% of the total sample had never heard of TAC. The multivariate regres-
sion models predict that never having heard of TAC almost doubles the odds of
endorsing AIDS conspiracies in the full sample (OR = 1.904; p = 0.001) and
triples it for African women (OR = 3.326; p = 0.002). However, there is no effect
in African men. Indeed, model 5 does not show a statistically significant effect of
never having heard of TAC for African men, but African women who have never
heard of TAC have substantially higher odds than African men who do of endors-
ing conspiracy beliefs—and this difference is significant (OR = 3.119; p = 0.017).
The large and significant effect of race, while expected, requires further elu-
cidation as it can be hard to interpret, given that the effects of apartheid and of
the continued racialisation of society and politics permeate almost all aspects of
South African life. Therefore, while the political variable of trust in Tshabalala-
Msimang reflects the most direct attitudinal factor predisposing the individual to
endorsement of AIDS conspiracy beliefs, it is likely that the race variable is pick-
ing up a further range of unobserved attitudinal factors. In addition, race clearly
impacts on the way in which a number of the other variables operate.
These results show not only that political allegiance and authority matter for
AIDS conspiracy beliefs (through the trust in Tshabalala-Msimang variable), but












likely played a role in limiting the impact of their rhetoric on AIDS. Note that by
including the variable capturing the difference in social distance scores for blacks
and whites we can be reasonably sure that we are picking up a measure of political,
rather than racial, preference. Note also that a potential endogeneity problem
exists in that it is not clear whether the variable measures the impact of Tshabalala-
Msimang on respondents or a pre-existing receptiveness to her messages on AIDS.
The large and significant increase in the odds of endorsing AIDS conspiracy
beliefs if respondents had never heard of TAC (especially among African wo-
men) provides strong evidence of the organisation’s impact on knowledge of/beliefs
about HIV/AIDS in Cape Town, and especially that it’s treatment literacy cam-
paigns have been effective in influencing the public understanding of AIDS sci-
ence. The inclusion of the variable for being well informed means we can be fairly
confident that this variable is picking up the effect of the organisation rather than
simply greater knowledgeability in general. The fact that the TAC variable’s ef-
fect is greater among women may result from the fact that TAC’s first campaign
(prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV) was of particular relevance
to women. Women were therefore more likely to come across TAC (and indeed,
most TAC activists are women) and to learn both about the science of HIV and
develop a critical consciousness towards Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang. Com-
pared to the Tshabalala-Msimang variable, we can be also more confident that
these findings reflect the impact of the organisation, given that respondents would
not have been able to avoid hearing about the organisation and its work, even
if they were politically opposed to it (i.e. it does not have the same endogeneity
problem). The results do suggest, however, that the organisation has not reached
men to nearly as great an extent as it has women in African communities (its core
constituency)—confirming a failure that leaders have sometimes spoken about can-
didly.
4.4.2 Multivariate models for condom use at last sex
Table 4.4 on page 128 presents four multivariate models of whether a respondent
used a condom at last sex, using the full sample, Africans only and then African












model for Africans, but instead of a gender-stratifiedmodel, gender is interacted on
a number of variables that seem to operate differently in African men and women.
A potential concern with the dependent variable used in these models is that it
relates to a single sexual encounter, rather than consistency of condom usage over a
period of time. However, in our view the risk is great that, in a survey like this, recall
bias will render self-reported data on the latter substantially less reliable. And, since
we control for relationship type with regard to that particular sexual encounter, we
believe that the measure is an adequate indicator of whether the respondent is alert
to issues of safe sex. Another potential concern is that the sexual encounter referred
to in the answer may be from very long ago. However, we also ran this model on
a sample restricted to respondents who explicitly reported having had at least one
sexual partner in the 12 months before the interview. This restriction made no
appreciable difference either to the size or significance of coefficients (Grebe and
Nattrass, 2012).
The results indicate that Africans are significantly more likely to use condoms
than other groups (OR = 4.019; p < 0.000). Being female substantially reduces
the odds of using a condom in both the full model (model 6, OR = 0.358; p <
0.000) and for Africans (model 7, OR = 0.387; p < 0.000).
Being older was associated with lower odds of using a condom in the full sample
(OR = 0.886; p < 0.000) and for Africans, driven by African women (OR =
0.925; p = 0.020), but this effect was not seen for African men. However, the
interaction term between gender and age in model 10 did not show a statistically
significant difference betweenAfricanmen andAfrican women. Higher household
income increased the odds of using a condom in the full sample (OR = 1.200; p =
0.036), but not for Africans.
Relationship type also mattered, with a significantly higher odds of using a con-
dom if the respondent reported being in a concurrent partnership among Africans
(OR = 1.389; p = 0.100). Model 10 again did not produce a statistically signific-
ant difference between African men and women on either of the relationship type
variables.
Knowing someone who had died of AIDS increased the odds of condom use
in the full sample (OR = 1.284; p = 0.067), for Africans (OR = 1.427; p = 0.012)












African men. The difference between African men and women did not show up
as statistically significant when the variable was interacted on gender in model 10.
A substantial minority of young adults in our sample endorsed AIDS denialist
claims (12.9% of the total sample and 18.4% of Africans). Both AIDS denialist
and AIDS conspiracy beliefs significantly and substantially reduced the odds of
safe sex in the multivariate models for the full sample (denial: OR = 0.592; p =
0.004; conspiracy: OR = 0.620; p = 0.021) and for Africans only (denial: OR =
0.613; p = 0.012; conspiracy: OR = 0.664; p = 0.054). However, the two factors
operated differently in African men and women, with only denialism significantly
reducing the odds of condom use in African women (OR = 0.525; p = 0.009). But
model 10 shows the difference between African women who endorsed denialist or
conspiracy beliefs and African men who did so was not statistically significant.
Never having heard of TAC reduced the odds of using a condom substantially
in the full sample (OR = 0.586; p = 0.001), for Africans (OR = 0.710; p =
0.070) and for African men (OR = 0.559; p = 0.051), but was not significant for
African women. In model 10, too, African men who had never heard of TAC
had substantially reduced odds of using a condom, compared to African men who
had heard of TAC (OR = 0.503; p = 0.014), while the gender difference was also
significant, with African women who had never hard of TAC having substantially
higher odds of using a condom than African men who had never heard of TAC
(OR = 2.369; p = 0.037).
As in the models for AIDS conspiracy beliefs, substantial race and gender dif-
ferences exist in the factors that drive condom use. It is likely that the increased use
of condoms by Africans is in response to the higher risk associated with higher pre-
valence among Africans in South Africa, and may also be related to the targeting
of most prevention programmes at Africans.
Political factors were clearly drivers of unsafe sex, with AIDS conspiracy be-
liefs, AIDS denialism and never having heard of TAC being significant predictors
of failure to use a condom in the full and African-only samples. The continuing leg-
acy of AIDS denialism in South Africa therefore takes the form, in part, of likely
new HIV infections among young adults resulting from conspiracy and denial-
related unsafe sex. Less gloomily, these results confirm that TAC’s ‘civil society












inspired AIDS policy and discourse, but also for promoting safer sex. Since TAC’s
impact on condom use should already be evident in the model through its impact
on conspiracy beliefs, the variable’s effect in the models for condom use should
largely reflect an independent prevention effect.
4.5 Conclusions
The analyses presented in this chapter provide evidence from survey data that
TAC’s leadership on AIDS has had appreciable effects not only at the level of
national politics, but also in local communities in the form of mitigating the impact
of irresponsible political leadership, promoting trust in conventional HIV/AIDS
science and promoting the use of condoms to prevent transmission. This is, to the
best of my knowledge, the first quantitative evidence for the preventive impact of
treatment activism in South Africa.
While one cannot easily extrapolate from a survey of mostly African and col-
oured young adults in Cape Town to communities across South Africa, the results
nevertheless show that community mobilisation can (and has been) an effective tool
in HIV prevention efforts. It also gives the lie to charges often made against AIDS
treatment activists that they emphasise treatment at the expense of prevention and
thereby harm prevention efforts. It suggests that TAC’s treatment literacy efforts
have been effective and deserve continued support, and also that their model of
combining political mobilisation and HIV education efforts may be useful in other













Table 4.1: Demographic breakdown of the CAPS 2009 sample
Male Female Total
N % (row) N % (row) N % (col)
African 578 44.02 735 55.98 1,313 45.26
Coloured 658 46.21 766 53.79 1,424 49.09
Indian 5 45.45 6 54.22 11 0.38
White 77 50.33 76 49.67 153 5.27












Table 4.2: Weighted conspiracy models
Dependent var: Conspiracy beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Africans African men African women







Age 0.963 0.997 1.017 0.967
(0.029) (0.033) (0.055) (0.050)
0.219 0.939 0.751 0.508
School grades completed 0.936 1.045 1.023 1.027
(0.061) (0.068) (0.076) (0.124)
0.307 0.497 0.758 0.824
Any tertiary education 0.827 0.466** 0.540 0.415*
(0.225) (0.140) (0.206) (0.212)
0.485 0.011 0.108 0.086
Household income per capita (log) 0.785*** 0.776** 0.828 0.674***
(0.065) (0.079) (0.127) (0.102)
0.004 0.013 0.220 0.009
Employed 1.056 1.377 1.771* 1.289
(0.211) (0.270) (0.530) (0.379)
0.785 0.104 0.058 0.388
Serious psychological distress 2.262*** 3.017*** 3.433*** 2.348**
(0.521) (0.830) (1.444) (0.940)
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.034
Trusts T-M more than Hogan 2.905*** 4.044*** 7.682*** 1.615
(0.582) (0.969) (2.871) (0.572)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.177
Attitude blacks minus whites 1.107*** 1.143*** 1.075* 1.268***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.044) (0.073)












(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agrees most people can be trusted 0.863 0.747 0.999 0.689
(0.197) (0.206) (0.383) (0.250)
0.518 0.291 0.998 0.304
Voted in the 2009 election 0.901 0.685* 0.682 0.572*
(0.186) (0.145) (0.203) (0.181)
0.615 0.075 0.200 0.078
Member of religious organisation 0.707 0.583** 0.531* 0.486**
(0.149) (0.144) (0.171) (0.164)
0.102 0.030 0.051 0.033
Never heard of TAC 1.904*** 1.831** 0.953 3.326***
(0.409) (0.442) (0.311) (1.279)
0.003 0.013 0.884 0.002
News radio/tv/newspaper 1.145 0.945 0.487** 1.739**
(0.190) (0.158) (0.167) (0.464)
0.413 0.734 0.037 0.039
Traditionalism (initiation) 3.114*** 2.059 4.911**
(1.343) (1.098) (3.092)
0.009 0.177 0.012
Witchcraft belief 3.393*** 2.443* 5.082***
(1.237) (1.280) (2.277)
0.001 0.090 0.000
Observations 1866 2703 1438 2792
Strata8 3 3 2 3
PSUs 265 322 210 324
Population (weighted) 217214 376774 178646 384832
Subpopulation 1115 489 626
Subpopulation (weighted) 92377 41549 50828
F 10.882 10.279 6.199 7.768
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exponentiated coefficients
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
8Where fewer than three strata, this results from a stratum being omitted because it contains












Table 4.3: Gender-interacted conspiracy model (Africans)










School grades completed 1.026
(0.066)
0.687
Any tertiary education 0.554
(0.210)
0.120
Female X Tertiary education 0.763
(0.490)
0.673
Household income per capita (log) 0.862
(0.130)
0.326






Serious psychological distress 2.815***
(0.785)
0.000















Female X Trusts MT>H 0.232***
(0.115)
0.003
Attitude blacks minus whites 1.157***
(0.043)
0.000
Agrees most people can be trusted 0.855
(0.231)
0.563
Voted in the 2009 election 0.707
(0.210)
0.244
Female X Voted 0.752
(0.310)
0.490












Female X Witchcraft belief 2.060
(1.409)
0.292
Never heard of TAC 1.000
(0.320)
0.999










































Table 4.4: Weighted condommodels
Dependent var: Condom used most recent sex
(6) (7) (8) (9)
All Africans African men African women







Age 0.886*** 0.953* 1.003 0.925**
(0.022) (0.025) (0.046) (0.031)
0.000 0.075 0.951 0.020
School grades completed 1.038 1.021 1.040 1.015
(0.045) (0.057) (0.094) (0.074)
0.383 0.719 0.665 0.834
Any tertiary education 1.281 1.129 1.002 1.277
(0.252) (0.222) (0.353) (0.327)
0.211 0.536 0.995 0.342
Household income per capita (log) 1.200** 1.082 1.257 0.957
(0.104) (0.094) (0.180) (0.097)
0.036 0.367 0.112 0.663
Employed 1.013 1.041 0.845 1.240
(0.139) (0.132) (0.200) (0.212)
0.927 0.751 0.479 0.210
Concurrent partnership 1.143 1.389* 1.334 1.491
(0.228) (0.277) (0.470) (0.363)
0.503 0.100 0.413 0.102
Monogamous partnership 0.749 0.846 0.616 0.976
(0.133) (0.155) (0.231) (0.204)
0.105 0.363 0.197 0.906
Knows someone who died of AIDS 1.288* 1.427** 1.112 1.541**
(0.177) (0.202) (0.266) (0.265)












(6) (7) (8) (9)
HIV from condoms 1.202 0.946 0.480* 1.115
(0.400) (0.240) (0.183) (0.370)
0.581 0.827 0.056 0.744
AIDS origin conspiracy beliefs 0.626** 0.664* 0.690 0.793
(0.126) (0.140) (0.216) (0.213)
0.021 0.054 0.238 0.389
AIDS denialism 0.592*** 0.613** 0.772 0.525***
(0.105) (0.119) (0.309) (0.129)
0.004 0.012 0.519 0.009
Never heard of TAC 0.586*** 0.710* 0.559* 1.115
(0.091) (0.134) (0.166) (0.325)
0.001 0.070 0.051 0.710
News radio/tv/newspaper 1.069 1.076 1.639* 0.872
(0.158) (0.156) (0.438) (0.153)
0.651 0.613 0.066 0.434
Observations 1741 2697 1413 2811
Strata9 3 3 2 3
PSUs 261 325 211 325
Population (weighted) 196632 376187 176499 386391
Subpopulation 1109 464 645
Subpopulation (weighted) 91790 39403 52387
F 16.862 7.080 2.134 2.512
p 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.003
Exponentiated coefficients
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
9Where fewer than three strata, this results from a stratum being omitted because it contains












Table 4.5: Gender-interacted condommodel (Africans)










Female X Age 0.933
(0.048)
0.180
School grades completed 1.025
(0.057)
0.660
Any tertiary education 1.164
(0.230)
0.441



























Female X Monogamous part. 1.518
(0.603)
0.295
Knows someone who died of AIDS 1.162
(0.279)
0.531
Female X Knows some. died HIV 1.371
(0.401)
0.282
HIV from condoms 0.844
(0.209)
0.495
AIDS origin conspiracy beliefs 0.579*
(0.179)
0.077






Female X AIDS denialism 0.706
(0.320)
0.443
Never heard of TAC 0.503**
(0.140)
0.014








































Uganda: Civil society leadership
‘in partnership with the state’1
In the previous two chapters I told the story of the Treatment Action Campaign
and demonstrated how transnational networks of influence helped it exert influ-
ence over AIDS policy in South Africa and also that it had a measurable impact
on prevention efforts at the community level. In this chapter I tell the story of
a very different—though very prominent and arguably equally important—civil
society group in Uganda, The AIDS Support Organisation. I will describe the
birth of TASO as a small group of volunteers, its growth and evolution into a large
and professionally-run organisation administering AIDS treatment for a substan-
tial number of patients. But I will also describe how it has been shaped by the
political and institutional context within which it operates—very different to that
of TAC’s—and try to explain why its path has been one of ‘partnership’ rather
than conflict with the state and why it has focused on service delivery rather than
activism.
This case study will help us to see that ‘civil society leadership’ on AIDS can
take different forms and is highly sensitive both to the choices of individual lead-
ers and to the social and political context within which it operates. The field-
work for this chapter largely took the form of in-depth semi-structured interviews
1The fieldwork for this chapter was generously funded by the Developmental Leadership Pro-













with key informants, including early TASO volunteers and leaders (like Noerine
Kaleeba, Peter Ssebanja and Dr Elly Katabira), subsequent and current TASO
leaders, other civil society leaders (including prominent activists) and officials of
state structures like the Uganda AIDS Commission. I further refer extensively to
the literature on the Ugandan AIDS response.
5.1 Introduction: state leadership and the mak-
ing of an ‘African success story’
Uganda experienced one of the earliest large-scale HIV epidemics in Sub-Saharan
Africa. In the late 1970s, North Western Tanzania and Southern Uganda prob-
ably constituted the epicentre of the African HIV epidemic (Epstein and Halperin,
2007:155-156). By the time the first AIDS cases were identified in Uganda, the ex-
istence of a mysterious wasting disorder known locally as ‘Slim’ was widely known
in the rural South-West of the country. The virus continued to spread quickly and
by the mid-1980s many communities were being ravaged by one of Africa’s worst
HIV/AIDS epidemics (see O’Manique, 2004; Thornton, 2008). The situation was
exacerbated by the insecurity and social upheaval of a bloody civil war lasting from
1981 to 1986 that contributed to widespread fear and confusion and rendered any
systematic state response nearly impossible.
By the time Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army took Kampala in
1986, having defeated the second Obote regime and the short-lived Okello mil-
itary junta, AIDS constituted a real crisis. The Museveni government initiated
HIV prevention campaigns, with the President himself frequently mentioning the
risks of contracting HIV through sex, which has contributed to the Ugandan gov-
ernment and in particular Museveni’s reputation for openness and leadership on
AIDS. These campaigns included discouraging sleeping around and (to some de-
gree) condom use, with the so-called ‘zero grazing’ (partner reduction) and ABC
(‘Abstain, Be faithful, Condomize’) messages featuring prominently. The govern-
ment also established an AIDS Control Programme in the Ministry of Health to
steer the national AIDS response. This openness and willingness to tackle the issue












Figure 5.1: Ruhakana Rugunda (in a later role representing Uganda at
the UN)
Source: UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras. ©United Nations 2009.
time (and even into the 1990s)2 and certainly contributed to the Ugandan govern-
ment’s stellar international reputation for its HIV prevention efforts. An example
of the willingness of Uganda’s political leaders to publicly tackle HIV/AIDS des-
pite the reputational risks—while in many other countries leaders were denying
the existence of the crisis—is the Ugandan health minister, Ruhakana Rugunda’s
speech at the 1987 World Health Assembly, described by Peter Piot (2012:175)
as a ‘lone voice’ calling on his peers to face the reality of AIDS on the African
continent.
This reputation is so good that many consider Uganda a model for addressing
AIDS in resource-poor settings (Youde, 2007b:1). But Uganda’s status as a ‘poster
boy’ for good governmental leadership on AIDS and Museveni’s reputation as an
exceptional African leader were probably cemented when it became apparent by
the mid-1990s that HIV prevalence had started to decline, turning Uganda into
the first African HIV prevention ‘success story’. But is this reputation deserved?
While the praise heaped on Museveni and his government probably say as much
about the need of the international development, aid and public health agencies












for African success stories as they do about Uganda, it is important to interrogate
the basis of this reputation. In order to do so, we must look both at the evolving
role of non-state actors in the Ugandan AIDS response and at the epidemiology
of HIV in Uganda.
The Ugandan state’s early response to the AIDS crisis took the form largely
of prevention campaigns (the efficacy of which is debatable), but it possessed ex-
tremely limited capacity to provide medical services to the AIDS sick and even less
to provide care and support at community level. There were few hospitals in the
country, and even fewer that had the resources to provide good services. AIDS ser-
vices in Uganda were pioneered by civil society working outside state structures,
most prominently in the form of TASO, which was founded in 1987 by a small
group of volunteers and a few passionate healthcare workers. Later in this chapter
I will describe the birth of TASO, its growth to eventually become the largest pro-
vider of medical services to AIDS patients and its evolving relationship with the
state. But suffice it to say that civil society stepped in where the state was largely
absent.
What exactly led to the decline in HIV prevalence is uncertain, but changes
in sexual behaviour—in particular reductions in the number of concurrent part-
ners—are generally thought to have played a significant role (Stoneburner and
Low-Beer, 2004; Low-Beer and Stoneburner, 2004). The Ugandan government
attracted substantial credit for the apparently radical behaviour changes that
would explain declining HIV prevalence (e.g. UNAIDS, 1998a; 2001). But while
it is undeniably due some credit, the degree to which the prevention campaigns
shaped the evolution of the epidemic should be questioned. There has been con-
siderable debate among scholars about the relative importance of different factors
(see, for example, Merson, 2006; Green et al., 2006; Gray et al., 2006; Atzori et al.,
2009), while Thornton (2008:35-37) has pointed to several difficulties with Stone-
burner and Low-Beer’s standard epidemiological model and instead emphasises
the effects of the configuration of sexual networks on HIV trends (Thornton, 2008:33).
Helen Epstein and Halperin (2007:160) argues that the many small community-
based AIDS groups that were founded during the 1980s and early 1990s deserve
much of the credit: “Their compassion and hard work brought the disease into












and denial, and led to a profound shift in sexual norms.”
Figure 5.2: Epidemiological model for Uganda showing new adult HIV




























































































New HIV infections (’000) HIV prevalence (%)
Source: Own model using Spectrum/EPP 2011 (see Appendix B).
In any event, it is fairly clear that the unexpected peak in HIV prevalence
could not have resulted from the Museveni government’s HIV prevention efforts
(although this is not to say that those efforts had no effect). Figure 5.2 shows estim-
ates of HIV incidence and prevalence for the period 1974-2004 according to an
epidemiological model described more fully in Appendix B from page 186. The
model makes use of UNAIDS’s Epidemiological Projection Package (UNAIDS,
2011a) and HIV prevalence data from Ugandan antenatal clinics in order to es-
timate new infections, total infected population, deaths and AIDSmorbidity. HIV
prevalence estimates are further calibrated using national seroprevalence survey












peaked by 1983. As shown in table B.1 in the appendix (page 192), AIDS deaths
continued to rise until 1995. According to the model, the fall in HIV prevalence
rates and total number of people with HIV from 1990 resulted from deaths ex-
ceeding new HIV infections. It therefore seems highly unlikely that Museveni’s
‘zero grazing’ campaigns was the decisive factor in Uganda’s prevalence declines.
If large-scale behaviour change was a major factor, it seems more likely that be-
haviour responded to the visibility of illness and AIDS deaths, both of which had
started to increase markedly by the early 1980s (see figures B.3 and B.4 on pages
193 and 194).
Despite the questionable assumptions underlyingUganda’s prevention ‘success
story’, and the fact that AIDS services are largely provided by civil society and
funded by external donors, Museveni and the Ugandan government did indeed
provide leadership. It did so by (1) ensuring AIDS featured prominently on the
national agenda (i.e. it showed ‘political commitment’ in the sense used by Bor,
2007) and (2) by building partnerships with civil society and coordinating the work
of various actors, first through the National Committee for the Prevention of AIDS
(NCPA) and and later through the national AIDS Control Programme (ACP) and
the Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC) (i.e. in the sense of Piot and Coll-Seck,
2001). Despite failings in both institutions and limits to civil society’s freedom
from political control (which would become a more serious problem later3), this
at least freed civil society actors to focus on providing services where the state was
unable to do so. TASO founder Noerine Kaleeba describes being brought into
high-level policy discussion and says that the “terrain had been set” for civil society
to respond to AIDS.4 This approach became known as Uganda’s ‘multi-sectoral
response’ and at least superficially fits with the notion of ‘good national leadership
on AIDS’, insofar as this is conceived as political commitment and a broad societal
mobilisation involving a range of stakeholders.
Furthermore, by the mid-2000s, Uganda was performing significantly better
than expected (and than most of its peers, most notably the much wealthier South
Africa) in the provision of antiretroviral treatment, even if this progress was largely
funded by PEPFAR and implemented by civil society organisations like TASO.
3See later sections of this chapter.












Using the novel approach described in chapter 2, Nattrass (2008b) shows that
Uganda performed significantly better in HAART coverage than an econometric
model incorporating its level of development, external resources, social character-
istics and burden of disease would predict, something she speculates may be related
to ‘political leadership’.
Like TAC in South Africa, TASO has been a key element of coalitions mo-
bilised in response to AIDS. Also like TAC, TASO initially relied heavily on the
charismatic and energetic leadership of exceptional individuals, most prominently
that of Noerine Kaleeba, and on strong interpersonal ties. But unlike TAC, it
has treasured partnership and cooperation with the state from its inception and
avoided political confrontation, focused on medical and support services to people
living with HIV/AIDS rather than mobilising a constituency r pursuing broader
social justice goals and more successfully (and probably more willingly) managed
the process of formalisation and bureaucratisation.
Despite its prominent role in the Ugandan response to AIDS, TASO is there-
fore not primarily an activist organisation and can probably not be characterised
as a social movement (although it does exhibit some characteristics associated with
the latter). Nevertheless, it is an example of ‘civil society leadership’ on AIDS and,
in keeping with the theoretical framework articulated in chapter 3, I will attempt to
describe and analyse how contextual and structural factors have shaped the devel-
opment of the organisation (and how it in turn shaped the societal AIDS response),
while at the same time acknowledging factors related to individual agency (such as
Kaleeba’s leadership of TASO and the actions of Museveni) that have impacted
on this development. I start by describing some of the early history of the organ-
isation before turning my attention to the political and institutional context within
which it has operated. I then look at the role of elite networks in the building of
an AIDS response coalition in Uganda, while paying particular attention to the in-
ternal evolution of the organisation, to alliances and partnerships with other civil












5.2 The origins of The AIDS Support Organisa-
tion
Both TASO and TAC were founded by charismatic and inspirational leaders who
were personally affected by HIV. In early 1987, a group of 16 men and women
(the majority of whom were HIV-positive) started meeting informally to share ex-
periences and support one another in coping with the impact of HIV/AIDS on
their lives (Ssebanja, 2007:1). As the group grew, it started calling itself ‘The AIDS
Support Organisation’ and increasingly formalised its structure and its programme
of ‘living positively’. Noerine Kaleeba, principal of the School of Physiotherapy at
MulagoHospital (Uganda’s only teaching hospital) was the leader of the group and
became its first director once it formally established itself as an organisation.5 She
cites as motivation for the founding of TASO “a feeling of anger and frustration
at the stigma and isolation of people with HIV and … the fact that families were
abandoning their loved ones.”6
The previous year, she had visited her husband, Christopher, in Englandwhere
he had become ill and was diagnosed with AIDS. In a remarkable interview for
the PBS documentary ‘The Age of AIDS’, she describes how she made a trip to
Geneva after discovering how ill her husband was. She had read about Jonathan
Mann’s appointment to the WHO to direct the GPA, travelled to his office and
asked to see him. She tells how she burst into tears when told she could not see
Mann, upon which he discovered her and invited her into his office:
He was apparently going to a meeting, that he never went to. We sat
for four hours and he talked to me. At the end of that time I was calm,
I was collected. He told me that my husband was probably going to
die, because at the time there was no cure. But he also said, “there is
prejudice that is attached to the disease, that we have to fight, and will
you help me fight it?” JonathanMann was a star, and the first scientist
that I met with a heart of gold. (Cran, 2006).
5The group decided to name themselves ‘The AIDS Support Organisation’ in November 1987
(Ssebanja, 2007:9).












This introduction to the world of intergovernmental organisations and the in-
ternational response to AIDS, as well as toMann himself, would later prove invalu-
able to Kaleeba as she built relationships and mobilised support for the struggle in
Uganda. She also participated in the international response (she would later be
recruited to work for UNAIDS under Peter Piot to develop its partnerships with
civil society). She brought Christopher back to Uganda, where he died in January
1987. During the last months of his life, the Kaleebas had direct experience of the
stigma surrounding AIDS, which she became determined to combat.7
Medical services for AIDS patients were extremely limited. Dr Elly Katabitra,
a physician who had come across AIDS while working in England, was shocked
to find large numbers of AIDS patients in Mulago Hospital when he returned to
Kampala in 1986. He set up a new outpatient clinic attached to the normal infec-
tious diseases clinic for HIV/AIDS services in late 1986, after opposing proposals
for a separate inpatient ward over his concerns that segregating AIDS patients
would exacerbate stigma and discrimination by marking AIDS as a “deadly and
shameful disease” and that a service outside the mainstream would not be sus-
tainable.8 (A compassionate and highly competent physician, Dr Katabira is now
the president of the International AIDS Society and a prominent international ad-
vocate for a human rights approach, progressive AIDS policy and access to AIDS
treatment.) By 1987, Katabira had been put in touch with the fledgling TASO and
became a key figure in their integration of social support and community-based
services with medical services. At the time no life-saving treatment for HIV/AIDS
was available, and the founders were responding primarily to the human tragedy
caused by widespread stigma and discrimination (both within the healthcare sys-
tem and the wider community), which condemned patients to lonely and undig-
nified deaths. They wished to enable patients to “die with dignity.”9 Their focus
on combating stigma was reflected in the choice to refer to the people they were
serving as ‘clients’ rather than as ‘AIDS patients’ so as not to exacerbate discrim-
ination against people with AIDS (Ssebanja, 2007:9).
This is of course in stark contrast to TAC activists, who rather than shying
7Interview, N. Kaleeba (16 October 2008).
8Interview, E. Katabira (14 October 2008).












away from terms like ‘HIV’ and ‘AIDS’, attempted to break down stigma by pro-
moting living openly with HIV and by wearing the iconic ‘HIV-positive’ tee shirts,
reflecting also a degree of identity-based mobilisation. This should, however, be
seen in the light of TAC’s emergence (about ten years after TASO) in the context
of HAART becoming available in the rich world and AIDS no longer necessar-
ily being a death sentence, its activist roots and a more developed transnational
activist movement.
The fledgling TASO reached out to communities, for example visiting neigh-
bourhoods to identify patients, running training workshops on caring for the ill at
home and combating stigma and discrimination by talking openly about AIDS,
leading by example and by emphasising that the risk of non-sexual transmission
of HIV was vanishingly small. A key early ally of TASO was the British charity
ActionAid, who provided early logistical and administrative support10 and funded
a number of early TASO initiatives, including providing the first vehicle for com-
munity visits and funding a series of AIDS sensitisation workshops organised for
staff and medical personnel at Mulago and other hospitals. Even the then chair-
man of the AIDS Control Programme in the Ministry of Health (Dr SamOkware)
attended one of these workshops (Ssebanja, 2007:17).
TASO continued to expand: it obtained a room atMulago hospital (the former
polio clinic) to use as an office and a space to provide counselling services to clients.
It wasn’t long before requests for assistance from other health care workers started
arriving. In May 1988 health and social workers led by Dr Sam Kalibala from
Masaka hospital (in one of the hardest-hit districts) contacted TASO and with the
help of a TASO team set up an HIV testing service and a day-care clinic (Sse-
banja, 2007:17). This would become TASOMasaka and eventually TASO would
operate 11 service centres distributed throughout the country.
Medical care for AIDS patients was woefully inadequate, and even at Mu-
lago hospital Dr Katabira battled to obtain the drugs and resources required
for the most basic care.11 Initially TASO focused on providing counselling and
psychosocial support, but increasingly responded to the weakness of the Ugandan
healthcare system by providing medical services itself. Dr Katabira describes how
10Interview, E. Katabira (14 October 2008).












Figure 5.3: Noerine Kaleeba in 2008
Source: Author’s collection. Photo by Larry Adupa (17 October 2008).
both local and international networks were built up and information and expertise
flowed in both directions. After Noerine Kaleeba and Dr Katabira went to Eng-
land for training in December 1987, they suggested to their funders that it would
be better to bring counselling trainers to Uganda so that these experts could see
the local conditions:
We asked them specifically to bring in people for teaching us or train-
ing us, which they did. And these people who came, actually they
ended up learning far more than us, because their training and ways
of talking about AIDS came from a different atmosphere. They
came from San Francisco, so you can imagine. Their thinking was
mainly of gay people, but here they find Josephine is sick, Peter is sick,
Josephine’s child is sick. In fact, they had to change their material
completely. And they learnt a lot, because in counselling and group
discussions you learn…12
Dr Katabira also describes how he encouraged health care workers from any-












where in the world to visit his AIDS clinic to encourage exchange of information
and experience:
…because I knew, if what I was doing with the clinic was good, then
it could also be good at Jinja hospital, at Gulu hospital and it could
be good at Masaka hopital. …People were completely changed and
that’s what I wanted, so they went out and said, “if you can do it, we
can do it.”13
TASOgrew rapidly and today employs over 1 000 staff and operates a large an-
tiretroviral treatment programme (much larger than that of the Ugandan govern-
ment). In contrast to TAC, which remained a smaller and more nimble activist or-
ganisation staffed largely by politically-motivated individuals, TASO has become
the major provider of both medical and social support services to HIV/AIDS pa-
tients in Uganda. It is a large and professionally-run organisation with a relatively
formal and inflexible management culture. This path of development was con-
ditioned by the initial motivations of the founders (TAC was always much more
oriented towards political activism and advocacy, and TASO towards service de-
livery), but crucially, also by the constraints imposed and opportunities provided by
its specific political, institutional and social environment. Contextual differences
include levels of development and state capacity (South Africa has a relatively soph-
isticated healthcare system and vastly greater state capacity to provide services), in
political institutions and cultures, and in the roles of other influential actors such
as donors. The next section will focus on these factors.
5.3 The context of civil society leadership: ‘part-
nership’ and Uganda’s multisectoral ap-
proach
Perhaps the insight that emerges most clearly from a comparison of TAC and
TASO (and their roles in helping to construct coalitions in response to AIDS in












South Africa and Uganda respectively) is that the development of AIDS response
coalitions is highly context-dependent. Civil society leaders and elites respond to
the opportunities provided, and constraints imposed, by structural factors, includ-
ing the formal legal and institutional framework of the state and the prevailing
political culture (I argued in chapter 3 that TAC made extensive use of the consti-
tutional legal framework of the post-apartheid state and drew upon the traditions
and political lexicon of the anti-aparteid struggle). In other words, what social
movement scholars call the ‘political opportunity structure’ matters. As Leftwich
and Hogg (2007) argue, economic and social structure and level of development
is of great consequence—in particular whether elite negotiations occur within the
context of a broad societal consensus on the principles and institutions which gov-
ern it (i.e. ‘robust and legitimised institutions’ and ‘agreed rules of the political
game’). Historically determined institutions privilege certain social actors as well
as define and mediate the range of interests, distribution of resources, sources of
conflict, and range of coalitional opportunities (Yashar, 1997:15).
In addition to a tale of exceptional individuals who acted beyond the call of
duty and left an indelible imprint on the history of AIDS in Uganda, the story of
TASO is therefore also the story of Ugandan post-civil war political development,
the Museveni government’s response to the AIDS crisis and the actions of interna-
tional donors. To a significant extent, TASO’s choice to focus on service delivery
(rather than activism) reflects, on the one hand, the inability of the Ugandan state
machinery to provide the required services, and on the other a political system
and culture that limits the freedom of civil society to speak up in opposition to
the government (see Scholte, 2004:229), despite the relative independence of civil
society (De Waal, 2006:108). But its effectiveness has also depended on a largely
supportive state that encouraged civil society (including NGOs like TASO, faith-
based organisations and foreign charities) to do what it could not, as long as this
work did not threaten the consolidation of its power.
Putzel (2004:23-26) reviews the early efforts of the Ugandan government to
respond to AIDS in some detail. He argues that while Uganda faced many of the
same pressures as other African governments and that its adoption of a vigorous
campaign was not unproblematic—for example, there was a significant backlash












to highlight the crisis and attract foreign assistance. However, the Museveni gov-
ernment did start responding to HIV shortly after coming to power: upgrading
a subcommittee that had been set up by the Obote government to the National
Committee for the Prevention of AIDS (NCPA) in October 1986 and making use
of a World Health Organisation mission to Uganda in January 1987 to draw up
a short-term intervention plan and a medium-term five year action plan. These
plans formed the basis of the Aids Control Programme (the first in Africa) and a
donor conference in May 1987. The President made a number of high-profile
speeches in which he drew attention to AIDS, and in December 1988 he unam-
biguously declared AIDS a major national priority, calling for an all-out public
education campaign. Putzel (2004:26) attributes the willingness of the Museveni
regime to tackle AIDS head-on to four factors: (1) Museveni listened to medical
experts and chose to base policy on scientific evidence rather than myths associ-
ated with HIV/AIDS, (2) the ‘incentive structure’ facing the government meant
it had little to lose and much to gain by taking action, (3) the impact of high-level
political commitment “put the epidemic beyond partisan politics” and (4) a “firm
coalition behind the President’s HIV/AIDS campaign.”
The primary purpose of this chapter is not to investigate Museveni and the
National Resistance Movement (NRM) government’s motivations for taking ac-
tion on AIDS, but it is important to interrogate these and other factors in order
to understand the political context within which civil society leadership took place
and that shaped the government’s and civil society’s responses as well as the in-
terplay between them. In particular, I will return to the role of foreign donors in
shaping the response. For now, however, I would like to point out a number of
things. First, Putzel makes the common mistake of exaggerating the impact of the
Ugandan government’s early efforts, crediting it with bringing the epidemic under
control on the basis of the prevalence declines observed in the mid-1990s (Putzel,
2004:19). As I argued in the introduction to this chapter, these efforts may have
been effective to a degree, and are certainly deserving both of praise and of political
analysis (given the relative uniqueness of the political commitment), but they could
not have been the decisive factor in the course of the epidemic given that incid-
ence declines probably started in the first half of the 1980s, before Museveni took












new infections in the first half of the 1990s. Second, and this is not necessarily in
conflict with Putzel’s arguments, several Ugandan respondents attributed Musev-
eni’s vigorous leadership to the very real threat that HIV/AIDS in the military
represented to the new government’s power base, given that it had come to power
by military means. This argument is echoed in the literature (see Ostergard and
Barcello, 2005; Tumushabe, 2006; De Waal, 2006). In fact, Museveni himself has
cited an incident where significant proportion of Ugandan army officers sent to
Cuba for training tested positive for HIV and Cuban President Fidel Castro per-
sonally informed Museveni of the problem (Garbus & Marseille 2003:11-12, cited
in Ostergard and Barcello, 2005; DeWaal, 2006:97). Furthermore, the newNRM
government was heavily reliant on donors and needed to legitimate itself in the eyes
of the international community in addition to the Ugandan public. Tumushabe
(2006:8) has argued that the Ugandan ‘success story’ on HIV/AIDS became a crit-
ical “approval and marketing issue” for the government, and De Waal (2006:96)
points out that Museveni started to trumpet his success on AIDS in the late 1990s
in order to use it for political credit.
As argued earlier, TASO was founded in the context of a very weak healthcare
systemwithout the capacity to care effectively for the deluge of AIDS patients. The
country had just emerged from a long period of economic mismanagement (under
the Amin and secondObote regimes) and war that had decimated its infrastructure
and economy. If the government were to stand a chance of successfully dealing
with the impact of AIDS, it would therefore need all the partners it could get. The
donor conference of May 1987 indicates that the government understood that it
needed international support. But for implementation it would need local partners.
When government officials became aware of TASO, they responded in a highly
supportive fashion. TASO was provided with facilities at Mulago hospital (and
later at hospitals throughout the country) and Noerine Kaleeba was appointed to
the committee in charge of the AIDSControl Programme, apparently at the behest
of President Museveni himself. Noerine Kaleeba explains:
I remember the first meeting I had with [President Museveni]. I said,
“Mr President, … I would like to do something about this disease.












to what I explained about TASO, but he did say [to the head of the
AIDS Control Programme], “put that woman on the committee.” So
when I look today at many leadership attempts by different people on
the HIV front in many countries in Africa, [I realise that] I was in a
country where the terrain had been set [for civil society to respond].
I think the government had already made a decision that if someone
comes up and wants to do something about HIV that is correct [they
should be encouraged]. So we didn’t have to contend with govern-
ment opposition.14
According to Thornton (2008:131), the government of Uganda began to real-
ise in the late 1980s that AIDS was not merely a medical matter that could be
dealt with through the health system alone. It started developing an approach
that would yield a nationally-integrated AIDS response, bringing together all gov-
ernmental organs, state-supported institutions (like schools and clinics) as well as
civil society (i.e. non-governmental organisations, ‘community-based organisa-
tions’ and ‘faith-based organisations’). This became known as Uganda’s ‘multi-
sectoral approach.’
A sense of partnership therefore characterised the relationship between TASO
and the Ugandan government from early on. However, over time and as TASO
grew in size and influence, disagreements inevitably emerged.15 Many Ugandan
AIDS activists and civil society leaders argue that TASO has failed to play a lead-
ership role in civil society and in particular failed to support efforts to hold govern-
ment to account.16
In contrast with more militant activists, interviews with senior TASO lead-
ers indicate a general unwillingness to acknowledge conflict with government or
serious failures in governmental leadership (although some are willing to recount
episodes of conflict off the record). This seems to reflect a fear that open criti-
cism would undermine TASO’s partnership with the Ugandan government and
consequently threaten service delivery (which is predicated on access to hospital in-
14Interview, N. Kaleeba (16 October 2008).
15Interview, A. Coutinho (14 October 2008).













frastructure, etc.). This belies the conventional wisdom about Uganda’s ‘openness’
and ‘partnership approach’.
While the early leadership of the Museveni regime (and of President Museveni
himself) are rightly lauded, therefore, this reputation is largely based on events
of the late 1980s and 1990s and must be interrogated in the light of more recent
events.
5.4 Puritanism, authoritarianism and ‘partner-
ship institutions’ beholden to the executive
In recent years, governmental leadership on HIV/AIDS is widely perceived to
have declined in quality and vigour. A number of respondents indicate that Pres-
ident Museveni seems to have ‘withdrawn’ from the AIDS response, while others
worry about shifts towards less progressive government policy on AIDS. Devel-
opments causing widespread concern include, for example, increased hostility to
condom promotion, a proposed law that would criminalise deliberate HIV trans-
mission andmost recently the introduction of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in 2009,
which, while not (yet) passed, received substantial support in Ugandan society, in-
cluding from prominent members of the NRM and the government.17
A puritanical and socially conservative agenda is not new in Uganda, and
17At the time of my fieldwork, the introduction of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill of 2009 and
the international uproar which it occasioned had not yet occurred. The bill was introduced by
Member of Parliament David Bahati in October 2009 as a private member’s bill. While same-
sex relationships are already criminalised in Uganda (dating from British colonial rule), the bill
would exacerbate repression and discrimination by introducing two new offences, ‘the offence of
homosexuality’ carrying a penalty of life imprisonment and ‘aggravated homosexuality’, defined
to include homosexual acts with a minor or by a person who is HIV-positive, and which would
carry the death penalty. Despite strong condemnation from various quarters, including Ugandan
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) activists and international human rights organ-
isations, the bill has received substantial support from the Ugandan public and in the Ugandan
media, which has framed criticism of it as ‘Western interference’ and as a battle over Uganda’s
moral self-determination (Sadgrove et al., 2012:105). While the bill has not been passed, nor has
it been formally withdrawn (Amnesty International, 2012:30). The bill and the wave of homo-
phobic sentiment expressed in the wake of its introduction seem to have tapped into a stridently
socially and sexually conservative agenda in Uganda, which enjoys both public support and has
powerful backers in the Museveni regime. A tragic and possibly related event has been the murder
of Ugandan gay activist David Kato in January 2011 (for which a man has since been convicted,












elements of it can be discerned even in the early discourse on HIV/AIDS from
Museveni and his government. De Waal (2006:98-105) points out that the lauded
‘ABC’ message of the Ugandan government has always been a rather mixed and
inconsistent one, often tailored so as to please or avoid offending specific audi-
ences. On numerous occasions the president has attacked condom promotion,
especially to young people. His wife, Janet Museveni (an outspoken ‘born-again’
Christian), has been particularly vigorous in her condemnation of condom promo-
tion to young people, saying to a conservative audience in the United States:
Condom use, as a preferred method of prevention or reduction or
infection, is definitely not in the interest of Ugandans. Our people
are still poor and the majority of them still live in remote villages in
rural areas. Even if they had money to buy condoms regularly, they
would find it a problem to access them. When condoms are not used
consistently, they are even less effective. Therefore, it is wiser to show
our people that there is a surer way to stay safe and alive; because the
truth is that there is no “safe sex” outside of the situation of faithfulness
to a partner.
Giving young people condoms is tantamount to giving them a license
to go out and be promiscuous; it leads to certain death. (Museveni,
2004).
In the mid-2000s, the United States became (by far) the largest donor funding
Uganda’s AIDS efforts through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR). But, as noted earlier, the programme’s origins as a Bush initiative with
the support of political Christianity in the United States meant that it came en-
cumbered with policies rooted in a conservative religious agenda (such as reserva-
tion of funds for faith groups and for abstinence-based prevention programmes).
As Epstein and Halperin (2007:185–201) shows, this conservative religious agenda
found fertile ground in certain sections of Ugandan society, in particular a num-
ber of conservative church groups and the first lady, who led a backlash against
condom promotion programmes. By 2008, this constituted a significant worry for
civil society leaders, including the former director of TASO, Dr Alex Coutinho,












is “anti-condoms and a little bit pro-abstinence”) and arguing that Museveni had
to be brought back to the forefront of HIV prevention efforts.18
It should therefore be kept in mind that the open and enabling approach of
the Ugandan state, was not simply the product of ‘good leadership’, but to a great
extent reflected structural factors like its dependence on donor funding, its lack of
capacity to combat HIV/AIDS through established public health infrastructure
and the new regime’s need to consolidate its power.
The reticence of TASO leaders to express criticism and a general weakness on
the part of civil society organisations with respect to political advocacy (described
by respondents as a ‘failure to hold government to account’) reflects, at least in
part, a political culture and institutional arrangements that discourage criticism
of the government (and the President in particular). A number of respondents
indicated that there are personal and professional risks to being perceived as crit-
ical—ranging from exclusion from consultative forums, being cut off from sources
of funding and even personal harassment and intimidation.
Uganda’s transition to multi-party democracy is relatively recent (2005)19 and
the protection of civil liberties much weaker than in South Africa, leaving civil soci-
ety with substantially less space for oppositional activity. Makara et al. (2009) point
out that the decision by the NRM to engineer a return to multiparty politics (while
driven more by internal factional conflicts than by donor pressure) was coupled
with constitutional changes designed to actually entrench the powers of the exec-
utive and the authority of the central political leadership. Makara (2010) further
argues that the return to multiparty politics has not resulted in democratic consol-
idation, nor have elections advanced democratic freedoms. At the local level, the
reintroduction of multiparty politics made little difference to the dyanmics of polit-
ical contestation, and most candidates preferred to remain aligned to the NRM
or stand as independents, with very few joining opposition parties (see Muriaas,
2009). The NRM therefore continues to dominate politics at both the local and
18Interview, A. Coutinho (14 October 2008).
19Uganda’s political system, before the return to multi-party elections after a referendum in
2005, allowed individuals to contest seats within the fold of the National Resistance Movement,
but did not allow opposition parties. The NRM presented itself not as a political party, but as a
‘movement’ representing all Ugandans and a vehicle for local (village-level) representative politics.












national levels. The authoritarian style of Ugandan democracy, and of Musev-
eni’s leadership, is reflected in the regime’s response to challenges to Museveni’s
authority. For example, after Museveni’s former physician Kizza Besigye ran for
president in 2001, Museveni’s campaign was characterised by open violence and
intimidation, with Besigye fleeing into exile after the election (Izama and Wilker-
son, 2011:65). After the February 2011 elections, during which Museveni again
defeated Besigye, brutal state repression met peaceful ‘walk to work’ protests over
fuel prices, in which several people died and Besigye was arrested so violently that
he had to be hospitalised in Kenya (Izama and Wilkerson, 2011:64-65).
Weak civil liberties, state control of much of the press, and power concen-
trated in the hands of the President (coupled with widespread poverty and limited
opportunities for economic advancement) therefore create a ‘political opportunity
structure’ in which it seldommakes sense for civil society to challenge state author-
ity. The risks of doing so are simply too great. In addition, officials are likely to
be primarily concerned with their own survival, rather than their formal or moral
duty—when this duty is in conflict with the interests of the political elite. It would
be simplistic to term this a ‘predatory coalition’ in the sense of Leftwich and Hogg
(2007), because often ‘good leadership’ (both from the bureaucracy and from civil
society) has indeed occurred, but it certainly closes down space for acting against
the interests of the President or the political elite (for example by strongly contest-
ing anti-condom rhetoric and policies emanating from Museveni’s inner circle).
The custodian of Uganda’s ‘multi-sectoral’ partnership approach and the body
charged with coordinating the AIDS response—the Uganda AIDS Commission
(UAC)—is widely seen as being under the control of and serving the interests of
the Museveni regime. The UAC exercises its coordination role through a Partner-
ship Forum (an annual meeting of stakeholders from all sectors) and a Partnership
Committee which meets regularly and takes day-to-day decisions, including on
resource allocations. The Partnership Committee also acts as the Country Co-
ordinating Mechanism for the Global Fund20 and controls a joint Civil Society
20The Global Fund disburses funds through Country Coordinating Mechanisms in which civil
society and governments are supposed to be represented. The current Ugandan arrangement was
the outcome of a consultative process after the Global Fund suspended Uganda’s grants in 2005
after serious mismanagement of funds by the relevant agency in the Ministry of Finance, Planning




































Fund (often referred to as a ‘basket fund’), through which pooled donor contri-
butions are disbursed to civil society organisations. As can be seen in Figure 5.4,
sectors are organised into ‘self-coordinating entities’ that are supposed to develop
joint policy positions and present these to the Partnership Committee on behalf of
their constituencies. While there are twelve such entities, the primary function of
the partnership mechanism is to coordinate the work of civil society (international,
domestic and faith-based civil society organisations), donors and government. At
the district level there exists a similar set of structures known as the District AIDS
Coordination Committees, with representation from the political leadership of the
district, government departments, local civil society organisations, the private sec-
tor and people living with HIV/AIDS.
The Director General of the UAC, Dr David Apuuli, argues that these struc-
tures are uniquely able to foster cooperation and coordination in the HIV/AIDS
response because they are established by law. The Ugandan government is there-
fore compelled by law to meet regularly and come to joint decisions with donors,
civil society and other sectors. National strategic planning on AIDS is a compet-
ency of the partnership structures.21












In reality, however, neither the UAC nor its partnership mechanism is inde-
pendent of government. All commissioners are appointed by President Musev-
eni and its Director General is perceived by independent civil society as highly
protective of the President’s interests.22 The UAC is not seen as effectively exer-
cising its coordination function (neither generally nor with respect to civil society).23
Tellingly, the Director General of the UAC refused to acknowledge any conflict
between civil society and the state and denied all problems with the partnership
mechanism raised by other respondents. When pressed on his claim that decisions
are taken by consensus and his denial that critical civil society voices were being
silenced, he argued:
First of all you must understand that civil society is diverse—there are
some small, there are some big—they are set up for different philo-
sophical reasons, some are philanthropic… So you can imagine that
they have different capacities, right? So that type of thing is due to
happen because there are different stages of evolution and strength.
Yes there are cases where we have had to sit and say “look, how do
we reach a decision on this particular matter?” But we have always
reached these decisions by consensus—it does not mean that the de-
cision might have necessarily pleased everybody but the decision has
been reached by majority consensus. Obviously it may not take [all]
opinions and feelings [into account], but this happens in every society,
you see?24
The recently established Civil Society Fund, operating under the auspices of
the Partnership Committee (and supported by many of the donors) is also widely
perceived as an attempt to gain control over donor funds for civil society in order
to deny resources to organisations critical of the government. Despite the fact that
it is still small, some of the more independent sections of civil society fear that it is
effectively being turned into what could be termed a ‘patronage fund’ and may be
22Interviews, M. Katana (24 October 2008); B. Were (30 October 2008) and others.
23Interviews, L. Mworeko (14 October 2008); M. Katana (24 October 2008); B. Were (30 Oc-
tober 2008).












used to silence critical voices.25
BeatriceWere, one of the highest profile AIDS activists in Uganda and founder
of the National Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS in Uganda and
former country director of ActionAid Uganda, argues that this problem is central
to the failure of the Uganda AIDS Commission to play an effective coordination
role:
It [the UAC partnership mechanism] is one of those mechanisms
where I only feel their intensity in the room—I don’t feel their im-
pact in the community. People don’t even know that it exists. To
be honest, the Uganda AIDS Commission hasn’t been effective in co-
ordinating the AIDS response in the country. …Any role where they
take the lead is yet to be effective. But I think the other challenge
why things are the way it is—from a civil society perspective—I think
the independence of civil society is completely lost once you are there.
Because the Uganda AIDS commission is …a political institution and
for civil society to be able to cause change …[they have to] raise is-
sues …you have to have a degree of autonomy. I feel that through the
partnership forum a lot of autonomy was lost from civil society, from
activists. I also feel very strongly that there is a degree of [sic] people
who are compromising their values because you have to be nice. Be-
cause now the Uganda AIDS Commission also accesses funding—the
basket funding business—and they determine who receives it. So what
it is is that you have to compromise certain values and be a nice per-
son, be a nice organisation, be a nice leader in terms of not being the
loud one. So that you can get the money.26
But the unwillingness of large civil society organisations like TASO to openly
criticise the government, the UAC or their major donors (most significantly PEP-
FAR) seems to confirm that these fears are not entirely unfounded.
25Interviews, L. Mworeko (14 October 2008) and M. Katana (24 October 2008).












5.5 Holding the purse strings: the impact of
donors
Dr Apuuli denies that donors exert undue influence over policy processes:
I can assure you, when we decide on what shall be in the National
Strategic Plan, when we do the [annual] joint review and come up
with priority actions that we must do as a country for the next two
years—it is not the [prerogative] of the donors to make that decision.
That decision is reached by consensus and collectively, and the donors
do follow what we have said they are going to do.27
But donors do have substantial influence on policies and outcomes in countries
that are heavily dependent on foreign aid (Mayhew, 2002). This is particularly true
in Uganda (in contrast to South Africa), where the majority of spending on AIDS-
related programmes are sourced from external sources and even state agencies like
the Uganda AIDS Commission and programmes in theMinistry of Health rely for
the bulk of their funding on foreign donors. More than 90% of all AIDS spending
and 93% of the UAC’s budget were externally sourced in the 2001/2002 fiscal
year (Tumushabe, 2006:6)—and this is unlikely to have changed significantly in the
interim. TASO is the major provider of medical services to HIV/AIDS patients,
including the vast majority of antiretroviral therapy, and obtains all of its funding
from donors.
This influence may serve (consciously or unconsciously) to broker effective
AIDS response coalitions or to inhibit their formation. Their clout in Uganda has
allowed the development partners to push for the inclusive partnership approach
and for an enabling environment that would allow civil society to participate effect-
ively in the AIDS response. But paradoxically, donors have also helped to inhibit
the development of a vocal and independent civil society sector capable of holding
the state to account.
It is important to recognise that political context and opportunity structures
change over time and that this may profoundly affect the evolution of movements












Figure 5.5: The US remains the most influential donor in Uganda
through PEPFAR
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and current Ugandan Minister of Health Dr. Christine Ondoa at
a PEPFAR-funded health clinic in Kampala (3 August 2012).
Source: US State Department. Used under Creative Commons Attribution licence.
http://www.flickr.com/photos/us_mission_uganda/7723417228/
and coalitions. As the political and institutional landscape evolved in Uganda,
attempts were made to close down the space for independent civil society organ-
isations, even as the political system moved to greater openness. Institutional ar-
rangements and historical factors profoundly shape the coalitional opportunities
facing civil society actors, including opportunities to forge the state-civil society
partnerships that ought to lie at the heart of AIDS response coalitions.
The influence of donors is felt in a number of ways: through direct condi-
tionalities imposed on the receiving state and choices over which programmes and
organisations to fund, but also more subtly through the competition over resources
between the state and civil society as well as within civil society. The clout of donors
is demonstrated by the resolution of a disagreement between TASO and the gov-
ernment over who was to provide the bulk of antiretroviral therapy, which was
decided in TASO’s favour largely because this was the preference of PEPFAR.
In situations where civil society is not well-developed or the political culture and












plementation, the potential for donors to broker inclusive coalitions is significant.
TheUgandan state’s lack of capacity in the late 1980s, and its resulting dependence
on donors and civil society organisations to provide public services, was arguably
the major factor in its adoption of an approach characterised by partnership with
civil society. Unlike South Africa, where legal arrangements guarantee the free-
dom of civil society organisations to operate, Ugandan civil society depends on the
continued tolerance of the state.
Keck and Sikkink (1998) identify a ‘boomerang pattern’ of influence, in which
civil society organisations can obtain leverage over the state in situations where
direct channels between it and the state are blocked. International allies—usually
Northern NGOs, but sometimes intergovernmental organisations or bilateral or
multilateral donors—can bring pressure to bear from outside, either directly or
via Northern states (see Figure 3.3 on page 67). De Waal (2006:58–59) argues
that this pattern is responsible for much of the success of AIDS activism in Africa,
where domestic activists have been able to exploit transnational networks compris-
ing international NGOs, intergovernmental organisations (including those of the
UN system such as UNAIDS) and, crucially, donor governments as a means of
leverage over their own governments—even in the most closed polities. However,
the fieldwork conducted for this chapter also points to significant risks associated
with powerful donors. Donors may dominate the AIDS response agenda, inhibit-
ing open engagement and inhibiting the ability of domestic actors to build locally
appropriate institutions and coalitions. Financial assistance has been used to ad-
vance a particular ideological agenda driven by the domestic politics of the donor
country (and which may consequently be inappropriate), as happened with respect
to condoms vs. abstinence-based prevention efforts during the years of PEPFAR
as a Bush Administration initiative. Further, donors may be overly concerned with
maintaining their partnership with the state, and consequently fail to support and
perhaps even unintentionally undermine the development of an independent and
critical civil society sector, as seems to be happening (at least to some extent) with
respect to the civil society ‘basket’ fund administered by the UAC.
As mentioned earlier, TASO’s largest funder, PEPFAR, has placed constraints
on its prevention activities.28 According to activists, the alliance between the Bush












administration and conservative forces in Uganda have undermined the country’s
prevention efforts and threatened the reductions in HIV prevalence that occurred
in the 1990s.29 PEPFAR imposed religiously-inspired conditions on recipients that
undermined locally-appropriate policies (see Epstein and Halperin, 2007). Fur-
thermore, there is some evidence that donors have discouraged vocal activism and
failed to support the more radical civil society organisations.30 TASO was unable
to escape the control of donors—or adopt a donation policy similar to TAC’s re-
fusal to accept funds from either the US or South African governments—because
of its substantial service delivery burden. It requires both large amounts of funding
from donors like PEPFAR that have sufficient resources to support large-scale an-
tiretroviral treatment programmes and a good relationship with the state in order
to meet its obligations successfully.
An important general conclusion is therefore that successful AIDS response
coalitions do not imply the resolution of all conflict and contestation. In fact, sup-
pressing conflict may harm the long-term effectiveness of coalitions by undermin-
ing the ability of civil society actors to influence policy through strong and inde-
pendent positions and to engage in vigorous advocacy.
5.6 Movement evolution: from volunteer net-
work to professional service delivery organ-
isation
While the formal and semi-formal networks out of which civil society coalitions are
built (‘activist networks’) are critical to mobilising resources in order to influence
policy, dense informal networks consisting of relationships of trust are also critical
in building social movements (see chapter 3). Both TAC and TASO drew heavily
on pre-existing networks of friends, colleagues and acquaintances to launch the
movements, but quickly pulled in like-minded individuals and created links with
significant outside actors. TASO’s founders did not have access to a pre-existing
29Personal communication with Gregg Gonsalves and Zackie Achmat.













Figure 5.6: Sign for the TASO clinic in Tororo, Uganda
Source: Author’s collection. Taken 23 October 2008.
network as geared towards collective action as that of TAC’s, or at least not as
politically-oriented. Nevertheless, personal friends and acquaintances—especially
those formed within the context ofMulago teaching hospital in Kampala—formed
the core of the early group (see Ssebanja, 2007). The importance of personal ties in
these networks is confirmed by the frequent references by respondents who were
involved in the founding of TASO to a ‘family spirit’ that governed their activities.
This sense of TASO being a closely-knit family has survived largely in name, but
probably contributed significantly to the early development of the organisation.
Decision-making in the early history of TASO was largely informal and consen-
sual, driven by Kaleeba and a few others.31
It is notable that the founders of both TAC and TASO were members of edu-
cated and well-connected elites. Even though Achmat was not particularly close
to the post-apartheid ruling elite in South Africa and Kaleeba was not involved in
political and policy issues before founding TASO, both were comfortable in elite
circles and capable of engaging in policy debates in a way that most people in the
poor and marginalised communities on whose behalf they were acting could never
be. This enabled both organisations to mobilise support quickly from other do-












mestic and international elite actors and to build support and influence networks.
I described how Kaleeba travelled to Geneva and met Jonathan Mann. She
also formed links with AIDS activists and AIDS service organisations in the United
Kingdom, some of which later supported TASO through training and funds.32
TASO immediately drew on the links Kaleeba established with AIDS activists in
the UK and pursued support from and partnership with both the government and
other local civil society organisations.
Movements (and the coalitions that they form or participate in) necessarily
evolve over time. Their evolution is shaped by changes in the political context
and opportunity structure, by their assessment of their own role and often by the
influx of resources (with the formalisation of structures and processes that the latter
requires). Some movements never progress beyond an informal (almost anarchist)
phase, either because they reach their goals, circumstances render them obsolete
or because their internal dynamics drive them to dissolution. Other movements,
however, transform and grow. Most chapters of ACT UP—the most prominent
and radical of the early AIDS activist organisations in the United States—dissolved
after a few years without ever establishing formal structures (Smith and Siplon,
2006), although many prominent ACT UP members formed more permanent or-
ganisations and most long-term American AIDS activists cut their teeth in ACT
UP.
Most often successful sustained social movements attract donor interest and
funding, which creates pressure to formalise and institutionalise their operations.
This may create tension between the charismatic and inspirational leadership re-
quired to build a social movement and the institutionalised, professional manage-
ment required for sustainability and efficient service provision. Some activists ex-
press resentment over the emergence of a class of ‘parasitic’ AIDS professionals
who are drawn to the field primarily by the promise of jobs and status, and NGOs
that are set up in order to make use of the opportunities afforded by an inflow of
resources:
And of course, as more money has come into the country it has be-
come like a business. Many professionals—and I wrote this in one of












my papers recently—have even put aside their mainstream professions
and got involved in AIDS work because it’s attractive, it’s lucrative be-
cause of the money. And those people are not providing leadership,
but they are parasites—they are like the opportunistic infections that
come along with HIV infection itself. …the people who are provid-
ing leadership are not given the right space, the professionals are kind
of taking over the space which was formerly occupied by the likes of
Noerine Kaleeba, by the likes of Major [Ruranga] Rubaramira,33 by
the likes of Beatrice Were. But now you are getting professionals.34
Like TAC, TASO initially relied principally on relationships of trust and the
strong cohesion brought about by charismatic leadership. But as the movements
grew, TAC stuck more closely to its roots as an activist organisation, while TASO
invested in developing professional management systems. This is reflected in em-
ployment practises, with most TASO staff recruited through formal processes on
the basis of professional skills and qualifications. Noerine Kaleeba recounts how
the TASO leadership made an explicit decision early in its history to build formal
systems.35 Donors have also invested substantially in the development of its mana-
gerial systems, as confirmed by Elise Ayers, the chief of HIV/AIDS for USAID36
in Uganda.37
TASO has benefited from the strength of its management systems, but has
also lost credibility as a social movement and the weakness of its advocacy work
has been blamed on it being dominated by professional managers.38 Says prom-
inent activist Milly Katana (who is HIV-positive and works for the International
HIV/AIDS Alliance in Uganda):
I think [TASO] has lost the crowd. …TASO is riding on the back of
its history, not on its current back or its future back. Of course it’s the
33Major Ruranga Rubaramira is the director of the National Guidance and Empowerment Net-
work of People Living withHIV/AIDS. He has been living withHIV since 1989 and is a prominent
PLWHA leader in Uganda and internationally. He was interviewed for this research.
34Interview, M. Katana (24 October 2008).
35Interview, N. Kaleeba (16 October 2008).
36The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—the US bilateral aid
agency—is also a significant funder of TASO.
37Interview, E. Ayers (29 October 2008).












biggest—outsiders trust it, value it, they give them more money and
they are expanding services, which is great. But to me that doesn’t
mean that they are leaders. To me these are different things: you
can be the biggest provider of services, but that charismatic leadership
which we look for in a situation of HIV, which is a complex disease—I
don’t think you can find that in TASO.39
5.7 Concluding thoughts
While the definitional difficulties around ‘leadership’ remain, effective AIDS lead-
ership can meaningfully be described as the mobilisation of coalitions around AIDS pre-
vention and treatment. A broad coalition that includes civil society, the state and the
international community has helped Uganda to mobilise one of the more effective
AIDS responses in Africa, even if the effectiveness of this response has sometimes
been exaggerated. The AIDS response coalition in Uganda, which included the
state, civil society, donors and the medical and research communities, has been
particularly effective at expanding antiretroviral treatment access in spite of the
severe resource constraints evident in the Ugandan health system.
The coalition was built, at least in part, out of networks of individuals: excep-
tional individuals like Noerine Kaleeba and Elly Katabira were able to build local
and international networks of influence and support that were critical in transform-
ing TASO from a small and informal group of volunteers into one of the largest
and most professionally managed AIDS organisations in the world. In general,
these individuals and their networks were people with education, experience and
useful connections (both local and foreign), which they were able to exploit in order
to mobilise a coalition for action on AIDS.
However, the evidence also shows that political context and opportunity struc-
tures, including, especially, constitutional and institutional arrangements, political
culture, state actions and donor actions, shaped the choices of individuals and or-
ganisations and—crucially—presented civil society with coalitional opportunities.
The coalitions that emerged are therefore best thought of as structure-agency con-
figurations in which both systems and institutions and individuals play important












roles. The fact that Uganda had very weak state capacity—at a time when one of
the world’s worst HIV epidemics was ravaging the country—left the new Musev-
eni government little choice but to pursue an ‘open’ and supportive policy with re-
spect to civil society and the donor community. At the same time, the weakness of
democratic institutions and a political culture that discouraged open criticism and
dissent has limited the space for a vocal and independent civil society. The power
of donors further (often inadvertently) undermined the freedom and independence
of civil society. However, this very power has also at times proved an important
lever for influencing the state and the partnerships between donors and civil soci-
ety organisations placed a limit on state repression by making these organisations
essential partners for the state (if it were to avoid losing access to resources). This
‘opportunity structure’ has severely restricted the ability of Ugandan civil society
to adopt an activist stance, either to contest policy (e.g. on condoms, commercial
sex workers or men who have sex with men) or to hold government to account or
pressure it into more effective delivery (e.g. on the severe and continuing failings
of the Ugandan healthcare system or to press for greater investment in healthcare
from domestic fiscal resources).
As TASO grew in size and prominence and attracted resources, it faced pres-
sure to formalise its structures and activities. It opted for a much more formal
service delivery-oriented model than organisations like TAC, or even some of the
smaller organisations in Uganda, and embraced a relatively rigid corporate model.
This allowed it to substantially strengthen its capacity to provide services, but also
undermined its credibility as an activist movement and to a certain extent it had
to cede moral leadership to other civil society actors. However, the ability of the
rest of Ugandan civil society to hold the government to account remains weak,
owing to the limited number of individuals and organisations who choose an act-
ivist route, in part as a result of the influence formal partnership structures give
the Museveni regime and conservative donors. Donors have a potential role in
brokering effective coalitions, particularly where civil society is not well-developed
or if the political institutions and constitutional arrangements inhibit openness and
broad participation in policy formulation and implementation. In Uganda, donors
have helped strengthen the hand of civil society through the ‘boomerang effect’ but












pendent civil society sector.40 Furthermore, while PEPFAR has funded nearly all
of the progress in treatment provision, it has also, under the previous US adminis-
tration, pursued policies inspired by religious ideology and informed by domestic
political considerations. Owing to current political realities in the United States
and the weakness of the US and world economic recoveries after the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, the Obama administration has not been able to substantially scale up
this investment. While the positive role of donors is therefore undeniable, an even
more effective AIDS response coalition could arguably have been achieved had
donors (and the US in particular) been more attuned to locally-appropriate policy
and worked harder to support the emergence of truly independent civil society in
Uganda.
In the case studies of South Africa and Uganda we have seen what ‘civil society
leadership on AIDS’ has meant in practice in two important Sub-Saharan African
examples. In the next and concluding chapter I reflect on some of the challenges
for the global AIDS movement going forward, especially what kind of civil society
leadership will be required if we are to continue to make progress in the struggle
to prevent HIV and treat AIDS.














Conclusion: The global AIDS
movement in an era of resource
constraints and shifting priorities
The notion of ‘AIDS leadership’ remains a problematic one. While this thesis
may have contributed to the conceptual clarification that is needed, the relation-
ship between political leadership and civil society leadership is complex and further
work is required. I have, however, provided some empirical detail that helps doc-
ument what civil society leadership has meant in practice.
While cross-country quantitative analysis could not conclusively show that, or
under which circumstances, civil society mobilisation results in improved govern-
ment responses, the evidence from the case studies suggest mobilisation indeed
makes a difference. However, the domestic political conditions under whichmove-
ments operate and the international context (donors, intergovernmental organisa-
tions, etc.) profoundly shape both how movements evolve and what they are able
to achieve. At the same time, the transformative leadership of certain individuals,
and the ‘networks of influence’ that they construct or participate in, can result in
the formation of coalitions with extraordinary power.
In South Africa, TAC managed to effectively oppose irrational government
policy and overcome the entrenched interests of pharmaceutical companies. It












with evidence from survey data suggesting a beneficial effect on beliefs about AIDS
and sexual behaviour relevant to prevention. In Uganda, TASO participated in an
effective government-donor-civil society coalition that achieved notable successes,
especially in AIDS care and treatment. However, activists found their freedom to
mobilise constrained.
Both of these organisations, together with other transnational activists and cer-
tain key leaders within intergovernmental and state institutions, participated in the
creation of a global coalition around the moral imperative of AIDS treatment. But
this coalition today finds itself weaker, perhaps even in crisis.
6.1 The decline of the global AIDS treatment
movement
Instead of the increases in resources for AIDS programmes in developing countries
that would be required to sustain progress, resources are declining (or at best re-
maining static). The Global Fund is in crisis, HIV/AIDS is no longer perceived in
international policy fora as the major priority it once was (with attention shifting to
other important questions like climate change), HIV/AIDS and public health ad-
vocates are fighting among themselves about whether disease-specific programmes
are appropriate and leading activist organisations (including TAC) are in decline.
If the progress that has been made is not to turn into reverses, the global public
health activist movement must be revitalised and a new coalition forged around a
vision of universal access to integrated and effective healthcare systems.
TAC’s time of greatest influence is therefore probably (and sadly) behind it. It
is in the midst of a slow and incomplete leadership transition, from its founding
generation of leaders to a new generation that is competent and committed, but
has less experience and inherits a movement of tired activists. It is faced with a new
set of challenges: ensuring continued progress in antiretroviral treatment delivery,
revitalising a crumbling public healthcare system and improving HIV prevention.
The end of state-supported AIDS denialism has (paradoxically) weakened TAC by
removing a source of public support and attention. Donors are turning to other












had a decade ago.
TASO continues to provide antiretroviral treatment and other services to large
numbers of Ugandans in need. But it is entirely beholden to donors and it cannot
expand services without increased external funding. Also, as a bureaucratic and
formalised service-oriented organisation, it has to some extent lost its position of
moral leadership and is no longer universally perceived sufficiently independent or
as an effective or legitimate voice for people living with HIV/AIDS in Uganda.
This malaise extends to the global AIDS activist movement. Many passionate
activists and advocates for AIDS treatment continue to work tirelessly. But the level
of attention, both from the media and from policy makers, has declined substan-
tially. Increasingly, attention is focused on other problems, especially the continu-
ing global economic crisis (particularly acute in Europe) and the long-term risks
of climate change (which is, even with increased attention, not being addressed
adequately).
With high-income countries battling recession and stagnation at home, bilat-
eral and multilateral assistance for HIV/AIDS have not increased since 2008, in
contrast to the substantial increases that would be required to increase access to
antiretrovirals beyond the mere 35% of the 15 million people who require treat-
ment currently receiving it. The Global Fund has had to cancel its eleventh round
owing to funding shortfalls. There is a long way to go, and now little chance of
getting to the destination.
To make matters worse, the global health architecture created to give effect to
the universal access vision is not functioning optimally. Allegations of corruption
and suspension or delays in disbursements are routine for Global Fund-funded
projects. Even TAC just narrowly avoided the shuttering of several large projects
and the retrenchment of most of its staff early in 2012, owing to severe delays in
the disbursement of Global Fund funds that had been allocated to it.
Furthermore, the oppositional discourse that has emerged in the debates on
global health priorities has harmed the cause of increased resources, not only for
AIDS, but for health in general. While AIDS activists, global health advocates
and development experts have bickered about whether we should be investing in
disease-specific programmes or strengthening health systems, whether we should












where. For a discussion of the backlash against AIDS-specific funding, see Nat-
trass and Gonsalves (2010). Instead of “what should we be spending on rather
than AIDS?” the question should have been “how can we best use the mechan-
isms and programmes we have built to ensure both increased delivery of AIDS
treatment and stronger health systems?”
6.2 What is needed?
Reversing the declines in international AIDS assistance and building a new con-
sensus on investment in global health requires that a new vision be articulated
that can unite activists and policymakers in both donor and recipient countries. A
good articulation of such a vision is provided by Mark Dybul (former US Global
AIDS Coordinator), Peter Piot and Julio Frenk in a recent article (Dybul et al.,
2012). They argue that while much of the progress achieved in the first ten years
of this century has been thanks to newly-created disease-specific institutions and
mechanisms (principally the Global Fund and PEPFAR) and large philanthropic
initiatives like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “the focus on specific dis-
eases has exposed fault lines in delivering services in places where many suffer from
multiple health issues at the same time or at varying points in their lives” (Dybul
et al., 2012). They propose instead an integrated approach focused on the health
of individuals and communities to be driven through a new international health
strategy and architecture comparable to the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944
and the institutions (like the World Bank) that gave effect to it.
A new international agreement to build a rational global health architecture
is a very ambitious proposal indeed. But it is a vision that global health advoc-
ates—including those focused onHIV/AIDS—could potentially unite around and
that can become the foundation for a moral consensus and policy agenda to drive
a new round of activism. Unless the global health movement is able to overcome
what I have referred to as the ‘oppositional discourse’ around conflicting interna-
tional health priorities (HIV/AIDS programmes vs. health system strengthening,
bed nets vs. sanitation programmes) it will not be possible to focus limited ad-
vocacy resources and stand a chance of building on the progress that has already












In pursuing this ambitious agenda, iterative and incremental advances can be
achieved. While a new global health architecture is some way off (even in the best-
case scenario), improvements can be made relatively quickly in the coordination
and revitalisation of the architecture that already exists.
It is also critical that building new partnerships on global health is not limited
to mechanisms for transferring resources from high-income to low and middle-
income countries. Significant assistance will undoubtedly remain necessary, but
even the poorest countries can and must invest in the health of their populations.
Not only is it unlikely—especially in the short to medium term—that sufficient re-
sources will be mobilised from high-income countries to maintain the momentum
towards universal access, but there are significant risks associated with dependency
on external resources. Even now many treatment programmes are at risk because
of reductions in funding to PEPFAR and the Global Fund. Countries like Uganda
cannot continue to depend on donor funds for more than 90% of health expendit-
ure. Activists, especially those who are based in low-income and African coun-
tries, must exert pressure on governments to increase health expenditure, perhaps
around the goal of 15% of national budgets that African Union members pledged
to allocate to health in the Abuja Declaration of 2001. African countries have
largely failed to implement this commitment, resulting in a lost decade of poten-
tial improvements in health systems, greater dependency on donors and a weaker
moral voice when the leaders of the G8 and other wealthy countries are criticised
for failing to implement commitments on international assistance.
It is also critical that AIDS and global health activists revitalise their ownmove-
ments and organisations, in order to have a base from which to work. Organ-
isations like TAC and the many similar movements across the developing world
should be supported and assisted. They are the greatest asset of the global health
















In this appendix I briefly review the literature on ‘ethical leadership’ with a view to
thinking more coherently about ‘AIDS leadership’. First, two approaches to lead-
ership (the ‘agential’ and ‘relational’ perspectives) are differentiated. I then turn to
the relevance of the literature on institutions for thinking about leadership before
presenting a short summary of the relational model of transformative leadership
we have proposed elsewhere (Grebe and Woermann, 2011:23-25,38-42).
The first thing to note is a major shortcoming in themainstream leadership and
business ethics literature: here, the focus is largely on ‘character’—the ethical traits
of individual leaders—insofar as these traits are believed to determine whether
individuals behave ethically. This fits with the traditional notion of leadership as
being about agency: the decisions that individual leaders make and how these
decisions impact on the organisations they lead. The recent literature, however,
has started to account for systemic influences on leadership processes. Since, as I
have argued, both agency and structural factors (i.e. both how structural conditions
influence individual behaviour and how individual choices can transcend those
1This appendix summarises a more extensive overview (emphasising different aspects of ‘lead-
ership’), produced jointly with Minka Woermann and previously published as a DLP Research












conditions) must be taken into account, it is this evolving ‘systemic perspective’
that we draw upon most.
It is in order to take account of structural factors that we turn to institutional-
ist approaches. However, two shortcomings in this literature, particularly where
it is inspired by institutionalist economics, hamper its usefulness. First, little at-
tention is given to the influence of individual agents/leaders on institutional struc-
tures, thereby veering towards the opposite extreme as the mainstream literature
on leadership. Second, many institutionalist schools of thought adopt a strict ra-
tional choice model of human behaviour, in which institutions are seen largely as
mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and foster cooperation. Consequently, a
reductionist view of institutions emerges that does not adequately account for the
historical contingencies that impact on institutional development and evolution,
or the power-plays around their content and design; but, rather sees them as the
products of rational institution building (see Offe, 2006:10-12). This reductionism
and ahistoricity is to be avoided.
A.1 ‘Agential’ and ‘relational’ perspectives on
leadership
Uhl-Bien (2006:655) refers to the two perspectives identified above as the ‘entity
perspective’ and the ‘relational perspective’ respectively. The latter is only now
starting to emerge in the literature and shifts the focus from individual leaders and
their character traits to the structural dynamics of leadership.
In the agential perspective leadership is treated in Cartesian terms, with the
‘knowing individual’ seen as “the architect and controller of an internal and ex-
ternal order” (Uhl-Bien, 2006:655). On this view, leaders can exercise influence
and control over followers, and “organisational life is viewed as the result of in-
dividual action” (Hosking et al., 1995). This perspective may take the form of
‘normative’ or ‘descriptive’ approaches (focusing on what leaders should do and do
do respectively).
In contrast, the relational perspective on leadership focuses on the interdepend-












than persons. It treats leadership processes as emergent properties of ‘the system’
(see Hosking, 2007; Uhl-Bien, 2006; Collier and Esteban, 2000). This implies that
leadership, rather than being the exclusive preserve of ‘leaders’, is “stretched over
the practice of actors within organisations” (Friedman, 2004:206) and “shared by
members of an organisational system” (Painter-Morland, 2008:229). This is not
to argue that individuals cannot assume leadership roles, but rather that different
individuals can embody leadership roles at different times, depending on circum-
stances (Painter-Morland, 2008).
Rather than viewing distributed leadership simply as the ‘sum of the parts’ or
aggregated influence of role-players (Wenger, 2000:231), it can be viewed in terms
of joint or ‘concertive action’ (Gronn, 2003:35). This notion links up well with the
idea of ‘coalitions’ that I also make use of in thinking about the influence of AIDS
activists in the broader political and social system. Gronn (2003:35) characterises
distributed leadership as concertive action in terms of three features: spontaneous
collaborative models of engagement, intuitive understanding resulting from close
working relations and institutionalised arrangements that attempt to regularise dis-
tributed actions.
All of these factors are evident in AIDS activism (see especially chapter 3). But
they also seem somewhat trite, probably characterising all workplaces and not
pointing to anything distinctive in ‘ethical leadership’. However, they may help
us think about the effectiveness of activists without falling into the trap of focusing
exclusively on ‘leaders’ mobilising ‘followers’.
A.2 Extending the relational leadership per-
spective by means of institutional analysis
I should note at this point that I employ institutional analysis not merely to extend
the relational leadership model. It is also directly applicable to the study of AIDS
activism in that it can help us make sense of the constraints that are imposed by
context, including the institutional architecture of societies. For example, the case
studies in chapters 3 and 5 point to substantial differences between the trajectories













The importance of institutions in shaping developmental trajectories is widely
acknowledged within the social sciences. However, as Offe (2006:9) points out,
the term is seldom clearly defined and often used in such a way that it would be
interchangeable with ‘power’ or even ‘the holders of power’, rendering it not very
useful. Some conceptual clarification is therefore in order before we can deploy
the concept productively. Before delving into the conceptual thickets, however, let
us start off by defining institutions very broadly as the ‘rules of the game’ that es-
tablish the parameters of individual action and the procedures by which collective
decisions are made, disputes settled and how power is wielded. While there are of
course also institutions that govern private behaviour, we are primarily interested
in what occurs in the public sphere, including politics and governance, commerce,
etc.
In addition to the problem of conceptual fuzziness, paradoxically, a further
problem is that the notion of institutions is frequently used in a very narrow and
depoliticised sense. Political scientists often use the term to refer exclusively to the
formal institutions of political settlement (parliaments, the presidency, the judi-
ciary, etc.) and neglect the informal institutions embedded in culture and tradition
that may have an even firmer hold over individual behaviour—andmay come into
conflict with the former, see Ekeh (1975). Economists, on the other hand, often
restrict the notion to the rules that regulate economic activities—i.e. institutions
that enable markets to develop and trade and commerce to take place, such as
enforceable contracts and private property rights (Chang, 2003). Institutions are
often seen in neoclassical economics as optimal behaviour by rational economic
agents interacting within frictionless markets (Greif, 2006:xiv). I would argue for a
wider view that includes not only institutions directly relevant to economic trans-
actions, but also all institutions relevant to social, political and economic develop-
ment. These include both the cultural/informal institutions and the formal and
legal institutions that shape and constrain individual behaviour.
In other words, I am interested in how formal and informal institutions define
the ‘rules’ that govern both economic activity and political contestation, including
elite settlements over AIDS policy, over the distribution of economic spoils and












and who ‘wins’. Some of these institutions even operate at supranational level and
govern interactions between states, and between national elites and international
elites (e.g. in international organisations and multinational corporations).
I therefore followGreif (2006) in considering institutions as interrelated systems
of rules (legal or otherwise), beliefs, norms of behaviour and organisations. How-
ever, there is a danger of expanding the definition of institutions so widely that
the concept loses analytical value. The best way to study institutional arrange-
ments and their impact on political, social and economic outcomes is through an
analytical approach to detailed historical case studies that, despite their inductive
character, allows one to tease out general insights on institutions. Therefore, while
institutions, the contexts within which they operate and the outcomes that they
produce differ according to historical circumstances, their study can nevertheless
provide generalisable insights applicable in other contexts.
The basic claim of institutional theory is that the institutional arrangements of
any given polity profoundly shape the opportunities and incentives facing individu-
als (Skocpol, 1995; Hay and Wincott, 1998; Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 2000; Pierson
and Skocpol, 2002), and most significantly those of leaders and members of elites.
Institutions therefore play a big role in shaping bothmicro-level behaviour and sys-
temic outcomes. Institutions are highly relevant to both the individual decisions of
leaders and the elite alignments that I refer to as coalitions.
While historical institutionalist scholars are largely interested in macro-level
historical changes that shape institutional and economic structures over time (see
David, 2001; Pierson, 2004), the perspective is nevertheless useful to a more micro-
level account of leadership and policy settlement that tries to be sensitive to the
contextual factors that shape the process. Useful attempts to apply institutional
analysis to include micro-level behaviour have been made by Robert Bates and as-
sociates, by extending neoclassical and strict rational choice models of individual
behaviour with insights from game theory (see Bates et al., 1998). However, ra-
tional choice and economic accounts of how institutions shape behaviour have a
curious apolitical view of history, in which institutions are essentially reduced to
mechanisms for overcoming collective action problems (in the technical sense) and
fostering cooperation between self-interested rational actors. These accounts lack












able parasitic elites to prosper or that fail to foster inclusive development.
The two predominant strands of institutional theory are New Institutional Eco-
nomics (NIE), differentiated from older institutionalist economics, and Historical
Institutionalism (HI). These are rooted in economics and comparative politics re-
spectively. In the economic literature the term ‘institutions’ usually refers to the
non-technological or social features of a society (at a given point in time) that im-
pact on economic outcomes. Institutions influence economic outcomes because
they impact on the decisions of economic agents: for example, legal recognition of
contracts reduces transaction costs by addressing asymmetrical information (effect-
ively, it restricts the freedom of agents to deceive other agents during transactions
and provides a dispute resolution mechanism). In political science and sociology
the emphasis is often on states and state-society relations, including such institu-
tional arrangements as constitutions and electoral systems.
However, the approaches share important methodological similarities, includ-
ing a preference for empirical historical analysis in the form of case studies and tra-
cing social and economic changes over time. It is also worth noting that there has
been a great deal of cross-fertilisation between different strands of institutionalist
thinking (Hall and Taylor, 1996, cited in Thelen, 2002:92), so a rigorous separa-
tion is not possible.
New institutional economists usually define institutions as the formal and in-
formal rules that influence behaviour by means of constraints and incentives.
Ménard and Shirley (2005:1) offer this general definition:
Institutions are the written and unwritten rules, norms and constraints
that humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control their environ-
ment. These include (i) written rules and agreements that govern
contractual relations and corporate governance, (ii) constitutions, laws
and rules that govern politics, government, finance and society more
broadly, and (iii) unwritten codes of conduct, norms and behavior, and
beliefs.
NIE remains rooted in mainstream economic theory in that it retains a core
of rational choice theory even though it abandons some of its standard assump-












(2005:21) points out that traditional neoclassical economics explores the efficiency
of resource allocation synchronously under the restrictive assumptions of friction-
less markets and therefore cannot explain processes of economic change (much less
social or political change). NIE therefore expands the domain of economic theory,
but does not substitute itself for neoclassical models. It could be argued that institu-
tional economics is a response to criticism levelled fromwithin other social sciences
against the tendency of economists to over-simplify human behaviour as ‘rational
utility maximisation’ and ignore social and political factors. While NIE broadens
accounts of human behaviour to take into account norms, beliefs and customs
and the incentives created by historically-specific institutional arrangements, insti-
tutionalist economics nevertheless remains firmly within a rational choice model.
Agents are motivated by the incentives created by institutions, and the interest is
primarily in institutions that support economic production and exchange. Even
though NIE attempts to move beyond the limitations of neoclassical economics,
institutions are still largely seen as structures that allow cooperation between self-
interested, rational utility-maximisers.
While HI scholars share many of the interests and approaches of NIE, they are
less likely to restrict their focus to economic outcomes and are oftenmore interested
in social and political institutions. Historical institutionalism (perhaps reflecting its
disciplinary roots in sociology and political science) is also more comfortable with
interpretive accounts of history than with rational choice theories.
They have also mad greater efforts to integrate into their accounts a theory
of power and conflict. Jack Knight’s Institutions and Social Conflict (Knight, 1992) is
perhaps the most important example of this. Moe (2006), however, argues that
despite the efforts to deal with power and exploitation, most institutionalist ana-
lyses still suffer from a poor theory of power. Individuals or groups may overcome
collective action problems and cooperate, for example cooperation between bur-
eaucracies and legislatures with differing interests in democratic societies. But this
cooperation may nevertheless be ‘exploitative’ in the sense that it runs counter to
the interests of ‘outsiders’ who do not have the power to compel the cooperating
actors to take their interests into account. Argues Moe (2006:32-33):












rational choice reasoning] that it is now easy to believe—as I suspect
most scholars in the field do—that power is an integral part of the the-
ory, on a par with cooperation in explaining political institutions. But
it really isn’t. However much power might be discussed, the funda-
mentals of the theory have not changed. They take their orientation
from the same framework that guides all economic theory: voluntary
exchange among rational individuals. They identify the key challenge
as one of understanding whether rational individuals will cooperate in
the face of collective action problems.
Nevertheless, these efforts by HI scholars to integrate a theory of power, to-
gether with attempts by economists like Olson (2000), are important corrective
developments.
Skocpol (1995:105) identifies four processes of note in historical institutionalist
policy studies: (1) the establishment and transformation of state and party organ-
isations; (2) the effects of political institutions and procedures and social institu-
tions on the identities, capacities and goals of social groups that become involved
in politics; (3) the fit or lack thereof between the goals and capacities of politically
active groups and the historically changing points of leverage created by political
institutions; and (4) the ways in which previously established social policies affect
subsequent policies over time. The latter process points to the centrality of changes
over time in historical institutionalism.
While change in institutions over time is also a central concern for some institu-
tionalist economists (see, for example North, 1990), the rational choice foundations
of NIEmakes it more likely that scholars will attempt tomodel one set of events and
the manoeuvres of actors in one institutional setting at a time (Skocpol, 1995:106).
As Pierson and Skocpol (2002:1) put it: “Historical institutionalists analyse organ-
isational configurations where others look at particular settings in isolation; and
they pay attention to critical junctures and long-term processes where others look
only at slices of time or short-termmanoeuvres.” A further difference between insti-
tutionalists in economics and those in other disciplines is that the former frequently
focus on individuals as economic agents, probably out of a desire to keep the scope












lysis is captured in the notions of path dependence—the ‘self-reinforcing’ persistence
of institutional structures or their change along distinct trajectories and of critical
junctures—moments of discontinuity and major institutional upheaval (see Collier
and Collier, 1991; Collier, 2007; Boas, 2007).
In broad terms, ‘path dependence’ refers to the idea that past decisions con-
strain present options. In historical institutionalism, it is usually used in the more
technical sense of the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes
by which behaviour becomes institutionalised and institutions resist change once
established (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002:6), characterised by what is called in eco-
nomics ‘increasing returns’ (Pierson, 2000:252).
This notion of path dependence usually supports a number of key claims: (1)
specific patterns of timing and sequence matter in historical events; (2) starting
from similar conditions, a wide range of outcomes may be possible; (3) ‘large’ con-
sequences may result from contingent and relatively ‘small’ events; (4) particular
courses of action, once undertaken, may be very hard to reverse; and (5) political
and social development is often punctuated by ‘critical junctures’ during which
the potential for change is greater and which shape the basic contours of social
and political life (Pierson, 2000:251). Alternatives that may be open early in the
process become increasingly unreachable and unlikely over time. This results in
the self-reinforcing character of changes in institutional arrangements. In their
classic study of political change in Latin America, Collier and Collier (1991) con-
vincingly argue that large-scale political change (such as democratisation) occurs
at such critical junctures, where the possibility of change is greater than under
normal circumstances. These changes then become increasingly irreversible over
time. Pierson and Skocpol (2002:8) argue that the macro-level interest of historical
institutionalism allows it to study conjunctures—interaction effects between dis-
tinct causal sequences that become joined at particular points in time (Aminzade,
1992)—which gives it a distinct advantage over rational choice-based theories with
a more micro-level focus.
Despite this, even HI often draws on economic analyses rooted in a rational
choice/free exchange model in which institutions are primarily cooperative struc-
tures. Nevertheless, HI is much better than NIE and other economic models at












making it more useful for an analysis of ‘leadership’ and of contentious AIDS act-
ivism. In a later section, complexity and systems theory inform a relational model
of ‘transformative leadership’. While this connection is seldom made in the liter-
ature, historical institutionalism’s focus on path dependence and critical junctures
is strikingly similar to certain notions from complexity theory: the self-reinforcing
character of institutions reminds one of the ‘self-reproductive’ character of com-
plex systems and the relative stability that may exist in the state of a system for
extended periods.
The ‘analytic narratives’ approach applies many of the techniques and explan-
atory mechanisms prevalent in NIE and historical institutionalist accounts. It is,
however, closer to NIE’s rational choice foundations. Analytic narratives employ
rational choice theory and mathematical models (especially models from game
theory) in the analysis of particular historical situations. Institutions in this view
can be seen as ‘self-enforcing equilibria that coordinate behaviour’ and choices
are regularised, stable and patterned because they are made in equilibrium (Levi,
2002:109). Particular historical circumstances are then understood with reference
to the selection, longevity and transformation of equilibrium solutions that arise
in particular times and places. (In classical game theory, each game has a ‘solu-
tion’, which represents the equilibrium state. Each ‘player’ attempts to optimise
his/her own position—i.e. an outcome which maximises the rewards to him/her.
An equilibrium emerges when each player has adopted a strategy that optimises
their position, given the strategies of the other players, so that they do not face
any incentive to change their strategy. The outcome realised in this situation is
therefore an ‘equilibrium solution’ to the game.)
It then uses these models to test the applicability of general theoretical points
in those specific circumstances, hoping that this allows historical case studies to
contribute to generalisable social theory. It explicitly grapples with a methodolo-
gical question that faces all social scientists who attempt historical analysis: how
to extrapolate from historically-specific case studies to generalisable theory (Bates
et al., 2000:696).
While analytic narratives have been heavily criticised by Elster (2000) as over-
ambitious deductive history, (see also Elster, 1999) its adherents rebut this charge












do not consider a necessary precondition of analytic narratives) is deductive and
by aligning themselves with a more general attempt in the social sciences to integ-
rate interpretive and rationalist accounts (Bates et al., 2000:69). Despite its origins
in NIE, the analytic narratives approach does address larger questions of political
economy such as political order, governance of the economy and polity and in-
terstate relations (Levi, 2002:109). However, its reliance on rational choice theory
limits its ability to do so. Furthermore, the application of game theory to political
situations that are difficult to describe exhaustively, or in which ‘players’ cannot
be assumed to behave as rational utility optimisers, remains very difficult. Like-
wise, the influence of power and ideology are difficult to incorporate in such an
analysis. While the analytic narratives approach therefore improves upon some of
the theoretical weaknesses of NIE, it does not provide a model that can easily be
integrated into a theory of leadership.
So, can an institutional perspective inform a relational model of leadership? A
strict rational choice approach, such as that employed in NIE and, less strictly, ana-
lytic narratives, essentially evacuates any space for meaningful individual agency,
since individual choices are merely rational strategic responses to a situation (that
is assumed to be fully describable). Individual decisions are in the final analysis
simply optimising behaviour within the constraints of a given institutional arrange-
ment (‘rules of the game’). What adherents of this approach would probably see
as its greatest advantage—that it can offer coherent and clear explanations for
behaviour—is therefore arguably also its greatest weakness. Historical institution-
alist approaches that are more interpretive in character avoid this reductionism
and allow greater space for individual agency to operate within the model, while
nevertheless retaining an interest in macro-historical and macro-sociological pro-
cesses.
A further potential problem with NIE identified above that persists in analytic
narratives is the focus (inherited from neoclassical economics and from game the-
ory respectively) on economic agents as individuals. While it is not excluded in
principle, collective action is hard to model using this approach. I would follow
Thelen in arguing that “institutions are important not just in how they constrain in-
dividual choice or affect individual strategies, but also in how they affect the articu-












emphasis, Thelen, 2002:92). I argued above that HI is better at integrating power
and exploitation into institutional analysis, but that even in comparative political
analysis, institutional approaches still draw substantially on economic assumptions.
HI’s incorporation of path dependence and critical junctures further allows for a
more convincing diachronic analysis than strict rational choice approaches.
The HI approach’s more flexible definition of institutions, its incorporation of
collective action and its model of institutional change over time is more compatible
with the notion of ‘coalitions’ that I make use of extensively in the case studies.
Yashar (1997:15) defines coalitions as follows:
…coalitions are defined as alliances among social sectors or groups.
They provide the organisational framework for delineating who sides
with whom, against whom, and over what. Coalitions bring together
groups or institutions with heterogeneous, divergent long-term goals
that they are willing to sacrifice for some intermediate, collective goals.
Coalitions, defined in this way, seem an almost perfect description of what
AIDS activists pursued around access to AIDS treatment. But how did activ-
ists provide the leadership required to build coalitions for policy change? This
is where a relational model of leadership, concepts related to resource mobilisa-
tion and movement building (from the social movement literature) and networks
as the ‘infrastructure’ for coalition-building become useful.
A.3 A relational model of transformative lead-
ership
In our report for the Developmental Leadership Program (Grebe andWoermann,
2011), we proposed a ‘complex systemic’ (i.e. relational) model of leadership that
incorporates both individual agency and structural (institutional) constraints.
In such a model, individual agents both compete and cooperate in order to
achieve goals (including such mundane ones as enhancing their material well-
being). The agency of each individual allows him/her to choose from a range of












and negative) of formal and informal institutions. So on the one hand, individual
choice is constrained by institutions. However, in keeping with a complex sys-
tems perspective, the patterns of individual behaviour and relationships between
individuals give rise to institutions—institutions are an ‘emergent property’ of the
system. The structure of the system is both shaped by individual choices over time
and imposes itself on individuals.
To clarify: individuals make choices at the level of individual agency, but are
then ‘rewarded’ or ‘punished’ by the institutions that regulate (but do not exhaust-
ively determine) individual behaviour. Structural or systemic factors therefore pro-
mote or undermine certain choices through positive or negative ‘feedback loops’
in what Woermann (2010) calls ‘downward causation’. Over time, these feedback
loops reinforce or undermine certain patterns of behaviour, which then become
institutionalised.
This may seem rather abstract. But the critical point is that institutions not only
place constraints on individual behaviour, but also provide opportunities for pur-
posive action and create the space for meaningful individual actions. For example,
the institutions of democratic politics limit the power of individual political lead-
ers but also provide a structure within which individuals can exercise meaningful
individual leadership.
Another important function of feedback loops within this systemic perspective
is that they represent the process through which, what we termed ‘congruence’
(Grebe and Woermann, 2011:24) emerges. The purpose of congruence in the
model is to account for collective action and alignment of purpose in a way that is
more flexible (but unfortunately also more vague) than the game theoretic notion
of self-interested cooperation.
This does not imply full agreement on normative codes or purpose, but rather
“the ability to accommodate difference and dissensus, without losing [the system’s]
functional unity or sense of purpose” (Painter-Morland, 2008:224). Hargadon and
Fanelli (2002) define ‘coherence’ (which we use interchangeably with congruence)
as follows:
Coherence in organisations exists as a social phenomenon in the re-












tional members come to hold (relatively) aligned interpretations of the
world, (relatively) aligned goals, and (relatively) aligned identities be-
cause they tend to be surrounded by their own actions… Through
the experiencing of actions by participation or by observations, indi-
viduals construct, reconstruct, and/or modify the scripts, goals, and
identities that make up their relevant schema.
Effective leadership therefore involves facilitating the emergence of congru-
ence—which is the basis of coalition-building and (over a longer time period) in-
stitutionalisation.
It should, however, be emphasised that a complex systemic model implies that
the myriad complex interactions between individuals, sub-systems and systems
cannot be exhaustively described in the way that rational choice models such as
those described earlier try to do. It is impossible to fully predict the outcome of the
competitive and cooperative activities of individuals that give rise to structures at
the systemic level and a certain degree of uncertainty is therefore implied by this
model. While the notion of congruence helps to describe how both pragmatic and
normative structural patterns become reinforced and institutionalised, the irredu-
cible complexities implied by this model mean that collective action problems can
never be fully overcome.
It is also important to emphasise that this model does not imply that individual
agents are ‘imprisoned’ or fully determined by institutions. Since the choices of
individuals influence the particular form that institutions take, individuals can be
important catalysts of transformation (at points in time that HI scholars might term
‘critical junctures’). But any such account of ‘transformative leadership’ must avoid
degenerating into the standard agential account of leadership (akin to the ‘big man
of history’ approach), since critical junctures that allow for substantial transform-
ation are few and far between, and in any event reflect opportunities rooted in the
trajectory of historical change.
Although leadership implies the exercise of power, the traditional notion of
leaders and followers (which assumes that power derives only from formal author-
ity and flows uni-directionally) is untenable in a complex system. Instead, a com-












relations are not static (although they may be relatively stable over time) and power
is often distributed or dispersed across levels. This means that leaders can only fulfil
their central function of mobilising people and resources towards achieving goals if
they are able to draw on this ‘systemic’ power—for example, by building coalitions
in which disparate actors align their efforts.
Lastly, it is important to point out that despite the emphasis on processes in
our systemic model of transformative leadership, actual end goals and the con-
sequences of action remain important. Leaders must accept responsibility for the
effects that their actions have on all stakeholders, including those they are not form-
ally accountable to, and even when these effects are not fully predictable. In fact,
one could argue that true responsibility results precisely from one’s inability to fully
know the consequences of one’s actions (see Grebe, 2009a). Assuming responsib-
ility requires that we develop successful strategies, which the complexity theorist
Edgar Morin (2008:96) describes as ‘the art of working with uncertainty’. There-
fore, although calculation is both useful and necessary, “strategy is called for as
soon as the unexpected or uncertainty arises, that is to say as soon as an important
problem appears” (Morin, 2008:56). In complex systems where interests compete
with one another, resources are limited and effects not fully predictable, this is a
difficult, though crucial task.
Individual agency can therefore not be evacuated from an understanding of
leadership (in AIDS or otherwise), but a relational perspective can link the indi-
vidual and systemic levels through processes like ‘feedback loops,’ providing a cred-
ible response to the structure-agency problematic. ‘Congruence’ acts as a theoret-
ical anchor point that allows us to conceive of meaningful action (both individual
and collective), which in turn allows for a notion of transformative leadership while
admitting structural limits. This is a model of leadership, therefore, that allows
us to account for the impact of individuals, for meaningful transformative lead-
ership by individuals like Zackie Achmat and Peter Piot, but that acknowledges
the structural constraints on individual agency and emphasises the importance of
institutional context in shaping the opportunities that individuals face. It is also
a model in which building coalitions is of critical importance and constructing and













An epidemiological model for
HIV incidence, prevalence and
mortality trends in Uganda
(1974-2004)
The purpose of this model is to help contextualise the discussion of political and
civil society leadership in Uganda by allowing the plotting of events such as the
coming into power of theMuseveni regime andMuseveni’s so-called ‘zero grazing’
campaigns against trends in HIV prevalence, incidence and mortality, especially
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The model uses seroprevalence data from antenatal clinics and is calibrated
using a population-based seroprevalence survey from 2003. It does not incorporate
the impact of antiretroviral therapy. Widespread access to HAART would have
resulted in lower mortality and higher HIV prevalence than this model predicts
in the post-2000 period. However, it does allow for credible estimation of HIV-
related trends for the period during which large-scale behaviour change is widely
supposed to have occurred in Uganda (the late 1980s and early 1990s) and it is












B.1 Methods and data
This model makes use UNAIDS’s Epidemiological Projection Package released as
part of the Spectrum/EPP 2011 suite of policy models (UNAIDS, 2011a), a tool
for country-level estimation and short-term projection of HIV/AIDS epidemics
by fitting a standard epidemiological model on observed HIV surveillance data.
The primary source of surveillance data used here is reported HIV seropreval-
ence among antenatal clinic (ANC) attendees at a range of urban and rural ANCs
in Uganda for the period 1987-2002 as published by UNAIDS and WHO (2004).
Urban sites with more than 2 data points are Mulago hospital, Nsambya Mission-
ary Hospital and Rubaga Missionary Hospital (all in Kampala), while rural sites
with more than two data points are Matany, Mbale, Moyo, Mutolere, Nyambani,
Palisa, Ruimi, Rukunyo, Soroti, Tororo, Virikia, Aber, Arua, Bundibugyo, Fort
Portal, Gulu district, Hoima, Jinja, Kagadi, Kasule, Kilembe and Lwala. Several
further sites with one or two data points were included.
Total adult population and urban/rural population data were used as sup-
plied with Spectrum/EPP 2011 (and sourced from the United Nations Office for
Population Statistics). Urban and rural epidemics were modelled separately (but
combined for overall estimates). Apart from division into urban and rural sites
(weighted according to the population split), prevalence data from ANC sentinel
sites are unweighted (i.e. all sites included in the model for urban and rural popu-
lations respectively are afforded equal weights), since population estimates for the
relevant catchment areas were not available. In this respect I followed Musinguzi
et al. (2009:79-80).
The model was calibrated using observed population-level seroprevalence data
from the Uganda HIV/AIDS Sero-Behavioural Survey 2004-2005 (UHSBS). In
other words, the model was adjusted so that predicted prevalence rates match the
found population-level prevalence rates of the survey. The UHSBS found national
seroprevalence rates of 10.1% among urban adults (aged 15-49) and 5.7% among
rural adults, based on 2 531 and 14 375 blood tests respectively (Ministry of Health
[Uganda] and ORC Macro, 2006:103).
The model prevalence curve was fit using EPP 2011’s ‘Variable-R’ algorithm,












aged 15-49 years. The model estimates epidemiological parameters for the period
1970-2016, but estimates are only reported for 1974-2004 since no measurable
HIV epidemic is predicted before 1974 and, as indicated before, the model is only
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The resulting model is summarised in figure B.2 and shown in greater detail in
table B.1 and figures B.3 and B.4. This model is useful for our purposes because it
estimates the likely trend in HIV incidence given the known trend in HIV preval-
ence at ANCs. What it does, essentially, is reverse-engineer from HIV prevalence
and assumptions about the general path of HIV epidemics (including time from
infection to death, etc.).
Figure B.2: Epidemiological model for Uganda showing new HIV































































New HIV infections (’000) HIV prevalence (%)
The model suggests that, given the rates of ANC HIV prevalence, new HIV
infections probably started rising from 1975, peaking in 1983 at approximately
211 000 new infections during that year. The adult HIV incidence rate (i.e. the
proportion of uninfected adults aged 15-49 that contract the virus during a given
year) peaked in 1984 at 4.0%.1 As a result of rapidly rising HIV incidence, the
1The number of new infections and and incidence rates can peak in different years because of












infected adult population and adult prevalence rate (i.e. the proportion of the
population that is HIV-positive) rose rapidly, lagging a few years behind incid-
ence. Total infections and adult HIV prevalence eventually peaked in 1989 and
1988 respectively, at approximately 1 418 716 HIV-positive adults and 20.0%.2
After 1984, incidence declined very rapidly, to 1.8% in 1990 and a mere 0.5% in
2004. HIV prevalence declined after 1988, reaching 10.1% in 1999 and 6.6% in
2004. Since the model was calibrated using a population seroprevalence survey,
the predicted prevalence in 2004 is very close to the measured prevalence repor-
ted in the UHSBS. This decline in prevalence represented the visible ‘success’ in
Uganda’s struggle against HIV/AIDS. AIDS deaths started rising around 1980
and hovered around 100 000 deaths per year from 1991 to 2000 (peaking in 1995
at about 112 000 deaths). Yearly deaths had declined to just more than 75 000 by
2004. Cumulative AIDS deaths reached a million in 1996 and 1.8 million deaths
in 2004.












Table B.1: Epidemiological model for Uganda (1974-2004)
Year New inf. Inc. rate Total HIV+ Prev. rate Deaths Cum. deaths
1974 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0
1975 885 0.02% 885 0.02% 0 0
1976 5 485 0.12% 6 346 0.13% 9 9
1977 15 661 0.32% 21 833 0.44% 68 77
1978 38 208 0.77% 59 442 1.15% 259 336
1979 74 543 1.46% 132 325 2.49% 780 1 116
1980 119 486 2.31% 248 004 4.54% 1 940 3 056
1981 163 310 3.13% 403 841 7.15% 4 142 7 198
1982 196 229 3.74% 587 064 10.08% 7 829 15 027
1983 211 187 4.03% 777 975 12.97% 13 398 28 425
1984 210 464 4.03% 959 233 15.55% 21 075 49 500
1985 197 954 3.80% 1 117 222 17.63% 30 823 80 323
1986 179 090 3.43% 1 244 076 19.03% 42 271 122 594
1987 157 800 2.98% 1 336 454 19.81% 54 762 177 356
1988 136 911 2.53% 1 393 933 20.03% 67 440 244 796
1989 118 156 2.12% 1 418 716 19.80% 79 419 324 215
1990 105 158 1.83% 1 418 303 19.25% 89 968 414 183
1991 96 178 1.62% 1 399 038 18.48% 98 595 512 778
1992 89 556 1.45% 1 365 924 17.56% 105 036 617 814
1993 81 734 1.27% 1 320 382 16.53% 109 251 727 065
1994 74 136 1.11% 1 265 128 15.42% 111 362 838 427
1995 68 163 0.98% 1 204 013 14.27% 111 621 950 048
1996 63 258 0.87% 1 139 962 13.13% 110 352 1 060 400
1997 61 135 0.81% 1 077 177 12.05% 107 864 1 168 264
1998 60 202 0.77% 1 018 091 11.04% 104 490 1 272 754
1999 58 858 0.72% 963 090 10.12% 100 521 1 373 275
2000 56 645 0.66% 911 528 9.27% 96 179 1 469 454
2001 54 308 0.61% 863 395 8.49% 91 593 1 561 047
2002 52 240 0.56% 819 539 7.79% 86 317 1 647 364
2003 50 320 0.52% 780 085 7.15% 80 797 1 728 161












Figure B.3: Detail of epidemiological model: prevalence rate,


























































































































Figure B.4: Detail of epidemiological model: new infections, HIV+
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Conducted by the aids2031 Leadership Working Group and the United Nations Non-governmental 
Liaison Service (NGLS) 
What is aids2031? 
"aids2031", is a "think tank"Ïa project hoping to shift the global response to HIV from a short-term, 
reactive, emergency response to a building long-term, proactive, strategic framework that would mitigate the
consequences of the HIV epidemic. 
aids2031 is about making recommendations which can be implemented now, to plot a course for the 
epidemic so that we might reach 2031Ï50 years from the first reported cases of AIDSÏwith everyone on 
treatment who needs to be on treatment; with no new infections in that year; and with the consequences of 
HIV for individuals, families and societies thoroughly minimized. 
How aids2031 works 
aids2031 has convened nine working groups of stakeholders in the HIV epidemic, including economists, 
epidemiologists, and biomedical, social, and political scientists, to make recommendations toward a long-
term strategic framework to confront and stop the epidemic. 
While science offers us understanding, tools, and technology to prevent and treat HIV, it is leaders who 
should demand the rights of people to access information, prevention, and treatment. Whether they are 
from grassroots organizations, the business sector, government, or the media, leaders have struck down 
laws that discriminate against people with HIV, secured the funds to treat thousands of people, and 
mobilized citizens to demand government action on AIDS. 
Progress in the AIDS movement has always relied on leaders, and this is why we need your opinions, your 
insights and your recommendations now as we prepare a long-range plan to strategically guide the future 
response to the HIV epidemic.  
For more information, visit the aids2031 website 
What is the purpose of the survey? 
While science offers us understanding, tools and technology to prevent and treat HIV, it is leaders who have
rolled out services and secured the rights of people to access information, prevention, and treatment. 
Whether they are from grassroots organizations, multinational NGOs, the business sector, government, or 
the media, progress in the AIDS movement has always relied on leaders. This is why we need your 
opinions, your insights and your recommendations now, as we prepare a long-range framework to 
strategically guide the future response to the HIV epidemic. 
The answers you provide will help the Leadership Working Group to formulate recommendations that will 
ultimately form part of the aids2031 final report, "An Agenda for the Future". The results of the survey will 
also be published separately as a free-standing report.  
Please take the time to give us your insights on the future of the global response to HIV.
While many of the questions ask for your opinion, our primary interest is in the perspective and views of 
your organization. Wherever possible, try to reflect organizational positions, or your best approximation of 
consensus in the organization, in your answers. 
Many questions in this survey can be answered from either a local, regional, national, or global perspective. 
Please formulate your response to match the description of your organization as provided in question 
number A4. 
aids2031 Civil Society Online Survey 
About this survey
Instructions
You do not have to answer every question: if you do not know the answer to or do not wish to 
answer a question, simply leave it blank. You are also not required to complete the entire 
questionnaire in one session. After you have submitted your email address, the system will send you












Thank your for participating in this survey.  
Please note that while most of the data collected as part of this survey will be used only in aggregate (and 
therefore in anonymous) form, it may be useful to present some data in a way which will allow the answers 
of individual organisations to be deduced. If you are concerned about this, mark the appropriate box below 
and your answers will be excluded from any such analyses. We encourage you to only impose this 
restriction if truly necessary.  
 
 
Please tick where appropriate:
My answers may be publicly attributed to my 
organization
gfedc
Please keep my answers confidential gfedc



















Please use an email address under your direct control, so that we can send you a link that allows you to retrieve your 



























A2. Please provide your organization's details
Organization's name:
Website:
I work in the: 













A3. My organization is (or is a subsidiary of) a(n)
Government agency nmlkj
Business or business organization nmlkj
International/multilateral agency nmlkj
Bilateral donor organization nmlkj
Charitable foundation nmlkj
Trade union/labour organization nmlkj
Faith-based organization nmlkj
Network of people living with HIV nmlkj
Multinational Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) nmlkj























A4. My organization primarily works (select one)
In a village/town/city/region within one country nmlkj
Throughout a single country nmlkj




A5.1 My organization has _ employees
1-5 nmlkj 6-20 nmlkj 21-100 nmlkj 101-250 nmlkj 251-1000 nmlkj 1000+ nmlkj
 
A5.2 My organization has _ volunteers (at least 10 work hours per week)












Medical services (excluding HAART) nmlkj
Medical services (including HAART) nmlkj




















Medical services (excluding HAART)gfedc
















National AIDS Plan fundinggfedc
Other government funding (non-NAP)gfedc
International Development Assistance Funding (IDAF)gfedc



















Other foreign government sourcegfedc
The Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malariagfedc
Other multilateral institutionsgfedc
Gates Foundationgfedc
Other foreign charitable foundationsgfedc

































B1. Which of the following areas in the global HIV/AIDS response do you consider 
to be the highest priorities at present in order to ensure a successful long-term 
response? (By placing numbers next to each item, rank them in order of priority.)
Combating stigma and discrimination against people living with
HIV
Sustaining and increasing financing for HIV/AIDS programs
Strengthening health systems
Combating stigma and discrimination against most-at-risk
populations (MSM, CSWs, drug users, etc.)
Services tailored to most-at-risk populations (MSM, CSWs, drug
users, etc.)




Measures to expand access to generic production of essential
medicines, technologies and diagnostics (preferential pricing,
related intellectual property issues, etc .)
Strengthening HIV prevention campaigns
Improving programme monitoring and evaluation
Strengthening civil society organizations who work on HIV/AIDS


















































C1. (By placing numbers next to each item arrange the following in order of 
priority) Civil society's primary task in the field of HIV/AIDS is to:
Provide services (e.g. treatment, prevention, care, support) to
people living with HIV / vulnerable groups
Raise awareness of HIV/AIDS and associated risks in the general
population
Conduct advocacy on behalf of people living with HIV / vulnerable
groups













C2. Indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following statements by 
selecting the appropriate option. Note: answer with respect to the country or 
area where your organization is active
My organization is able to effectively discharge its functions
My organization receives adequate funding
Government is susceptible to civil society pressure
Funders of Civil Society Organizations (CSO) are willing to
support militant activism
CSOs that are perceived as critical and independent are sidelined
or otherwise punished
Political leaders are committed to the fight against HIV/AIDS
CSOs have been successfully discharging a "watchdog" function













C3.1 Does your organization work with and/or obtain support from an 
international network of activists/CSOs?
yes nmlkj no nmlkj
If you answered Yes above, in which respects is this network important? (Mark 
all that apply.)
Exchanging informationgfedc
Joint mobilization (e.g. global days of action)gfedc
Financial resourcesgfedc
Exerting influence on multinational entitiesgfedc
Exerting influence on foreign governmentsgfedc
Exerting influence on domestic governmentgfedc
Other (please specify):
 



















































International Treatment Preparedness Coalitiongfedc
AIDS & Rights Alliance Southern Africagfedc




Regional Network of People Living with HIV/AIDSgfedc
International Council of AIDS Service Organizations (ICASO)gfedc
Global AIDS Alliancegfedc
International AIDS Alliancegfedc
International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS (ICW)gfedc
The Global Fundgfedc
UNAIDSgfedc





















C4 Please evaluate to what extent each of the following harm the ability of your 
organization to effectively perform its functions
Lack of adequate funding
Lack of appropriately skilled professional staff
Lack of skills and experience in advocacy/activism
Lack of skills in monitoring and evaluation
Funders that discourage critical advocacy or militant mobilization
Difficulty registering an organization with the government
Onerous reporting requirements of funders
Other onerous administrative requirements






C5.1 What do you consider the main challenges, top priorities and key 








































C5.2 What do you consider the main challenges, top priorities and key 
interventions with respect to strengthening civil society? (e.g. capacity building, 
knowledge transfer, organizational development, etc.)
5
6
C5.3 What do you consider the main challenges, top priorities and key 






































D1. My organization does significant work targeting the following population 
group(s) (Tick all that apply)





Refugees or asylum seekersgfedc
Internally displaced personsgfedc
Members of indigenous groupsgfedc
Migrant workersgfedc


























D2. In the area where you work, which of these group(s) are neglected in the 
AIDS response, and to what extent?





Refugees or asylum seekers
Internally displaced persons
Members of indigenous groups
Migrant workers



















































D3.1 Are there laws already in place or movements underway in your country / 
region to criminalize HIV transmission or to criminzalize "behaviours associated 
with at risk populations" (i.e. same sex behaviour, drug use, sex work, etc.)?




D3.2 If yes, is your organization involved in efforts to overturn or prevent these 
laws?





D3.3 What are the major obstacles you see to prevent or overturn these laws 














D4. Please evaluate to what extent each of the following harm HIV 
prevention, treatment and care in the area where your work:
Criminalization of HIV transmission
Discrimination on the basis of HIV status
Inadequate legal protection of confidentiality
Criminalization of same-sex sexual behavior
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or sexual
practices
Discrimination on the basis of gender identity/designation
Discrimination against and/or low social status of women/girls
Criminalization of drug use
Criminalization of sex work













D5. Thinking of the vulnerable population groups listed in D1 and your 
answers in D4, which types of discrimination are most prevalent? (Tick no 
more than two)
Social ostracization in society generallygfedc
Social ostracization in the familygfedc
Discrimination in health facilitiesgfedc
Discrimination in educational facilitiesgfedc
Official (governmental) discriminationgfedc
Police harassmentgfedc
Discrimination in employment practicesgfedc

















































Brief description explaining the content of this section goes here 













E1. Indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following statements by 
selecting the appropriate option
Current prevention programmes are sufficient
Treatment programs are taking resources away from prevention
programs
Prevention interventions should be targeted to specific most-at-
risk populations
Prevention campaigns should focus on promoting abstinence
Prevention campaigns should focus on partner reduction
Prevention campaigns should focus on condom distribution
Harm reduction programs (incl. needle exchange) and substitution
therapy for injecting drug users should be more widely rolled out
















E2. Please evaluate to what extent each of the following contribute to HIV 
transmission in the area where your work
Lack of access to HIV testing facilities
Reluctance to test for HIV
Inadequate or absent interventions targeting Men who have sex
with Men (MSM)
Inadequate or absent interventions targeting sex workers
Inadequate or absent interventions targeting [injecting] drug users
Inadequate or absent interventions targeting other vulnerable
populations
Inadequate or absent sex education in schools
Lack of access to condoms
Lack of access to safe injecting equipment
Lack of access to harm reduction and / or treatment services for
drug users.
Lack of access to antiretroviral [incentive to test].
Lack of access to PMTCT












E3. Do you believe the following will be successfully developed/implemented and 












































































































F1. Indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following statements by 
selecting the appropriate option 
The government is showing sufficient commitment to rolling out
universal access to HAART and related services
There is sufficient civil society advocacy on universal access to
HAART and related services
Pharmaceutical patents result in unaffordable prices for
antiretrovirals
There is sufficient investment in developing new treatments for TB
and other opportunistic infections
There is sufficient investment in developing affordable treatments
for hepatitis C
Countries are making sufficient use of flexibilities allowed under
the TRIPS agreement (e.g. compulsory licences)
More local production of generic drugs is needed to ensure
universal access to HAART and related services
There is sufficient civil society advocacy on trade policy and
intellectual property rights issues
There is sufficient civil society advocacy on funding for treatment,
care and support services











F2. Do you believe the following will be achieved within the next 10-15 years?
Universal access to HAART in the country/region where we work
Universal access to HAART world-wide
Better treatments for Hepatitis C co-infection
Better treatments for TB (incl MDR and XDR TB)
Sufficient international funding of treatment, care and support
services in poor countries
Sufficient local funding of treatment, care and support services in












F3. Please evaluate to what extent each of the following impede access to 
comprehensive treatment, care and support in the are where you work.
Unavailability of first-line antiretroviral drugs
Unavailability of second-line antiretroviral drugs
Unavailability of third-line and salvage antiretroviral drugs
Unavailability of HIV diagnostic & monitoring tests
Unavailability of TB diagnostic & monitoring tests
Unavailability of other diagnostic & monitoring tests
Cost of first-line antiretroviral drugs
























































































Cost of drugs for OIs/coinfections (e.g. TB or Hep C)
Cost of diagnostics and laboratory monitoring
Patents on antiretroviral drugs
Patents on other drugs
Patents on diagnostics and other technologies
Unavailability of generic antiretrovirals
Unavailability of generic drugs for OIs/coinfections (e.g. TB or Hep
C)
Lack of local drug mangufacturing capacity
Failure to integrate HIV and other healthcare services
Too few / lack of access to healthcare facilities
Patients not testing/knowing their HIV status
Reluctance to access healthcare services
Insufficient government funding for treatment & care
Insufficient international funding for treatment & care
Shortage of qualified medical staff
Shortage of appropriately qualified and skilled managers / other
professional staff
Drug stock-outs / supply management problems
Lack of treatment/services in prisons, labour camps, etc.
Lack of skills/capacity in procurement and supply management
Unavailability of substitution therapy for drug users
Unavailability of TB treatment or failures in TB treatment
programme
Unavailability of treatment for Opportunistic Infections
Unavailability of hepatitis C treatment
Side effects or toxicity from antiretroviral drugs
Lack of governmental commitment to HIV programmes




F4. What do you consider the main challenges and priorities with respect to 

















































































G1. "Indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following statements by 
selecting the appropriate option 
AIDS-specific programs and health-system strengthening
compete for international resources
The government spends sufficient resources on health
Spending should be re-allocated from AIDS programs to general
health spending and/or other diseases
Spending on AIDS programs strengthens the overall health
system
There is sufficient civil society advocacy on health system
strengthening and related issues
Shortages of skilled medical personnel is the main impediment to
strengthening the health system
Shortages of skilled management and other technical personnel
is the main impediment to strengthening the health system
The health system can be strengthened through measures to
facilitate knowledge transfer from Northern (developed) countries
to Southern (developing) countries
Adding related services (e.g. for TB, malaria, maternal health,
drug treatment or hepatitis C) to HIV programs will strenghten










Please tick where appropriate:
I want to receive a copy of the report for the 
aids2031 Civil Society Online Survey 
gfedc
I want to receive a copy of the final report of 
aids2031, "An Agenda for the Future" 
gfedc
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